deSEC MCP by usefulapi
REMOTE · DESEC.USEFULAPI.IO
Read deSEC domains, DNSSEC keys, zone files and RRsets; create or replace one DNS record set.
Available components
Last scanned (6 hours ago)
Scores higher than 46% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 17 Oct 2026.
Category Cloud Infrastructure
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security78
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port redirected somewhere other than https, so enforcement is unproven. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint redirected instead of responding directly. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1479 tokens (~211/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
- Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Oct 26 +3
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- The server now declares the “prompts” capability functional
- First check of Schema quality: 100 functional
- New prompt “getting_started” functional
- Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.1.0 functional
- 13 Oct 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Oct 26 60
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 17 Oct 2026 · Probed https://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=usefulapi.io | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 13 Sept 2026 | 12 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d9be3287b0fde9630e825ba1f79bff3f |
| SANs: usefulapi.io, *.usefulapi.io | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of desec.usefulapi.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | present | 57355 | 8 | Verified |
| usefulapi.io. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 302 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer realm="OAuth", resource_metadata="https://desec.usefulapi.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
Bearer realm="OAuth", resource_metadata="https://desec.usefulapi.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://desec.usefulapi.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://desec.usefulapi.io |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp | Redirected | 302 | https://usefulapi.io/desec/ |
| http (plaintext) | http://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp | Inconclusive | 302 | http://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
desec_create_rrset Create RRset ~313
WRITE: create ONE new RRset (a set of DNS records of one type at one name) in a domain. It goes live in DNS immediately and a wrong record can take a site or mail offline. Fails if an RRset with this subname and type already exists (use desec_replace_rrset for that) or if a CNAME would conflict with other records. Never touches the apex NS or DNSSEC records and cannot delete anything. Subject to deSEC's write limits (15/min, 300/day per domain). POST /domains/{name}/rrsets/.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain name in this deSEC account, e.g. example.com (see desec_list_domains). |
| records | array | yes | Record contents in zone-file format, at least one (an empty list would delete the RRset and is refused). Names need a trailing dot ("10 mx.example.com."), TXT needs quotes ("\"v=spf1 -all\""). |
| subname | string | – | Subname relative to the domain: "www", "_443._tcp.www", "*" for a wildcard. Empty or "@" = the zone apex. Never the full name. |
| ttl | integer | yes | TTL in seconds, at most 86400. Not below the domain's minimum_ttl (usually 3600): deSEC rejects lower values. |
| type | string | yes | Record type (uppercase). DNSSEC types and SOA are managed by deSEC and cannot be written. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
desec_export_zonefile Export zonefile ~86
The whole zone as a plain-text BIND-format zonefile (all RRsets except DNSSEC types). Handy as a backup before changing records. Counts as an expensive deSEC operation (300/min). GET /domains/{name}/zonefile/.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain name in this deSEC account, e.g. example.com (see desec_list_domains). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
desec_get_domain Get domain ~77
One domain with its DNSSEC key material: the DNSKEY and the DS records to publish at the registrar for the chain of trust, plus minimum TTL and publication times. GET /domains/{name}/.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain name in this deSEC account, e.g. example.com (see desec_list_domains). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
desec_get_rrset Get RRset ~154
One RRset by subname and type, e.g. the A records of "www" or the MX records of the apex. GET /domains/{name}/rrsets/{subname}/{type}/.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain name in this deSEC account, e.g. example.com (see desec_list_domains). |
| subname | string | – | Subname relative to the domain: "www", "_443._tcp.www", "*" for a wildcard. Empty or "@" = the zone apex. Never the full name. |
| type | string | yes | Record type, e.g. A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, TXT, CAA, SRV, TLSA. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
desec_list_domains List domains ~140
List the DNS domains (zones) in this deSEC account, newest first, with creation and last-published times and minimum TTL. DNSSEC keys are omitted here (see desec_get_domain). Use owns_qname to find which of your domains is responsible for a DNS name (for example before adding a record for www.dev.example.net). Up to 500 per page. GET /domains/.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | string | – | Opaque cursor from a previous reply's next_cursor. Omit for the first page. |
| owns_qname | string | – | Only the domain that is authoritative for this DNS name (the longest matching zone you own). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
desec_list_rrsets List RRsets ~165
List the DNS records of a domain as RRsets (all records of one name and type, sharing one TTL), newest first. Filter by type and/or subname. Up to 500 per page. GET /domains/{name}/rrsets/.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | string | – | Opaque cursor from a previous reply's next_cursor. Omit for the first page. |
| domain | string | yes | Domain name in this deSEC account, e.g. example.com (see desec_list_domains). |
| subname | string | – | Only RRsets at this subname ("" or "@" = the zone apex). Omit to include every subname. |
| type | string | – | Only RRsets of this type, e.g. A, MX, TXT. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
desec_replace_rrset Replace RRset ~329
WRITE (overwrites): set ONE RRset to exactly the given TTL and records, creating it if it does not exist and REPLACING all its current records if it does. It goes live in DNS immediately; a wrong value can take a site or mail offline. The previous RRset is read first and returned as `previous` so the change can be undone with another call. An empty record list is refused (this tool never deletes), and the apex NS and DNSSEC records cannot be changed. Subject to deSEC's write limits (15/min, 300/day per domain). PUT /domains/{name}/rrsets/ with a one-element array.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain name in this deSEC account, e.g. example.com (see desec_list_domains). |
| records | array | yes | Record contents in zone-file format, at least one (an empty list would delete the RRset and is refused). Names need a trailing dot ("10 mx.example.com."), TXT needs quotes ("\"v=spf1 -all\""). |
| subname | string | – | Subname relative to the domain: "www", "_443._tcp.www", "*" for a wildcard. Empty or "@" = the zone apex. Never the full name. |
| ttl | integer | yes | TTL in seconds, at most 86400. Not below the domain's minimum_ttl (usually 3600): deSEC rejects lower values. |
| type | string | yes | Record type (uppercase). DNSSEC types and SOA are managed by deSEC and cannot be written. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the deSEC MCP by usefulapi server?
deSEC MCP by usefulapi is a hosted endpoint at https://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · desec.usefulapi.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-usefulapi-desec 'https://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp'
What is the deSEC MCP by usefulapi server?
deSEC MCP by usefulapi is listed in the public MCP registry as io.usefulapi/desec. Read deSEC domains, DNSSEC keys, zone files and RRsets; create or replace one DNS record set. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://desec.usefulapi.io/mcp).
Is the deSEC MCP by usefulapi server safe to use?
deSEC MCP by usefulapi scores 64 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the deSEC MCP by usefulapi server expose?
deSEC MCP by usefulapi exposes 7 tools: desec_list_domains, desec_get_domain, desec_export_zonefile, desec_list_rrsets, desec_get_rrset, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,264 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the deSEC MCP by usefulapi server require authentication?
Yes. deSEC MCP by usefulapi asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the deSEC MCP by usefulapi server still maintained?
deSEC MCP by usefulapi is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 17 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.