AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway
REMOTE · API.AGENTEXEC.DEV · SCANNED SEP 20
Monetization and execution gateway for autonomous AI agents on Base Mainnet
Available components
Recent critical change
Authorization (14 Sept 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (execute_onchain_intent). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 449 tokens (~112/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage81
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 44% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway is a hosted endpoint at https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.agentexec.dev
claude mcp add --transport http har50-gateway 'https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"har50-gateway": {
"url": "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"har50-gateway": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.har50-gateway] url = "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"har50-gateway": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add har50-gateway --url 'https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
har50-gateway:
url: "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"har50-gateway": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add har50-gateway -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"har50-gateway": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Sept 26 +3
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “dry_run_simulation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “execute_onchain_intent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “get_smart_account_info” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “issue_session_key” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “execute_onchain_intent” is now declared destructive security
- Schema quality: 90 → 112 ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation. functional
- 13 Sept 26 +36
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 0 functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 44 functional
- 5 Sept 26 23
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.agentexec.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 4 Sept 2026 | 3 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 7610ce65952ff9b60ead95fae07d0e92 |
| SANs: api.agentexec.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.agentexec.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| agentexec.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.agentexec.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
dry_run_simulation ~87
Simulates a transaction on Tenderly without broadcasting. Returns predicted gas and balance changes. Works without an API key (rate-limited per client) unless the operator disables public simulation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| calldata | string | yes | – |
| fromAddress | string | yes | – |
| maxAllowedDrainUSD | number | – | – |
| targetAddress | string | yes | – |
| valueWei | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
execute_onchain_intent ~170
Simulates and executes a gasless, sponsored Web3 transaction on Base L2 (e.g. token swaps, transfers). Runs Tenderly dry-run safety checks automatically before broadcasting. Requires an API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | – | Agent identifier for session scoping. |
| calldata | string | yes | Hex-encoded transaction calldata. |
| fromAddress | string | yes | The Safe Smart Account address performing the action. |
| maxAllowedDrainUSD | number | – | Maximum allowable wallet drain in USD during simulation guardrail check. |
| sessionKeyId | string | – | Optional ERC-7579 session key id to enforce spend/target caps. |
| targetAddress | string | yes | Target contract or token recipient address. |
| valueWei | string | – | Native token value in Wei (defaults to '0'). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_smart_account_info ~35
Retrieves the Agent Owner EOA address and counterfactual Safe Smart Wallet address on Base. Works without an API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
issue_session_key ~71
Issue an ERC-7579 / ZeroDev-scoped session key (time limit, USDC spend cap, target whitelist). Requires an API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | – |
| maxUsdc | number | – | – |
| target | string | – | – |
| ttlHours | number | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Har50/gateway. Monetization and execution gateway for autonomous AI agents on Base Mainnet. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp).
Is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server safe to use?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server expose?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway exposes 4 tools: execute_onchain_intent, get_smart_account_info, dry_run_simulation, issue_session_key. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 363 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server still maintained?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.