io.hunchful/hunchful
REMOTE · HUNCHFUL.IO
Read and grow a person's falsifiable, consent-based model of how they work with AI (CMP).
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 19% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Memory and Knowledge
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify streamable-http. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. See how to fix → Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. See how to fix → Unverified
Unverified: 6 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm. Claim this server and supply a read-only token to verify it and lift the score.
Checks we ran (5)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
Checks we could not complete (6)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Transport in Transport & Reachability (scores 0 for this)Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify streamable-http.
- Schema quality in Schema Quality & AI Usability (scores 0 for this)Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it.
- Stability in Stability & Change Management (scores 0 for this)Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- Tool coverage in Tool Coverage (scores 0 for this)Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.
- Tool safety in Tool Safety (scores 0 for this)Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.
- Capabilities in Capabilities (scores 0 for this)Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → pass ▲ security
- First check of Authorization: partial security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://hunchful.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=hunchful.io | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 26 Oct 2026 | 24 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 312f86fa294c08f80ee920f8c6d47f4a |
| SANs: hunchful.io, *.hunchful.io | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hunchful.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | DS published | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| hunchful.io. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On connection |
| HTTP status | 401 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://hunchful.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", scope="messages plans household channels quiz practice content schedule announce overview admin professional people model"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://hunchful.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", scope="messages plans household channels quiz practice content schedule announce overview admin professional people model"| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| www-authenticate | Bearer resource_metadata="https://hunchful.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", scope="messages plans household channels quiz practice content schedule announce overview admin professional people model" |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://hunchful.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://hunchful.io/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://hunchful.io |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hunchful.io/mcp | Auth required | 401 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://hunchful.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://hunchful.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
add_hunch ~235
Record a NEW hunch the person just confirmed in conversation — a custom axis with their answer, added directly to their model (visible, revisable, removable by them). OWNER-LEVEL trust required: OAuth as the owner, or the editToken. Only record what the person actually said — never invent or infer a hunch they didn't confirm. For situational axes name it 'When <situation>'. If they haven't answered yet, use suggest_question instead.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| by | string | – | Your name, e.g. "claude" — recorded in the revision history. |
| confidence | number | – | 0.05–0.97; default 0.7 for a fresh self-stated answer. |
| editToken | string | – | The model's edit key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| name | string | yes | Short axis name, e.g. "When plans change suddenly". |
| pole | string | yes | The pole the person SAID fits them. |
| poleA | string | yes | Pole A label. |
| poleB | string | yes | Pole B label. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| falsifier | string | – | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| patternId | string | yes | – |
| statement | string | – | – |
| urls | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
apply_refinement ~84
Apply a refinement directly as one logged revision (append evidence pointers, nudge confidence). Authorized by OAuth (own model) or an editToken. Prefer propose_refinement unless the owner asked for direct writes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| editToken | string | – | The model's edit key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| items | array | yes | – |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| applied | array | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| updatedAt | string | yes | – |
| urls | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
find_complementary_thinkers ~82
Which famous thinkers would COMPLETE this person — opposite poles on the axes where opposites unstick each other (not similarity). Open read; great for curiosity and for explaining what a complementary collaborator looks like. Share the pages as links.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| modelId | string | – | Model id. Omit when connected via OAuth to use the person's own model. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| complements | array | yes | – |
| humanVersion | string | yes | – |
| modelId | string | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
find_matches ~121
Look for complementary PEOPLE for the connected person (rule: agents propose, humans accept — this creates pending proposals the human decides on in their Hunchful hub; identities are never revealed here). Requires OAuth as the owner or the model's editToken, and the person must have joined introductions on their matches page.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| direction | string | – | seek = they want a fresh angle; offer = they can offer one. Default seek. |
| editToken | string | – | The model's edit key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| matchesUrl | string | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| proposals | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
propose_refinement ~79
Propose a refinement (provenance pointers only). It lands in the owner's confirm queue — nothing changes until they accept. Authorized by OAuth (own model) or a contributionToken.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contributionToken | string | – | Scoped propose-only key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| items | array | yes | – |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | string | yes | – |
| proposalIds | array | yes | – |
| reviewUrl | string | yes | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
read_model ~79
Read a Hunchful collaboration model: its hunches (axis, pole, confidence), the axis ids you can refine, and how you're connected. Start here. With OAuth, omit modelId to read the connected person's own model.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| modelId | string | – | Model id. Omit when connected via OAuth to use the person's own model. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| canApplyDirectly | boolean | yes | – |
| connectedAs | string | yes | – |
| constraints | string | yes | – |
| guidance | string | yes | – |
| howToConnect | string | – | – |
| hunches | array | yes | – |
| libraryVersion | string | yes | – |
| modelId | string | yes | – |
| openHunches | object | yes | – |
| refinablePatternIds | array | yes | – |
| render | string | yes | – |
| urls | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
suggest_question ~210
Suggest a NEW question/axis for the person — a dimension their model doesn't capture (situational axes welcome: name it 'When <situation>'). It lands in their Hunchful inbox and, by default, emails them; nothing is added until they answer. Authorized by OAuth (own model) or a contributionToken. Use sparingly — about once a week at most.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| by | string | – | Your name, e.g. "claude". |
| contributionToken | string | – | Scoped propose-only key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| name | string | yes | Short axis name, e.g. "When plans change suddenly". |
| poleA | string | yes | Pole A label — one way of working. |
| poleB | string | yes | Pole B label — the other way. |
| question | string | yes | The question, addressed to the person. |
| why | string | – | Why you're asking — what you observed (no quotes, no names). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inboxUrl | string | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| notified | boolean | yes | – |
| proposalId | string | yes | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server?
io.hunchful/hunchful is a hosted endpoint at https://hunchful.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hunchful.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-hunchful-hunchful 'https://hunchful.io/mcp'
What is the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server?
io.hunchful/hunchful is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.hunchful/hunchful. Read and grow a person's falsifiable, consent-based model of how they work with AI (CMP). This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hunchful.io/mcp).
Is the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server safe to use?
io.hunchful/hunchful scores 36 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server expose?
io.hunchful/hunchful exposes 7 tools: read_model, propose_refinement, suggest_question, add_hunch, find_complementary_thinkers, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 890 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server require authentication?
Yes. io.hunchful/hunchful asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server still maintained?
io.hunchful/hunchful is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 5 checks on io.hunchful/hunchful, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 1 more. 6 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.hunchful/hunchful: Transport, Schema quality, Stability, Tool coverage and 2 more. 6 categories score 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.