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Assurance

PYPI · ASSURANCE-MCP

Checks what an agent did NOT read. Coverage over a retrieval step or a folder.

Available components

0 this week 92 Trust /100

Last scanned (19 hours ago)

Scores higher than 95% of PyPI servers

Category Developer Tools

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security100
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
  • 3 of 33 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency100
  • Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
  • Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to i-ops-hq/assurance). View diagnostics → Pass
  • Clear OSI-approved license (Apache-2.0).Pass
  • Actively maintained (last published 7 days ago).Pass
  • Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 912 tokens (~152/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage71
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
  • Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 28 Oct 26 +15
    • Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
  • 27 Oct 26 −15
    • Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Package version: 0.5.8 → 0.5.10 functional
    • Package version: 0.5.8 → 0.5.9 functional
  • 21 Oct 26 0
    • Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
    • Package version: 0.5.7 → 0.5.8 functional
  • 18 Oct 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 16 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 14 Oct 26 +40
    • Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Schema quality: 786 → 912 ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
    • Stability: unverified → 0.87 ▲ functional
    • Package version: 0.5.5 → 0.5.7 functional
  • 12 Oct 26 −41
    • Stability: 0.97 → unverified ▼ security
    • Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
    • First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
    • Package version: 0.5.5 → 0.5.7 functional
  • 3 Oct 26 +16
    • Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/assurance-mcp@0.5.10

Provenance Verified

A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.

Result Verified
Ecosystem pypi
Reason Verified
Discovered via Registry attestation endpoint
Source repo i-ops-hq/assurance
Certificate issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Certificate SAN https://github.com/i-ops-hq/assurance/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/mcp-v0.5.10
Rekor log index 3526024711
Predicate type PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1
Subject digest sha256:40bf44803cf63046cf977342904725358649b651566d7aff51f5e3021bcfcff3

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Install scripts 1 script
Hook Tier Command
build_backend allowlisted setuptools.build_meta

Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →

Dependencies 33 packages
Packages resolved 33
Stale 2
No linked repository 1
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 6 exposed · ~912 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
check_coverage_tool ~94

Check whether every month in a folder span is present. Read-only. `folder` must be inside a folder this server was granted; a relative name is read against the granted folders, and empty means the only one. Optionally a period range such as 'January 2024 to December 2025' or 'last 12 months'.

NameTypeReqDescription
folderstring––
period_range–––

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

check_retrieval_coverage_tool ~304

Check a retrieval step: did something come back from every document the question spans? Read-only, touches no filesystem. Use this instead of `check_set_coverage_tool` whenever the thing you retrieved is CHUNKS, because the two sides are not the same unit. `retrieved_chunks` may be document ids, or the records your vector store returned — the parent document is read from `document`, `doc`, `source`, `path` or `id`, at the top level or under `metadata`. Chunks are reduced to parent documents and de-duplicated: five chunks of one document is one document covered, not five. **Do not diff chunk ids against a document scope.** Top-k returns k chunks and a scope holds more, so such a record can never be complete no matter how good the retrieval was. `expected_documents` is YOUR declaration — a metadata filter, a graph walk, a join. Never the retriever's own output: a denominator the retriever picks always reports that it did fine. Returns the coverage record. Documents retrieved from OUTSIDE the declared scope appear under `out_of_scope`; they earn no credit and do not make the run incomplete, but on a multi-tenant corpus they are often the more alarming line.

NameTypeReqDescription
derivation–––
expected_documentsarrayyes–
retrieved_chunksarrayyes–
scope–––

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

check_set_coverage_tool ~263

Check what a task required against what was actually read, over any two sets of keys. Read-only, and touches no filesystem — the caller holds both lists. Use this when the thing you must account for is not dated files in a folder: documents the question spans against the chunks a retriever returned, files changed in a pull request against files reviewed, table partitions against partitions loaded, required controls against controls with evidence, declared eval cases against cases actually run. `expected` is the caller's declaration and is never inferred here. `scope` names the items for the sentence ("documents the question spans"); `where` names where they were looked for ("the retrieved set"); `derivation` records how the expected set was arrived at, so a reader can disagree with the denominator rather than only with the result. Returns the coverage record: `complete`, `read` of `required`, and each way an expectation failed to be evidence kept separate. Anything present that was not expected is reported under `unexpected` and deliberately earns no credit against the denominator.

NameTypeReqDescription
derivation–––
expectedarrayyes–
foundarrayyes–
scope–––
where–––

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

check_staleness_tool ~84

Check whether a document's figures still match a source file the caller names. Read-only. Does not search for a plausible match — both paths are required. Returns UNCHECKABLE when recorded facts are missing and cannot be read.

NameTypeReqDescription
documentstringyes–
folderstringyes–
recorded_facts–––
sourcestringyes–

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

list_dated_files_tool ~41

List which reporting periods a folder holds from dated filenames. Read-only. Helps an agent decide what to ask next.

NameTypeReqDescription
folderstring––

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

reach_tool ~126

What a change to a file or folder would reach, before the change is made. `folder` is one the server was granted; `path` is relative to it. `depth` is hops to follow, 0 for no limit. The answer names each reached symbol with the call site that carried the dependency and how sure the graph is of it, and says how far behind the code the graph is — an agent that acts on a stale graph should know that it did.

NameTypeReqDescription
depthinteger––
folderstring––
pathstring––

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the Assurance MCP server?

Assurance runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx assurance-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

pypi · assurance-mcp

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add i-ops-hq-assurance-mcp -- uvx assurance-mcp
Common questions

What is the Assurance MCP server?

Assurance is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.i-ops-hq/assurance-mcp. Checks what an agent did NOT read. Coverage over a retrieval step or a folder. This page covers its PyPI package (assurance-mcp).

Is the Assurance MCP server safe to use?

Assurance scores 92 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 4 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the Assurance MCP server expose?

Assurance exposes 6 tools: check_coverage_tool, check_staleness_tool, list_dated_files_tool, check_set_coverage_tool, check_retrieval_coverage_tool, reach_tool. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 912 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the Assurance MCP server still maintained?

Assurance is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the Assurance MCP server under?

Assurance declares the Apache-2.0 licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.