io.github.holistis/capacity-attest
NPM · CAPACITY-ATTEST · SCANNED SEP 20
Signed delivery claims for x402 capacity trades: GPU-hours, storage, API credits, bandwidth.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security98
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 32 of 104 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency19
- Repository presence not verified: we could not reach the forge to check. This is a gap on our side, not a finding about the repository. View diagnostics → Unverified
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 5 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability63
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1204 tokens (~401/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management67
- Stability observed for 20 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 3 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the io.github.holistis/capacity-attest MCP server?
io.github.holistis/capacity-attest runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y capacity-attest. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · capacity-attest
claude mcp add holistis-capacity-attest -- npx -y capacity-attest
{
"mcpServers": {
"holistis-capacity-attest": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"capacity-attest"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"holistis-capacity-attest": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"capacity-attest"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add holistis-capacity-attest -- npx -y capacity-attest
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"holistis-capacity-attest": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"capacity-attest"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add holistis-capacity-attest --command npx --arg -y --arg capacity-attest
mcp_servers:
holistis-capacity-attest:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "capacity-attest"] {
"McpServers": {
"holistis-capacity-attest": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"capacity-attest"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add holistis-capacity-attest -t stdio -c npx -a -y capacity-attest
{
"mcpServers": {
"holistis-capacity-attest": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"capacity-attest"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 −5
- Provenance: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 19 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 60 to 63. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 18 days of observed history at the previous scan, 19 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 47 to 50. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 14 days of observed history at the previous scan, 15 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Sept 26 +1
- Package version: 0.1.2 → 0.5.0 functional
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 8 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 7 Sept 26 +11
- Known CVEs: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Dependency health: unverified → 0.86 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/capacity-attest@0.5.0
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 104 packages
| Packages resolved | 104 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 32 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_delivery_history Get a seller's delivery history ~372
Return every signature-verified delivery claim recorded against a given sellerAddress in THIS installation's local ledger, oldest first. Purely factual — no aggregate score, rating, or reputation judgment is computed. IMPORTANT, two separate caveats, both repeated in the response's own `note` field: (1) this is scoped to the local ledger only — a different installation may hold other claims against the same seller that this call cannot see, so an empty or short result does NOT mean the seller has a clean record elsewhere, only that no claims have been recorded here; (2) even within this installation, a shown claim's signature is genuinely verified, but nothing proves this is the COMPLETE set of claims the operator actually holds — completeness depends on the operator's honesty, not cryptography. The response's `completeness` field analyzes the per-buyer claim chains (priorClaimId) and flags, in possibleOmissions, any shown claim that links back to a claim NOT in the result — a concrete sign the operator may be hiding a middle claim. IMPORTANT: that field is computed by this same server, so if you do not run it yourself, do NOT trust the field — recompute it locally by calling analyzeCompleteness() over the returned claims, whose priorClaimId links are signed and cannot be forged or stripped. It cannot catch a hidden most-recent claim or a hidden whole buyer, and a dangling link can also just mean the prior claim lives on another installation; see DECISIONS.md D-006. A buying agent can call this BEFORE paying a seller to see that seller's raw delivery history for gpu-hours, storage, api-credits, and bandwidth claims.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sellerAddress | string | yes | 0x address of the agent/service that was paid and was supposed to deliver |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
record_delivery Record a delivery claim ~552
Record a signed delivery claim after an x402 capacity settlement (gpu-hours, storage, api-credits, or bandwidth). The buyer agent calls this AFTER paying, once it knows whether what was promised actually arrived. The claim's schema and signature (must recover to buyerAddress) are validated before it is written to the append-only ledger. This is a factual receipt, not a reputation score — see get_delivery_history for how other agents read it back. OPTIONAL priorClaimId: set it to the claimId of your (this buyer's) previous claim about the SAME sellerAddress, so your claims about that seller form a chain. It is optional and omitted on your first claim about a seller. Chaining lets a reader later detect a host that hides one of your middle claims; it is signed into the claim so a host cannot strip it. See DECISIONS.md D-006.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assetType | string | yes | What kind of capacity this claim is about |
| buyerAddress | string | yes | 0x address of the paying agent — must match the address recovered from `signature` |
| claimId | string | yes | Content-addressed id: sha256 of the canonical JSON of this claim's content fields — see computeClaimId() |
| delivered | string | yes | Whether what was promised actually arrived |
| evidenceHash | string | yes | sha256 hex digest of evidence for this claim (logs, response payload, etc.) — the evidence itself is not stored here |
| externalRefs | object | – | Optional, unverified pointers into other agent-economy infrastructure (identity, authority, intent, dispute). Tokenizen never resolves or trusts these — they are citations, not verified facts |
| measured | object | – | Optional quantitative record of how much was promised and how much was measured. Presence is the version marker; absence is the only encoding of 'not measured' |
| priorClaimId | string | – | Optional chain link: the claimId of this buyer's immediately previous claim about the SAME sellerAddress. Omitted on a buyer's first claim about a seller. Lets a reader detect a host that hides a mid… |
| promisedSpec | – | yes | What the seller promised to deliver — free text or a structured object |
| sellerAddress | string | yes | 0x address of the agent/service that was paid and was supposed to deliver |
| settlementRef | string | yes | x402 payment reference or on-chain tx hash for the settlement this claim is about |
| signature | string | yes | Buyer's EIP-191 personal-sign signature over claimId |
| timestamp | string | yes | ISO-8601 timestamp of when this claim was made |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_agent_identity Resolve an ERC-8004 agent identity (read-only, on-chain) ~280
Look up an agent's on-chain identity registration in an ERC-8004 Identity Registry: who owns the agentId (ownerOf) and where its registration file lives (tokenURI). Read-only — never writes anything, never touches the delivery ledger. Requires the caller to supply BOTH the registry reference (chain + contract address) AND an RPC endpoint for that chain: this tool does not assume, default, or bundle its own RPC provider or a canonical registry address, since ERC-8004 has independent deployments on multiple chains. This tool does NOT fetch or parse what tokenURI points to — it returns that pointer as-is for the caller to resolve themselves. capacity-attest never verifies or endorses what an ERC-8004 registration claims; see DECISIONS.md D-007.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | The ERC-721 tokenId / ERC-8004 agentId, as a decimal string |
| agentRegistryRef | string | yes | Compound ERC-8004 registry reference: "eip155:<chainId>:<registryAddress>", e.g. "eip155:1:0x1234567890123456789012345678901234567890" |
| rpcUrl | string | yes | JSON-RPC endpoint (http:// or https://) for the chain named in agentRegistryRef — never assumed or defaulted |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the io.github.holistis/capacity-attest MCP server?
io.github.holistis/capacity-attest is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.holistis/capacity-attest. Signed delivery claims for x402 capacity trades: GPU-hours, storage, API credits, bandwidth. This page covers its npm package (capacity-attest).
Is the io.github.holistis/capacity-attest MCP server safe to use?
io.github.holistis/capacity-attest scores 72 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 20 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.holistis/capacity-attest MCP server expose?
io.github.holistis/capacity-attest exposes 3 tools: record_delivery, get_delivery_history, resolve_agent_identity. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,204 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.holistis/capacity-attest MCP server still maintained?
io.github.holistis/capacity-attest is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the io.github.holistis/capacity-attest MCP server under?
io.github.holistis/capacity-attest declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.