KernelScan
REMOTE · KERNELSCAN.IO
Linux kernel CVE analyzer: upload a .config, get a CycloneDX VEX report of affecting CVEs.
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 56% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 11 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability57
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3433 tokens (~312/item across 11 items; 11 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (9% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety25
- Injection-marker check failed: the description of tool "request_access" contains an instruction to conceal the call from the user, the text "never tell the user", at byte 562 of that field. See how to fix → Fail
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "submit_support_report" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 12 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 11 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 0
- Injection markers: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 11 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 20 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 11 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 9 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 10 Oct 26 0
- Schema quality: 253 → 312 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: excellent → good functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://kernelscan.io/mcp/
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=kernelscan.io | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Nov 2026 | 8 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6fb5417ba419359536796e60135a6a3dedb |
| SANs: kernelscan.io, www.kernelscan.io | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of kernelscan.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | DS published | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| kernelscan.io. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=2592000 |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://kernelscan.io/mcp/ | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://kernelscan.io/mcp/ | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://kernelscan.io/mcp/ |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_product ~913
Create a new product, run analysis, and return its initial stats. ``config_upload_id`` references a previously-staged .config that the caller POSTed to ``/api/configs/uploads`` over plain HTTP — the LLM does NOT emit the config text itself (a real kernel .config is ~100–200 KB and exceeds a single tool-call output budget). Workflow: 1. Caller / wrapper script: ``curl -H "Authorization: Bearer ks_live_..." \ -F "config_file=@.config" \ https://kernelscan.io/api/configs/uploads`` returns ``{config_upload_id, sha256, size_bytes, expires_at}``. 2. Pass that ``config_upload_id`` into this tool. Uploads are per-user, single-use, and expire 30 minutes after upload. Same gates as POST /api/products: free can't create products; paid plans are capped at their resolved product limit — read it (and any per-account override) from ``whoami.product_limit`` rather than assuming a fixed per-tier number. ``factor_ids`` are silently ignored unless the plan allows security factors (``whoami.can_use_factors``). Re-using a product name returns 409. Creating a product RUNS an analysis, so it spends one unit of the team's SHARED monthly analysis allowance (``whoami.monthly_analyses_used`` / ``monthly_analyses_limit``). When the allowance is exhausted the tool fails with "Monthly analysis limit reached (…/month) [429]". This is a durable monthly quota — NOT the transient per-call rate limit that also surfaces as 429: it will not clear until next month, so report it to the user instead of retrying. Check ``whoami`` before a batch of creates. ``kernel_version`` is the kernel's release. For a stable kernel that is its version (``6.6.67``). For a CIP SLTS kernel pass its CIP release or the full ``uname -r``: ``4.19.325-cip136``, ``4.19.325-cip136-rt50…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| arch | string | yes | – |
| config_upload_id | string | yes | – |
| description | – | – | – |
| factor_ids | – | – | – |
| kernel_version | string | yes | – |
| name | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_cve ~146
Fetch a single Linux kernel CVE by ID (e.g. ``CVE-2024-12345``). No API key required: keyless callers get the public representation of a CVE, but only for CVEs in the public set (recent high-severity); any other id returns ``not found``. Free *keyed* callers get a 404 for CVEs published more than 60 days ago. AI risk-summary / analysis fields are included for any keyed user on CVEs in the public set, and for pro / enterprise on every assessed CVE.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_product ~58
Fetch one product owned by the caller, including the CVE breakdown. Returns 404 (not 403) if the product belongs to another user, so product existence isn't leaked across accounts.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| product_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_product_vex ~292
Return the VEX MANIFEST for one of the caller's products — metadata, not the document. Multi-megabyte CycloneDX documents (up to 8,000+ vulnerability entries) are not safe model-context payloads, so this tool returns a bounded manifest: CycloneDX format/spec version, product id, generated/expires timestamps, the VEX hash and the composite ETag identity, the uncompressed size in bytes, total + per-status vulnerability counts, and the authenticated REST download path. Reads from the 24h ProductVexCache; if the cache is empty/expired the next call to ``get_product`` (or the REST endpoint) will regenerate it. The MANIFEST carries the same ``kernelscan.io:exploit_maturity`` / ``kernelscan.io:kev`` overlay identity as the REST download (backend#337), so ETags compare across transports. To inspect the entries themselves, use ``list_product_vex_entries``. To retrieve the COMPLETE CycloneDX document, use the authenticated REST endpoint ``GET /api/products/{product_id}/vex`` (same ks_live_ key) — that is the canonical way to retrieve the full artifact; no MCP tool returns it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| product_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_product_vex_entries ~490
Page through the VEX vulnerability entries of one of the caller's products. Returns COMPLETE CycloneDX vulnerability objects for one bounded page — never the root document, never all entries — plus ``returned``, ``total_matching``, and a ``next_cursor`` to continue with. Every result is bounded to 256 KiB: the page stops before the byte limit and returns a cursor when necessary. Entries are ordered by CVE id (ascending) and carry the same live ``kernelscan.io:exploit_maturity`` / ``kernelscan.io:kev`` properties as the REST download (backend#337). Filters (all optional, combinable): - ``statuses``: ``affected`` / ``not_affected`` / ``in_triage`` - ``severities``: ``critical`` / ``high`` / ``medium`` / ``low`` / ``none`` - ``kev``: true/false — CISA KEV listing only / non-KEV only - ``exploit_maturity``: ``poc`` / ``weaponized`` - ``cve_ids``: exact-match list of CVE ids ``limit`` defaults to 25, maximum 100. ``cursor`` is the opaque continuation token from a previous page — it is tied to the product, the active filters, AND the current document + threat-overlay revision: changing filters, a regenerated cache, or a KEV/PoC signal that moved since the last page invalidates it (start a fresh page without a cursor — re-using a stale one is rejected, never silently re-applied). Within one revision, concatenating all pages yields each matching CVE exactly once. The COMPLETE multi-megabyte CycloneDX document is served by the authenticated REST endpoint ``GET /api/products/{product_id}/vex`` (same ks_live_ key) — the canonical way to retrieve the full artifact.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | – | – |
