Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for security agents
REMOTE · LATTICE.NAMIQ.IO
CVE, KEV, MITRE ATT&CK, CWE and detection graph for AI agents; every link names its source.
Available components
Last scanned (10 hours ago)
Scores higher than 87% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1915 tokens (~273/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 4 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 2 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 84 to 88.
- 31 Oct 26 +2
- Judged manipulation: unverified → pass ▲ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “graph_lookup” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “graph_path” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 29 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 71 to 74.
- 27 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 64 to 68.
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 58 to 61.
- 23 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 51 to 54.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://lattice.namiq.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=namiq.io | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 8 Oct 2026 | 6 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | aa71177aee18908c0e6f7c17e636f40f |
| SANs: namiq.io, *.namiq.io | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of lattice.namiq.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | DS published | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| namiq.io. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://lattice.namiq.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://lattice.namiq.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://lattice.namiq.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
graph_lookup Look up an id ~200
Start here when a CVE, ATT&CK technique or CWE id appears in your task. Find nodes by exact external id, e.g. CVE-2021-44228, T1059.001, CWE-79. Returns each match with its source (a CVE has a kev node if CISA lists it as exploited, and an nvd node) and a uid for graph_node and graph_neighbors. An empty items list means the graph has no such id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Exact external id, for example CVE-2021-44228, T1059.001 or CWE-79. Case-insensitive; prefixes and free text do not match (use graph_search for a prefix). |
| label | – | – | Optional node label (type) to restrict the answer to, for example CVE, Technique or Detection. The valid labels are listed by graph_meta; an unknown label is refused with the valid ones. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
graph_meta Describe the graph ~174
Describe the graph this server reads, without looking up any fact in it. Returns the snapshot id and creation time, the schema version with notable schema changes, the node labels (types), the relationship verbs, the contributing sources, and the path templates that graph_path accepts. When to call it: once at the start of a session, to learn the valid values for the label argument of graph_lookup, graph_search and graph_neighbors, the verb values for graph_neighbors and the template names for graph_path; and when you report a finding, to cite the snapshot id it came from. What it is not for: it returns no CVEs, techniques, groups or detections. Use graph_lookup to find those. It takes no arguments, only reads, and gives the same answer to every caller of a snapshot.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
graph_neighbors List linked nodes ~250
Directly connected nodes with each link's verb, source, confidence and whether it is declared or inferred. Declared and cross-source links come first. If the answer has truncated: true, pass its next_cursor as cursor to continue.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | – | Continuation token: pass the next_cursor from a previous answer that had truncated: true to get the next page. Omit it for the first page. |
| direction | string | – | Which links to follow: out (from this node), in (to this node) or both. |
| label | – | – | Optional node label (type) to restrict the answer to, for example CVE, Technique or Detection. The valid labels are listed by graph_meta; an unknown label is refused with the valid ones. |
| limit | integer | – | Maximum links to return. The server clamps it to its own maximum; the answer reports applied_limit and limit_clamped. |
| uid | string | yes | The uid of the node whose links to list, from graph_lookup, graph_search or graph_node. |
| verb | – | – | Optional upper-case relationship verb to keep, for example EXPLOITS, DETECTS or USES. The valid verbs are listed by graph_meta. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
graph_node Read a node ~114
One node's properties (long text is clipped). uid comes from graph_lookup or graph_search. On a kev node: date_added, due_date, known_ransomware_use (Known or Unknown; Unknown means not recorded), required_action, vendor_project, product. On an nvd node: description and metadata (cvss_score, affected_products). A cvss_score of 0 means not scored yet.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| uid | string | yes | The uid of a node, as returned by graph_lookup, graph_search or graph_neighbors. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
graph_notices Get licence notices ~225
Return the licence and attribution notices for the data sources behind an answer. Other tools list notice ids with their answers. Pass those ids here to get, for each notice, its title, what it applies to, the obligation it places on you (for example attribution wording or a share-alike condition) and the notice text. Long texts are cut and flagged text_truncated, with text_url pointing to the full text. When to call it: before you quote, republish or build on anything the graph returned, and then quote what the obligation requires. Unknown ids are reported in unknown rather than failing. What it is not for: it returns no security facts, and it is source licence information, not legal advice. It only reads and gives the same answer each time for a snapshot.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ids | – | – | Notice ids to fetch, as listed in the notice list of other answers, at most 10 per call. Omit to get the notices the server holds (up to 10). Ids it does not know come back in the unknown list. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
graph_path Answer a multi-hop question ~256
Answer a multi-hop question from an external id in one call instead of several lookups: for a CVE, the attack techniques it enables and the detections and response procedures for them. Needs a key; without one the error says how to get one. Templates: cve-context (start: CVE), cve-to-defense (start: CVE), technique-coverage (start: Technique), weakness-chain (start: Weakness), actor-ttps (start: ThreatActor/Malware/Campaign). Use cve-to-defense when asked what to detect or do about a CVE: it gives the techniques the CVE enables and the detections and procedures for them.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | External id to start from; it must be of a kind the template starts from (see the template list in the tool description). |
| label | – | – | Optional node label (type) to restrict the answer to, for example CVE, Technique or Detection. The valid labels are listed by graph_meta; an unknown label is refused with the valid ones. |
| template | string | yes | Name of the path template, one of: cve-context, cve-to-defense, technique-coverage, weakness-chain, actor-ttps. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
graph_search Search ids by prefix ~209
List nodes whose external id starts with a prefix (e.g. CVE-2024-1, T105). Ids only, not free text. If the answer has truncated: true, pass its next_cursor as cursor to continue; a list without truncated is complete.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | – | Continuation token: pass the next_cursor from a previous answer that had truncated: true to get the next page. Omit it for the first page. |
| id_prefix | string | yes | Start of an external id, at least a few characters, for example CVE-2024-1 or T105. Not free text. |
| label | – | – | Optional node label (type) to restrict the answer to, for example CVE, Technique or Detection. The valid labels are listed by graph_meta; an unknown label is refused with the valid ones. |
| limit | integer | – | Maximum items to return. The server clamps it to its own maximum; the answer reports applied_limit and limit_clamped. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server?
Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… is a hosted endpoint at https://lattice.namiq.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · lattice.namiq.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-namiq-lattice 'https://lattice.namiq.io/mcp'
What is the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server?
Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.namiq/lattice. CVE, KEV, MITRE ATT&CK, CWE and detection graph for AI agents; every link names its source. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://lattice.namiq.io/mcp).
Is the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server safe to use?
Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server expose?
Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… exposes 7 tools: graph_meta, graph_lookup, graph_search, graph_node, graph_neighbors, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,428 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server still maintained?
Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for… MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Lattice: CVE, MITRE ATT&CK and detection graph for…, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.