Faultline
REMOTE · MCP.FLTLN.IO
Check infrastructure health, manage incidents, and run runbooks in Faultline.
Available components
Last scanned (4 hours ago)
Scores higher than 66% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Monitoring and Observability
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 603 tokens (~60/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management10
- Stability observed for 3 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 2 Nov 26 +41
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 0 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- 25 Oct 26 +10
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Transport: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools. security
- Tool coverage: Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools. functional
- Schema quality: Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. functional
- Capabilities: Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.fltln.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=fltln.io | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 14 Oct 2026 | 12 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6061695c06507c2db31a5c048093059aa1a |
| SANs: *.fltln.io, fltln.io | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.fltln.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | present | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| fltln.io. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | no_resource_metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.fltln.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.fltln.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.fltln.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
acknowledge_incident ~49
Acknowledge an open incident, stopping further escalation. Call this when the user says they are looking into an incident or asks you to take ownership of it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| incidentId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
diagnose_incident ~91
Analyze an open incident and recommend the next action: run a specific runbook, escalate to a human, resolve, or wait. Returns the recommendation (with rationale and confidence) and the candidate runbooks. This is analysis ONLY — it does not change anything. Call this to decide what to do about an incident; then confirm with the user before calling run_runbook.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| incidentId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_incident ~55
Get an incident's full record: timeline of every update, escalations, runbook results, AI summary, and post-mortem if drafted. Call this before acting on an incident.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| incidentId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_service ~49
Get one service's details including its 10 most recent health checks (status codes, latency, errors). Call this when diagnosing WHY a service is degraded or down.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| serviceId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_anomalies ~80
List recent learned-baseline latency anomalies: observed vs baseline response time, the deviation z-score, how many consecutive hours it has been sustained, and the incident it auto-opened (if any). Call this when asked why a service is slow, about latency spikes, or for early degradation signals that have not yet tripped a hard up/down threshold.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_incidents ~46
List incidents — open ones by default, or recently resolved with status='resolved'. Call this when asked about outages, what's broken, or incident history.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_services ~57
List all monitored services with their current status (OK, DEGRADED, DOWN, PAUSED, PENDING). Call this first to get an overview of infrastructure health, or to find a service's ID.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_incident ~59
Mark an incident as resolved, with an optional note describing the fix. Only call this when the user confirms the underlying issue is fixed — resolving is a status-page-visible action.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| incidentId | string | yes | – |
| note | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_runbook ~78
Execute one specific runbook against an incident. This MUTATES INFRASTRUCTURE (it can restart or scale services). Only call after diagnose_incident recommended it AND the user has confirmed. Pass the runbookId from the diagnosis's recommendation or candidate list.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| incidentId | string | yes | – |
| runbookId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
who_is_on_call ~39
Get the person currently on call for each on-call schedule, and when their shift ends. Call this when deciding who to contact about an incident.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Faultline MCP server?
Faultline is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.fltln.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.fltln.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-fltln-faultline 'https://mcp.fltln.io/mcp'
What is the Faultline MCP server?
Faultline is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.fltln/faultline. Check infrastructure health, manage incidents, and run runbooks in Faultline. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.fltln.io/mcp).
Is the Faultline MCP server safe to use?
Faultline scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Faultline MCP server expose?
Faultline exposes 10 tools: list_services, get_service, list_incidents, get_incident, acknowledge_incident, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 603 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Faultline MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Faultline asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Faultline MCP server still maintained?
Faultline is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.