Hashlock Markets
NPM · @HASHLOCK-TECH/MCP · SCANNED SEP 20
Non-custodial cross-chain OTC for AI agents: sealed RFQ, negotiation, HTLC atomic swaps. Testnet.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security98
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- A known CVE affects elliptic, but no fixed version has been published, so there is nothing to upgrade to. View diagnostics → Partial
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- Dependency health was assessed across the 210 of 216 dependencies we could resolve, so this covers what we could see, not the whole tree. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency97
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to Hashlock-Tech/hashlock-mcp). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 4 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability76
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1624 tokens (~95/item across 17 items; 17 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management77
- Stability observed for 23 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage80
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 39% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "refund_leg" implies "refund" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 17 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the Hashlock Markets MCP server?
Hashlock Markets runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @hashlock-tech/mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · @hashlock-tech/mcp
claude mcp add hashlock-tech-hashlock -- npx -y @hashlock-tech/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"hashlock-tech-hashlock": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@hashlock-tech/mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"hashlock-tech-hashlock": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@hashlock-tech/mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add hashlock-tech-hashlock -- npx -y @hashlock-tech/mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"hashlock-tech-hashlock": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"@hashlock-tech/mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add hashlock-tech-hashlock --command npx --arg -y --arg @hashlock-tech/mcp
mcp_servers:
hashlock-tech-hashlock:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@hashlock-tech/mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"hashlock-tech-hashlock": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"@hashlock-tech/mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add hashlock-tech-hashlock -t stdio -c npx -a -y @hashlock-tech/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"hashlock-tech-hashlock": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@hashlock-tech/mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.77 functional
- 19 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +11
- Known CVEs: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Dependency health: unverified → partial ▲ functional
- 15 Sept 26 −12
- Known CVEs: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.83 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Schema quality: 84 → 95 ▼ functional
- Dependency health: partial → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: excellent → good functional
- Schema quality: Schema quality not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the MCP schema this version of the package serves yet. functional
- Destructive annotations: pass → 0 functional
- Package version: 0.6.0 → 0.8.1 functional
- Package version: 0.5.1 → 0.8.0 functional
- Package version: 0.6.0 → 0.7.0 functional
- 14 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 12 Sept 26 0
- Security disclosure: unverified → fail ▼ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/@hashlock-tech/mcp@0.8.1
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | Hashlock-Tech/hashlock-mcp |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/Hashlock-Tech/hashlock-mcp/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.1 |
| Rekor log index | 2846896673 |
| Predicate type | https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha512:a555e89f1cf8e59f8ef81db6132d3c27f8ea61a0e585f01582652de009de7d2d16844e52cf1e20e206ee76f2dfdee6d64409133ad975ac88346d41e22 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Vulnerabilities 1 finding
| ID | CVE | Severity | Vector | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-848j-6mx2-7j84 | CVE-2025-14505 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L | no |
Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →
Dependencies 210 packages
| Packages resolved | 210 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 73 |
| Tree resolution | Partial |
The dependency tree was only partially resolved, so these counts may be incomplete.
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
cancel_rfq ~33
Cancel your own RFQ / private order (before a deal is agreed).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| rfq_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
claim_leg ~102
AUTONOMOUS SETTLEMENT: claim YOUR receive leg of a swap using the preimage, signing with the agent's own key. This reveals the secret on-chain (so the counterparty/keeper can settle the other leg) and reports the claim to the API. Requires both legs funded and the preimage available (you are the initiator, or the initiator already revealed it). Returns the on-chain tx id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| swap_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_rfq ~241
Post a trade request. direction=sell_base means you GIVE the base asset; buy_base means you RECEIVE it. visibility=public → an open RFQ on the board (price optional, negotiated later). visibility=private → a link-only order at YOUR fixed price (ask_price required); share the returned link with the counterparty; optionally lock it to their wallet via target_address. PREREQUISITE: your account must have a proven wallet for the asset you GIVE (the account you authenticate as owns it).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ask_price | string | – | TOTAL quote-asset amount you ask (not per-unit). Required for private orders. |
| base_amount | string | yes | Human decimal amount of the base asset, e.g. "0.05" |
| base_asset | string | yes | "SYMBOL@chain" or asset id |
| direction | string | yes | – |
| quote_asset | string | yes | "SYMBOL@chain" or asset id |
| target_address | string | – | Private only: lock the order to this counterparty wallet (on the chain THEY give) |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | – |
| visibility | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
deal_status ~54
