ZTL Judge
REMOTE · API.VITALYREZNIK.COM
Zero-trust logic judge: your AI writes a claim as a ZFL table, the ZTL core judges it.
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 60% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 16 Oct 2026.
Category Developer Tools
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 3 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability62
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 519 tokens (~173/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management57
- Stability observed for 17 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 43. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 13 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Oct 26 +3
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Server version: a78db5a → f92c53b functional
- 4 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Server version: 387fd54 → a78db5a functional
- 29 Sept 26 61
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 16 Oct 2026 · Probed https://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.vitalyreznik.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 23 Sept 2026 | 22 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6aa64dfeb0140936f9c39d7b6b8d40cdae1 |
| SANs: api.vitalyreznik.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.vitalyreznik.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| vitalyreznik.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
examples ~22
Worked examples: questions already written as ZFL documents, ready to judge.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
judge ~226
Judge a ZFL document with ZTL, a zero-trust logic: three values, two-valued connectives. Args: document: The ZFL document, as an object or as JSON text: {"rows": [{"name": ..., "means": ..., "status": ..., "ground": ...}], "claim": ...}. Returns: The verdict with its disposition and grade, the receipt, the instruments that applied, the issues found, and what the core read. Read the verdict WITH its disposition: T EARNED = established; F REFUTED = false; F OPEN or Z OPEN = NOT ESTABLISHED, it could still turn either way (do not report it as false) — `why` and `unverified` say what to check; ON CREDIT = holds only on an unverified ground. A compound claim gets T or F; a claim that is a single name gets that name's own value, Z while unverified. The full report is returned whatever `ask` says.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| document | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
language ~27
The ZFL language: the columns of a row, the document fields, their meaning and rules.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ZTL Judge MCP server?
ZTL Judge is a hosted endpoint at https://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.vitalyreznik.com
claude mcp add --transport http inventor1975-ztl-judge 'https://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp'
What is the ZTL Judge MCP server?
ZTL Judge is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judge. Zero-trust logic judge: your AI writes a claim as a ZFL table, the ZTL core judges it. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.vitalyreznik.com/mcp).
Is the ZTL Judge MCP server safe to use?
ZTL Judge scores 70 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ZTL Judge MCP server expose?
ZTL Judge exposes 3 tools: language, examples, judge. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 275 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ZTL Judge MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ZTL Judge without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ZTL Judge MCP server still maintained?
ZTL Judge is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 16 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.