AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway
REMOTE · API.AGENTEXEC.DEV
Monetization and execution gateway for autonomous AI agents on Base Mainnet
Available components
Last scanned (21 hours ago)
Scores higher than 62% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
Recent critical change
Authorization (14 Sept 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (execute_onchain_intent). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability61
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 628 tokens (~157/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage82
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 47% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 1 Nov 26 −1
- Tool “dry_run_simulation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “execute_onchain_intent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “get_smart_account_info” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “issue_session_key” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.0.2 functional
- “execute_onchain_intent” added an optional parameter “paymentSignature” cosmetic
- “execute_onchain_intent” reworded the description of “maxAllowedDrainUSD” cosmetic
- “execute_onchain_intent” reworded the description of “sessionKeyId” cosmetic
- 13 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 12 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 7 Oct 26 +2
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.agentexec.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 2 Nov 2026 | 31 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | f9d452af6730e0850eb43caa5678ce6c |
| SANs: api.agentexec.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.agentexec.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| agentexec.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.agentexec.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
dry_run_simulation ~99
Simulates a transaction without broadcasting: on Tenderly when the operator has it enabled (gas and balance changes), otherwise an RPC gas estimate only. Works without an API key (rate-limited per client) unless the operator disables public simulation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| calldata | string | yes | – |
| fromAddress | string | yes | – |
| maxAllowedDrainUSD | number | – | – |
| targetAddress | string | yes | – |
| valueWei | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
execute_onchain_intent ~323
Simulates and executes a gasless, sponsored Web3 transaction on Base L2 (e.g. token swaps, transfers) against operator-allowlisted targets. Simulates before broadcasting: Tenderly when the operator has it enabled, otherwise an RPC gas estimate plus a USDC amount cap. Requires an API key. When the operator charges for execution, the first call returns the x402 USDC payment requirements; sign that EIP-3009 authorization locally (never send a private key) and call again with paymentSignature. Payment settles only after the target and simulation checks pass, and only for the exact price.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | – | Agent identifier for session scoping. |
| calldata | string | yes | Hex-encoded transaction calldata. |
| fromAddress | string | yes | The Safe Smart Account address performing the action. |
| maxAllowedDrainUSD | number | – | Maximum allowable wallet drain in USD. Checked against Tenderly balance changes; an RPC-only simulation reports none. |
| paymentSignature | string | – | Base64 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: { signature, payload: { from, to, value, validAfter, validBefore, nonce } } for the EIP-3009 USDC TransferWithAuthorization in the payment requirements. Single-use and exact… |
| sessionKeyId | string | – | Optional gateway-issued session key id to enforce spend/target caps. |
| targetAddress | string | yes | Target contract or token recipient address. |
| valueWei | string | – | Native token value in Wei (defaults to '0'). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_smart_account_info ~39
Retrieves the Agent Owner EOA address and Safe Smart Wallet address on Base, and whether the Safe is deployed. Works without an API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
issue_session_key ~81
Issue a scoped session key (time limit, USDC spend cap, target whitelist) enforced by the gateway; ZeroDev on-chain permissions only when the operator configures them. Requires an API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | – |
| maxUsdc | number | – | – |
| target | string | – | – |
| ttlHours | number | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway is a hosted endpoint at https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.agentexec.dev
claude mcp add --transport http har50-gateway 'https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp'
What is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Har50/gateway. Monetization and execution gateway for autonomous AI agents on Base Mainnet. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.agentexec.dev/mcp).
Is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server safe to use?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server expose?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway exposes 4 tools: execute_onchain_intent, get_smart_account_info, dry_run_simulation, issue_session_key. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 542 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway MCP server still maintained?
AgentExec WebMCP & Base L2 Gateway is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.