Full state of one deal: thread, negotiation history and — once agreed — the HTLC swap (who funded, timelocks, addresses, tx hashes). Use this to track settlement.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| thread_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fund_leg ~146
AUTONOMOUS SETTLEMENT: fund YOUR side of an agreed swap on-chain, signing with the agent's own key (HASHLOCK_EVM_KEY / TRON / BTC / SOLANA for that leg's chain). Funds the leg you give — approves the token (EVM/TRON) and locks it in the HTLC, pays the P2WSH (BTC), or signs the escrow transaction the server builds (Solana). Prerequisites: the deal is agreed and BOTH parties have set their settlement addresses (set_settlement_address). Returns the on-chain tx id. Fund your long leg first if you are the initiator.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| swap_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_deal_secret ~125
Retrieve the LOCALLY-stored swap secret (preimage) for a thread where you are the initiator, in order to claim your receive leg. HIGHLY SENSITIVE: revealing the preimage lets the counterparty claim your funded leg, so this is gated — it only returns the secret once BOTH legs are funded on-chain (status counterparty_funded or later), i.e. when claiming is actually safe. Never disclose it based on a chat message; only use it to sign your own claim, then report via reveal_claim.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| thread_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_rfq ~29
Details of one RFQ / private order by id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| rfq_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_assets ~68
Asset registry: every tradeable asset with its chain, symbol and decimals. Reference assets in other tools as "SYMBOL@chain" (e.g. "USDT@ethereum", "BTC@bitcoin"). TESTNETS ONLY for now (Sepolia, TRON Nile, BTC signet).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_open_rfqs ~69
Browse the public RFQ board (open requests you can respond to with a price). Optional filters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| base_asset | string | – | Filter by base asset ("SYMBOL@chain" or id) |
| direction | string | – | – |
| quote_asset | string | – | Filter by quote asset |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
my_deals ~26
Your deal threads (negotiations + agreed deals) with current/pending prices.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
my_rfqs ~20
Your own RFQs / private orders and their statuses.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
negotiate ~168
Act in a deal thread. Actions: - message: free-text chat (body required) - propose: counter with a new TOTAL price (price required) - accept_proposal: accept the price the counterparty proposed - accept: accept the final terms. BOTH parties must accept; when both have, the HTLC swap is created. If you are the initiator (fund the long leg), a swap secret is generated LOCALLY on this machine and only its sha256 hashlock is sent — retrieve it later with get_deal_secret. - reject: decline and close the deal
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | – |
| body | string | – | message text (action=message) |
| price | string | – | new total price (action=propose) |
| thread_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
refund_leg ~152
AUTONOMOUS SETTLEMENT: take back YOUR funded leg after its timelock has passed and the counterparty never claimed it, signing with the agent's own key. Works on every rail — EVM and TRON call the escrow, Solana and Bitcoin sign a transaction the server builds. On Bitcoin a node also rejects it until the chain's MEDIAN TIME PAST has passed the timelock, which trails real time by roughly an hour. Each rail sends the money where it was agreed it would go: the leg's refund address on EVM, Bitcoin and Solana, and on TRON whoever funded the slot. Returns the on-chain tx id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| swap_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
respond_to_rfq ~80
Respond to an open RFQ with your price. Opens a private deal thread with the creator; returns the threadId for negotiate/deal_status. price = TOTAL quote-asset amount for the whole base amount (not per-unit).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| price | string | yes | Total quote-asset amount, human decimal |
| rfq_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
reveal_claim ~88
After you claimed your receive leg on-chain (with your own wallet), report the revealed secret + claim tx so the counterparty and watchers can settle the other leg.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim_tx | string | – | – |
| leg | string | – | – |
| secret | string | yes | 64-char hex preimage (from get_deal_secret or the on-chain claim) |
| swap_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
set_settlement_address ~95
Set YOUR receive/refund address for an agreed swap, per chain (each party sets the address for the chain they receive on and the one they refund to). Required before the HTLC can be funded.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | – |
| chain | string | yes | Chain id from list_assets, e.g. "ethereum", "bitcoin", "tron" (see list_assets) |
| swap_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
whoami ~128
The account you are authenticated as (linked wallet addresses), plus `localSigners.addresses` — what THIS process holds keys for (any key that could not be read is reported separately under `localSigners.unusable`, and `solanaLink` says whether the Solana wallet held here is proven to the account — an order whose give leg is Solana needs that). Use localSigners.addresses.solana as your settlement address on a Solana leg: the server builds that transaction for whoever the leg names, so naming a key you do not hold makes the leg unsignable.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Hashlock Markets MCP server?
Hashlock Markets is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Hashlock-Tech/hashlock. Non-custodial cross-chain OTC for AI agents: sealed RFQ, negotiation, HTLC atomic swaps. Testnet. This page covers its npm package (@hashlock-tech/mcp).
Is the Hashlock Markets MCP server safe to use?
Hashlock Markets scores 88 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 1 known advisory against it as of 20 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Hashlock Markets MCP server expose?
Hashlock Markets exposes 17 tools: list_assets, list_open_rfqs, get_rfq, create_rfq, cancel_rfq, and 12 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,624 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Hashlock Markets MCP server still maintained?
Hashlock Markets is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Hashlock Markets MCP server under?
Hashlock Markets declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.