| cve_ids | – | – | – |
| exploit_maturity | – | – | – |
| kev | – | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| product_id | string | yes | – |
| severities | – | – | – |
| statuses | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_products ~42
List the calling user's products with denormalized analysis stats. Paid plans only (basic / pro / enterprise). Free callers get a clear upgrade message.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
request_access ~162
Explain how to get a KernelScan account (no API key needed). Self-registration is open — there is no invitation to wait for and no admin in the loop. The user signs up on kernelscan.io themselves (email + password, accepting the terms), confirms the verification mail, and mints a ks_live_ API key on their account page. This tool only hands that path back: it files nothing and sends no mail. ``email`` / ``name`` / ``reason`` are still accepted so older clients don't break, but they are ignored — never tell the user that a request was submitted on their behalf.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| – | – | – | |
| name | – | – | – |
| reason | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_cves ~201
Search Linux kernel CVEs. No API key required: keyless callers get the free public tier — recent high-severity Linux kernel CVEs (capped at 25 results). Free *keyed* callers see only CVEs published in the last 60 days; basic+ keyed callers get the full corpus. ``query`` matches against CVE id and description (case-insensitive). ``severity`` filters by effective severity (``critical``/``high``/``medium``/``low``). ``cvss_min`` filters by effective CVSS score. ``published_after`` (ISO 8601) returns only CVEs newer than that date. Returns up to ``limit`` (max 100) CVEs, newest first.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cvss_min | – | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| published_after | – | – | – |
| query | – | – | – |
| severity | – | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_support_report ~220
Send a support / dispute report to KernelScan staff. Use this when an automated CVE or factor assessment looks wrong, or when you need to hand human-needed context back to the team. The caller's API-key user is attached automatically (id, email, plan) so support can look the account up. ``category`` should be one of: - ``cve_assessment`` — wrong AI verdict / CVSS / CWE on a CVE - ``factor_assessment`` — wrong factor verdict for a product - ``bug`` — broken behavior in the API or UI - ``other`` — anything else ``cve_id`` / ``product_id`` / ``assessment_id`` are optional but recommended — they let support jump straight to the relevant row.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assessment_id | – | – | – |
| category | string | yes | – |
| cve_id | – | – | – |
| message | string | yes | – |
| product_id | – | – | – |
| subject | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
update_product ~453
Update a product owned by the caller. Re-runs analysis if the kernel_version, arch, or referenced .config changed. To change the .config, first POST the new file to ``/api/configs/uploads`` (see ``create_product`` for the curl recipe) and pass the returned ``config_upload_id`` here. Leave ``config_upload_id`` as ``None`` to keep the existing .config. ``factor_ids=None`` leaves factor selections untouched; an empty list clears them. Same tier gates as PUT /api/products/{id}. A change that re-runs analysis (``kernel_version``, ``arch``, or the ``.config``) spends one unit of the team's shared monthly analysis allowance and can fail with the same durable "Monthly analysis limit reached … [429]" quota error as ``create_product`` (distinct from the transient rate-limit 429 — don't retry it). A rename / description / factor-only edit runs no analysis and is free; the product's VEX is re-evaluated against the new factors in the background (not metered), so ``get_product`` / ``get_product_vex`` show the new verdicts a few seconds later. ``kernel_version`` takes the same forms as in ``create_product``: a stable version, or a CIP release / full ``uname -r`` such as ``4.19.325-cip136-rt50``, whose ``-cipN`` counter decides which CIP fixes apply. A changed version string the analysis cannot read fails with 400 and changes nothing; re-sending the stored value is always accepted. A CIP release must stay on the base its ``.config`` header names: whichever of the two the update changes is checked against the other ([400], before the upload is consumed).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| arch | – | – | – |
| config_upload_id | – | – | – |
| description | – | – | – |
| factor_ids | – | – | – |
| kernel_version | – | – | – |
| name | – | – | – |
| product_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
whoami ~49
Return the caller's identity, plan, and quota state. Works without an API key: keyless callers get a lightweight public-tier payload (no account) describing how to request access.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the KernelScan MCP server?
KernelScan is a hosted endpoint at https://kernelscan.io/mcp/, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · kernelscan.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-kernelscan-kernelscan 'https://kernelscan.io/mcp/'
What is the KernelScan MCP server?
KernelScan is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.kernelscan/kernelscan. Linux kernel CVE analyzer: upload a .config, get a CycloneDX VEX report of affecting CVEs. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://kernelscan.io/mcp/).
Is the KernelScan MCP server safe to use?
KernelScan scores 71 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the KernelScan MCP server expose?
KernelScan exposes 11 tools: search_cves, get_cve, list_products, get_product, get_product_vex, and 6 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,026 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the KernelScan MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to KernelScan without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the KernelScan MCP server still maintained?
KernelScan is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the KernelScan MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on KernelScan, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about KernelScan: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.