Agent Utility MCP
REMOTE · AGENT-UTILITY-MCP.INSIVOTRON.WORKERS.DEV · SCANNED SEP 22
Stop your agent before it runs rm -rf /etc or emails your .env. Deterministic preflight checks.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability78
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 542 tokens (~135/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the Agent Utility MCP server?
Agent Utility MCP is a hosted endpoint at https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev
claude mcp add --transport http insivotron-agent-utility-mcp 'https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"insivotron-agent-utility-mcp": {
"url": "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"insivotron-agent-utility-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.insivotron-agent-utility-mcp] url = "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"insivotron-agent-utility-mcp": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add insivotron-agent-utility-mcp --url 'https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
insivotron-agent-utility-mcp:
url: "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"insivotron-agent-utility-mcp": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add insivotron-agent-utility-mcp -t streamable-http -u 'https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"insivotron-agent-utility-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 14 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 9 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 7 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 4 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 31 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Sept 2026 · Probed https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=insivotron.workers.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 14 Aug 2026 | 12 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | bd4acd66878d3d4013bab7dc4649f581 |
| SANs: insivotron.workers.dev, *.insivotron.workers.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| workers.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 406 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
analyze_tool_call ~159
Analyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) covering destructive actions, sensitive-data exposure, external transmission, privilege changes and irreversible operations, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Filesystem paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than paths inside it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| arguments | – | yes | The proposed tool arguments. They are analyzed as data and never executed. |
| context | object | – | Optional declarative context about the proposed operation. |
| policy | string | – | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| tool_name | string | yes | The exact name of the proposed tool. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | object | yes | – |
| context_completeness | string | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| policy_applied | string | yes | – |
| risk | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | number | yes | – |
| ruleset_version | string | yes | – |
| schema_version | string | yes | – |
| signals | array | yes | – |
| tool_name | string|null | yes | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
analyze_url_risk ~100
Analyze a URL for structural and security risk signals and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| context | object | – | Optional declarative context. |
| policy | string | – | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| url | string | yes | The absolute URL to analyze. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | object | yes | – |
| context_completeness | string | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| domain | string|null | yes | – |
| hostname | string|null | yes | – |
| input | string | yes | – |
| normalized_url | string|null | yes | – |
| policy_applied | string | yes | – |
| port | string|null | yes | – |
| protocol | string|null | yes | – |
| public_suffix | string|null | yes | – |
| risk | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | number | yes | – |
| ruleset_version | string | yes | – |
| schema_version | string | yes | – |
| signals | array | yes | – |
| subdomain | string|null | yes | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
inspect_command ~148
Analyze a shell command before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) without running it, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than paths inside it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | yes | The complete command text to inspect without executing it. |
| context | object | – | Optional declarative context. |
| cwd | string | – | Optional working-directory context. It is never accessed. |
| policy | string | – | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| shell | string | – | The command shell, when known. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | object | yes | – |
| command | string|null | yes | – |
| context_completeness | string | yes | – |
| cwd | string|null | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| policy_applied | string | yes | – |
| risk | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | number | yes | – |
| ruleset_version | string | yes | – |
| schema_version | string | yes | – |
| shell | string | yes | – |
| signals | array | yes | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
inspect_file ~135
Inspect a Base64-encoded file locally for deterministic structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content_base64 | string | yes | The complete file content encoded as canonical Base64 (maximum decoded size: 1 MiB). |
| context | object | – | Optional declarative context. |
| filename | string | yes | The original filename, including its extension. |
| policy | string | – | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checks | object | yes | – |
| context_completeness | string | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| declared_extension | string|null | yes | – |
| detected_type | string|null | yes | – |
| filename | string|null | yes | – |
| policy_applied | string | yes | – |
| risk | string | yes | – |
| risk_score | number | yes | – |
| ruleset_version | string | yes | – |
| schema_version | string | yes | – |
| sha256 | string|null | yes | – |
| signals | array | yes | – |
| size_bytes | number|null | yes | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | – |
No examples provided.
What is the Agent Utility MCP server?
Agent Utility MCP is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.insivotron/agent-utility-mcp. Stop your agent before it runs rm -rf /etc or emails your .env. Deterministic preflight checks. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp).
Is the Agent Utility MCP server safe to use?
Agent Utility MCP scores 81 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Agent Utility MCP server expose?
Agent Utility MCP exposes 4 tools: analyze_url_risk, inspect_command, inspect_file, analyze_tool_call. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 542 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Agent Utility MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Agent Utility MCP without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Agent Utility MCP server still maintained?
Agent Utility MCP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.