io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop
PYPI · FCOP-MCP
FCoP Core adapter with 25 canonical tools and 6 read-only resources for durable agent work.
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 55% of PyPI servers
Category Project Management
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security40
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- CVE check failed: a known medium-severity CVE affects fastmcp 3.2.4, a direct dependency. A fixed version is available. View diagnostics → Fail
- Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 3 of 57 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 55 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1658 tokens (~53/item across 31 items; 25 tools + 6 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "merge_branches" implies "merge" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 26 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (15)
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this package. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Malware scan in Supply Chain SecurityMalware scan not yet available for this package.
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 20 Nov 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 18 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 17 Nov 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 16 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 15 Nov 26 +8
- Known CVEs: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Dependency health: unverified → 0.98 ▲ functional
- 14 Nov 26 −8
- Known CVEs: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Dependency health: 0.98 → unverified ▼ functional
- 12 Nov 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/fcop-mcp@4.0.5
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | Known build tool | hatchling.build |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Vulnerabilities 1 finding
| ID | CVE | Severity | Vector | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →
Dependencies 57 packages
| Packages resolved | 57 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 2 |
| No linked repository | 1 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
approve_task ~70
Request Core T4 review to done using independently validated review and authorization evidence.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| authorization_ref | string | yes | – |
| profile_ref | string | yes | – |
| report_ref | string | yes | – |
| review_ref | string | yes | – |
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
archive_task ~67
Request Core T7 done to archive; Core enforces authorization and family convergence.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| authorization_ref | string | yes | – |
| family_digest | – | – | – |
| profile_ref | string | yes | – |
| review_ref | – | – | – |
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
claim_task ~39
Request Core T2 inbox to active; actor records attribution and grants no authority.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_branch ~83
Create a branch TASK through Core T1 with an explicit branch_of relation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | – |
| operation_id | string | yes | – |
| priority | string | – | – |
| recipient | string | yes | – |
| root_task_id | string | yes | – |
| sender | string | yes | – |
| subject | string | yes | – |
| workspace_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_task ~112
Create a TASK using Core T1 and its workspace-scoped operation identity. Repeated requests retain Core idempotency semantics.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | – |
| branch_of | – | – | – |
| operation_id | string | yes | – |
| parent | – | – | – |
| priority | string | – | – |
| recipient | string | yes | – |
| references | – | – | – |
| risk_level | – | – | – |
| sender | string | yes | – |
| subject | string | yes | – |
| thread_key | – | – | – |
| workspace_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
init_workspace ~43
Create only a canonical FCoP 4.0 workspace at the server-bound root. An optional explicit profile is a reference, never executable authority.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| profile | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
inspect_family ~30
Read Core family membership, REPORT heads, digest and convergence readiness.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| root_task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
inspect_task ~29
Read Core lifecycle, current attempt and transition evidence for a TASK.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
inspect_workspace ~23
Inspect protocol identity, envelopes, lifecycle, families and recovery facts without repair.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_issues ~49
List validated canonical ISSUE facts, with deterministic filtering and pagination.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | – | – | – |
| offset | integer | – | – |
| sender | – | – | – |
| severity | – | – | – |
| subject_ref | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_reports ~59
List REPORTs through Core, including exact attempt and head selection semantics.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attempt_id | – | – | – |
| head_only | boolean | – | – |
| limit | – | – | – |
| offset | integer | – | – |
| sender | – | – | – |
| subject_ref | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_reviews ~53
List validated canonical REVIEW facts; listing grants no authorization.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| decision | – | – | – |
| limit | – | – | – |
| offset | integer | – | – |
| review_kind | – | – | – |
| sender | – | – | – |
| subject_ref | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_tasks ~59
List validated canonical TASK facts, optionally filtered by stage or relations.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| branch_of | – | – | – |
| limit | – | – | – |
| offset | integer | – | – |
| parent | – | – | – |
