io.hunchful/hunchful
REMOTE · HUNCHFUL.IO · SCANNED SEP 21
Read and grow a person's falsifiable, consent-based model of how they work with AI (CMP).
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability75
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 890 tokens (~127/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage93
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 74% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server?
io.hunchful/hunchful is a hosted endpoint at https://hunchful.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hunchful.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-hunchful-hunchful 'https://hunchful.io/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-hunchful-hunchful": {
"url": "https://hunchful.io/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"io-hunchful-hunchful": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hunchful.io/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.io-hunchful-hunchful] url = "https://hunchful.io/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"io-hunchful-hunchful": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://hunchful.io/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add io-hunchful-hunchful --url 'https://hunchful.io/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
io-hunchful-hunchful:
url: "https://hunchful.io/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"io-hunchful-hunchful": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://hunchful.io/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add io-hunchful-hunchful -t streamable-http -u 'https://hunchful.io/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-hunchful-hunchful": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hunchful.io/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 26 Aug 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 24 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Jul 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Sept 2026 · Probed https://hunchful.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=hunchful.io | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 28 Aug 2026 | 26 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | cac61141bf8d22e20e7130505e3bc371 |
| SANs: hunchful.io, *.hunchful.io | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hunchful.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | present | 57355 | 8 | Verified |
| hunchful.io. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31556926 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hunchful.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://hunchful.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://hunchful.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
add_hunch ~235
Record a NEW hunch the person just confirmed in conversation — a custom axis with their answer, added directly to their model (visible, revisable, removable by them). OWNER-LEVEL trust required: OAuth as the owner, or the editToken. Only record what the person actually said — never invent or infer a hunch they didn't confirm. For situational axes name it 'When <situation>'. If they haven't answered yet, use suggest_question instead.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| by | string | – | Your name, e.g. "claude" — recorded in the revision history. |
| confidence | number | – | 0.05–0.97; default 0.7 for a fresh self-stated answer. |
| editToken | string | – | The model's edit key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| name | string | yes | Short axis name, e.g. "When plans change suddenly". |
| pole | string | yes | The pole the person SAID fits them. |
| poleA | string | yes | Pole A label. |
| poleB | string | yes | Pole B label. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| falsifier | string | – | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| patternId | string | yes | – |
| statement | string | – | – |
| urls | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
apply_refinement ~84
Apply a refinement directly as one logged revision (append evidence pointers, nudge confidence). Authorized by OAuth (own model) or an editToken. Prefer propose_refinement unless the owner asked for direct writes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| editToken | string | – | The model's edit key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| items | array | yes | – |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| applied | array | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| updatedAt | string | yes | – |
| urls | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
find_complementary_thinkers ~82
Which famous thinkers would COMPLETE this person — opposite poles on the axes where opposites unstick each other (not similarity). Open read; great for curiosity and for explaining what a complementary collaborator looks like. Share the pages as links.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| modelId | string | – | Model id. Omit when connected via OAuth to use the person's own model. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| complements | array | yes | – |
| humanVersion | string | yes | – |
| modelId | string | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
find_matches ~121
Look for complementary PEOPLE for the connected person (rule: agents propose, humans accept — this creates pending proposals the human decides on in their Hunchful hub; identities are never revealed here). Requires OAuth as the owner or the model's editToken, and the person must have joined introductions on their matches page.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| direction | string | – | seek = they want a fresh angle; offer = they can offer one. Default seek. |
| editToken | string | – | The model's edit key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| matchesUrl | string | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| proposals | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
propose_refinement ~79
Propose a refinement (provenance pointers only). It lands in the owner's confirm queue — nothing changes until they accept. Authorized by OAuth (own model) or a contributionToken.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contributionToken | string | – | Scoped propose-only key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| items | array | yes | – |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | string | yes | – |
| proposalIds | array | yes | – |
| reviewUrl | string | yes | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
read_model ~79
Read a Hunchful collaboration model: its hunches (axis, pole, confidence), the axis ids you can refine, and how you're connected. Start here. With OAuth, omit modelId to read the connected person's own model.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| modelId | string | – | Model id. Omit when connected via OAuth to use the person's own model. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| canApplyDirectly | boolean | yes | – |
| connectedAs | string | yes | – |
| constraints | string | yes | – |
| guidance | string | yes | – |
| howToConnect | string | – | – |
| hunches | array | yes | – |
| libraryVersion | string | yes | – |
| modelId | string | yes | – |
| openHunches | object | yes | – |
| refinablePatternIds | array | yes | – |
| render | string | yes | – |
| urls | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
suggest_question ~210
Suggest a NEW question/axis for the person — a dimension their model doesn't capture (situational axes welcome: name it 'When <situation>'). It lands in their Hunchful inbox and, by default, emails them; nothing is added until they answer. Authorized by OAuth (own model) or a contributionToken. Use sparingly — about once a week at most.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| by | string | – | Your name, e.g. "claude". |
| contributionToken | string | – | Scoped propose-only key, if not connected via OAuth. |
| modelId | string | – | – |
| name | string | yes | Short axis name, e.g. "When plans change suddenly". |
| poleA | string | yes | Pole A label — one way of working. |
| poleB | string | yes | Pole B label — the other way. |
| question | string | yes | The question, addressed to the person. |
| why | string | – | Why you're asking — what you observed (no quotes, no names). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inboxUrl | string | yes | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| notified | boolean | yes | – |
| proposalId | string | yes | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
What is the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server?
io.hunchful/hunchful is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.hunchful/hunchful. Read and grow a person's falsifiable, consent-based model of how they work with AI (CMP). This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hunchful.io/mcp).
Is the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server safe to use?
io.hunchful/hunchful scores 87 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server expose?
io.hunchful/hunchful exposes 7 tools: read_model, propose_refinement, suggest_question, add_hunch, find_complementary_thinkers, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 890 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.hunchful/hunchful without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.hunchful/hunchful MCP server still maintained?
io.hunchful/hunchful is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.