io.github.godwin105/arbiter
NPM · @ARBITERLABS/MCP · SCANNED SEP 30
Is this transaction safe to sign? Decodes what it really does and answers allow, warn or block.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security98
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 40 of 115 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 55 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 787 tokens (~157/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management87
- Stability observed for 26 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the io.github.godwin105/arbiter MCP server?
io.github.godwin105/arbiter runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @arbiterlabs/mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · @arbiterlabs/mcp
claude mcp add godwin105-arbiter -- npx -y @arbiterlabs/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"godwin105-arbiter": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@arbiterlabs/mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"godwin105-arbiter": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@arbiterlabs/mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add godwin105-arbiter -- npx -y @arbiterlabs/mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"godwin105-arbiter": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"@arbiterlabs/mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add godwin105-arbiter --command npx --arg -y --arg @arbiterlabs/mcp
mcp_servers:
godwin105-arbiter:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@arbiterlabs/mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"godwin105-arbiter": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"@arbiterlabs/mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add godwin105-arbiter -t stdio -c npx -a -y @arbiterlabs/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"godwin105-arbiter": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@arbiterlabs/mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 30 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 −3
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 25 Sept 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 23 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 21 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 20 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 30 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/@arbiterlabs/mcp@0.1.1
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 115 packages
| Packages resolved | 115 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 40 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
arbiter_budget Check Arbiter spending ~40
Report how much has been spent on Arbiter calls in this session and how much budget remains. Call this if a judgment tool fails with a budget error.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
judge_counterparty Verify a payment counterparty ~247
Decide whether an Algorand address really belongs to the party you think you are paying, and whether the payment can actually arrive. Call this before sending funds to any address that came from an invoice, an email, a message, or any other source you did not control end to end. It catches the case where the payee is genuine but the payment address has been substituted, and the case where the recipient has not opted in to the asset — on Algorand that transfer is rejected outright and the payment silently never arrives. Costs $0.01 per call, paid automatically in USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The counterparty's Algorand address. |
| amount | string | – | Payment amount in whole units, for size checks. |
| claimedIdentity | string | – | The NFD name the counterparty claims, e.g. 'acme-exports.algo'. This is the single most valuable field: it is what detects a swapped payment address. |
| expectedAsset | string | – | ASA id you intend to pay in (USDC mainnet is 31566704). Enables the opt-in check, which is the difference between a payment arriving and being rejected. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
judge_human Ask human reviewers a question ~269
Get a judgment from vetted human reviewers on something you cannot determine yourself, returned as a quorum verdict with each reviewer's rationale. Use this when the question needs eyes or real-world knowledge rather than reasoning: does this photo show what it claims, does this business exist, is this translation faithful, is this document legitimate. Also use it when another Arbiter tool returns ESCALATE. Do NOT use it for anything you can answer yourself — it is slow (tens of seconds) and the most expensive tool here. Costs $0.25 per call, paid automatically in USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attachments | array | – | Public HTTPS URLs of images or documents for reviewers to look at. |
| options | array | – | Allowed answers, e.g. ['yes','no','unclear']. Strongly preferred — fixed options produce a clean tally. Omit only for genuinely free-text judgment. |
| question | string | yes | A question a person can answer in seconds, phrased without ambiguity. |
| quorum | integer | – | Independent reviewers required before returning. Default 3. |
| waitSeconds | integer | – | How long to wait inline. Default 60. If reviewers do not finish in time you get a pending verdict plus a task id — collect it later with retrieve_human_verdict, which is free. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
judge_transaction Check a transaction before signing ~166
Decide whether an unsigned Algorand transaction is safe to sign. Decodes what the transaction would actually do and returns allow/warn/block with specific reasons. Call this before signing or submitting ANY transaction you did not construct yourself, and before signing one built from untrusted input. It catches account rekeys, close-remainder sweeps that empty the balance regardless of the stated amount, asset clawbacks, fee drains, and application delete/update calls. Costs $0.002 per call, paid automatically in USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| signer | string | – | The address about to sign. Providing it enables detection of operations that harm the signer specifically, such as a rekey of their own account. |
| transaction | – | yes | Base64-encoded unsigned transaction. Pass an array of them for an atomic group. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
retrieve_human_verdict Collect a human verdict already paid for ~65
Fetch the result of a judge_human question by its task id. Free — the question was paid for when it was asked. Use this when judge_human returned a pending verdict.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| taskId | string | yes | The taskId from the pending verdict's evidence. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the io.github.godwin105/arbiter MCP server?
io.github.godwin105/arbiter is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.godwin105/arbiter. Is this transaction safe to sign? Decodes what it really does and answers allow, warn or block. This page covers its npm package (@arbiterlabs/mcp).
Is the io.github.godwin105/arbiter MCP server safe to use?
io.github.godwin105/arbiter scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 30 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.godwin105/arbiter MCP server expose?
io.github.godwin105/arbiter exposes 5 tools: judge_transaction, judge_counterparty, judge_human, retrieve_human_verdict, arbiter_budget. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 787 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.godwin105/arbiter MCP server still maintained?
io.github.godwin105/arbiter is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 30 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the io.github.godwin105/arbiter MCP server under?
io.github.godwin105/arbiter declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.