| recipient | – | – | – |
| sender | – | – | – |
| stage | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mark_human_approved ~124
Ask Core to append independent authorization evidence. Caller-supplied approver text alone is never authority; expires_at must be explicit.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approver | string | yes | – |
| attempt_id | – | – | – |
| comment | string | – | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| expires_at | – | yes | – |
| family_digest | – | – | – |
| from_stage | string | yes | – |
| issued_at | string | yes | – |
| issuer_proof | – | – | – |
| profile_ref | string | yes | – |
| review_id | string | yes | – |
| to_stage | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
merge_branches ~100
Record the caller's convergence decision atomically in Core; never choose winners or archive the root.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| branch_report_heads | object | yes | – |
| conclusion | string | yes | – |
| conflict_resolution | string | yes | – |
| expected_family_digest | string | yes | – |
| operation_id | string | yes | – |
| recipient | string | yes | – |
| root_task_id | string | yes | – |
| sender | string | yes | – |
| workspace_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
read_report ~26
Read a canonical REPORT through Core identity resolution.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| filename_or_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
read_review ~29
Read a validated REVIEW from its canonical bucket without changing its decision.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| review_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
read_task ~27
Read a canonical TASK by its typed identity through Core.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
reject_task ~71
Request Core T5 review to active; Core validates evidence and advances the attempt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| authorization_ref | string | yes | – |
| profile_ref | string | yes | – |
| report_ref | string | yes | – |
| review_ref | string | yes | – |
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
reopen_task ~61
Request Core T6 done to active with explicit reopen evidence and authorization.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| authorization_ref | string | yes | – |
| profile_ref | string | yes | – |
| review_ref | string | yes | – |
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_task ~46
Request Core T3 active to review with the explicit current-attempt REPORT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| report_ref | string | yes | – |
| task_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
validate_workspace ~27
Deterministically validate canonical workspace facts through Core validators; never repair or consult host/runtime state.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
write_issue ~68
Append a Core ISSUE with explicit workspace and subject identity.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | – |
| recipient | string | yes | – |
| references | – | – | – |
| sender | string | yes | – |
| severity | string | yes | – |
| subject_ref | string | yes | – |
| workspace_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
write_report ~91
Append a Core REPORT for the explicit TASK attempt; reporting does not accept or archive work.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attempt_id | string | yes | – |
| body | string | yes | – |
| recipient | string | yes | – |
| references | – | – | – |
| report_kind | string | – | – |
| result | string | yes | – |
| sender | string | yes | – |
| subject_ref | string | yes | – |
| workspace_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
write_review ~142
Append a typed Core REVIEW. Authority is evaluated only by trusted startup Profile evaluators.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attempt_id | – | – | – |
| authorization_ref | – | – | – |
| authorization_scope | – | – | – |
| body | string | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| expires_at | – | – | – |
| family_digest | – | – | – |
| issued_at | – | – | – |
| issuer_proof | – | – | – |
| operation_kind | – | – | – |
| profile_ref | – | – | – |
| recipient | string | yes | – |
| references | – | – | – |
| review_kind | string | yes | – |
| sender | string | yes | – |
| subject_ref | string | yes | – |
| transition | – | – | – |
| workspace_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server?
io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx fcop-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · fcop-mcp
claude mcp add joinwell52-ai-fcop -- uvx fcop-mcp
What is the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server?
io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop. FCoP Core adapter with 25 canonical tools and 6 read-only resources for durable agent work. This page covers its PyPI package (fcop-mcp).
Is the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server safe to use?
io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop scores 63 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 1 known advisory against it as of 21 November 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server expose?
io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop exposes 25 tools: init_workspace, inspect_workspace, validate_workspace, create_task, claim_task, and 20 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,528 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server still maintained?
io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server under?
io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 15 checks on io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop, covering Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health, Source repository and 11 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.github.joinwell52-AI/fcop: Malware scan. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a PyPI package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.