global.rootz.ship/maritime
REMOTE · SHIP.ROOTZ.GLOBAL
Signed global shipping & commodity data: oil, LNG, grain, sanctions, fleet, emissions.
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 59% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security60
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 16 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1432 tokens (~89/item across 16 items; 16 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage80
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 40% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 16 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 16 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 16 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 30 Oct 26 0
- Schema quality: 80 → 89 ▼ functional
- New tool “shipping_port” functional
- New tool “shipping_port_calls” functional
- New tool “shipping_port_coverage” functional
- 10 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Oct 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://ship.rootz.global/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=ship.rootz.global | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 28 Oct 2026 | 26 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6e88017320aadb053779e5c469ee6cadc88 |
| SANs: ship.rootz.global | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC secure
Validation of ship.rootz.global. — Secure
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| global. | DS published | 52924 | 8 | Verified |
| rootz.global. | DS published | 40948, 52524 | 13, 13 | Verified |
| ship.rootz.global. | Verified address RRset verified with the apex keys |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://ship.rootz.global/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://ship.rootz.global/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://ship.rootz.global/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
shipping_chokepoint ~146
Maritime chokepoint intelligence for Hormuz, Suez, Malacca, or Bab el-Mandeb. Returns authoritative EIA baseline throughput (barrels/day, % of global), a live AIS snapshot (vessels/tankers/moving/stationary) for the chokepoint, sanctioned vessels currently detected there, and dark-fleet behavioural signals (loitering + AIS gaps). This is the tool for "how is Hormuz doing".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chokepoint | string | – | "Hormuz", "Suez", "Malacca", or "Bab el-Mandeb" |
| query | string | – | Alias for chokepoint (free text) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_country_flows ~67
Trade partners for a specific country (who they export to / import from). Pass the country as `country` or `query`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| country | string | – | – |
| direction | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| query | string | – | Alias for country |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_doc_intel ~99
Query the shipping document intelligence layer: eBL platform adoption (12 platforms), MLETR country adoption (23 countries, 13 enacted), document fraud cases ($11.3B), DCSA standards (10), industry stats (26 metrics). The state of shipping document digitization.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| topic | string | yes | Topic: "platforms", "mletr", "fraud", "standards", "stats", or "overview" |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_emissions ~141
Query EU MRV vessel emissions data — CO2, fuel consumption, time at sea for 22,543 vessels (2018-2024). Search by IMO, ship type, or year — or a free-text `query` (7-digit = IMO, else ship type/name).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| imo | string | – | IMO number (7 digits) |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| query | string | – | Free-text: IMO number or ship type/name |
| ship_type | string | – | Ship type filter (e.g., "Oil tanker", "LNG carrier") |
| year | string | – | Reporting period year (2018-2024) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_fleet ~86
Query tanker fleet database. Accepts structured filters OR a free-text `query` (matches vessel name, IMO, owner, or type).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| company | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| query | string | – | Free-text: vessel name, IMO, owner company, or type |
| search | string | – | – |
| vessel_type | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_freshness ~54
Per-dataset freshness only: pipeline refresh age vs expected cadence, newest record age, source, and status (ok / lagging / stale / empty / unknown). Use before relying on a figure that must be current.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_oil_prices ~34
Get oil price benchmarks (WTI, Brent)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| benchmark | string | – | – |
| days | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_oil_trade ~120
Query bilateral oil trade flows (EIA US imports/exports + Eurostat). Accepts structured filters OR a free-text `query` (matches country/notes). NOTE: this is import/export flow data, NOT chokepoint throughput — for Hormuz transit volumes use shipping_chokepoint.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| partner | string | – | – |
| period | string | – | – |
| product | string | – | – |
| query | string | – | Free-text: a country name or keyword |
| reporter | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_port ~170
What this service holds about ONE port, and how good the evidence is. Returns NGA World Port Index identity (UN/LOCODE, coordinates, harbour class, channel/anchorage/pier depths), the evidence grade for our movement data (origin = the authority publishes its own board / custody = a third party publishes it / measured = AIS inference only, asserted by nobody / none), what we do NOT hold, and what happened the last time we fetched the port's own website. Pass a port name, UN/LOCODE, or WPI port number as `query`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| port | string | – | Alias for query |
| query | string | – | Port name, UN/LOCODE (e.g. NZTRG), or WPI port number |
| unlocode | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_port_calls ~122
Berth-level vessel movements harvested from port authority movement boards: vessel, IMO, arrival/departure, berth, agent, declared last/next port. Each row carries its source and whether the channel was TLS-verified. This is TESTIMONY from the port, distinct from the AIS-inferred port_visits behind other tools. Pass a port name or an IMO as `query`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| imo | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| port | string | – | – |
| query | string | – | Port name or 7-digit IMO |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_port_coverage ~94
Coverage ledger across all 2,951 ports: how many we hold at each evidence grade, how many publish a machine-readable movement board, and what happened when we checked those that do not. Call this to find out what this service does NOT know about ports before relying on what it does.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| country | string | – | Optional ISO-2 or country name filter |
| query | string | – | Alias for country |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_sanctioned_at_eu ~118
Find sanctioned vessels that called at EU/EEA ports. Cross-references OFAC sanctions with EU MRV emissions data (verifiable IMO-level identity). Filter by year or a free-text `query` (sanctions program e.g. "Iran"/"Russia", flag, or vessel name).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| query | string | – | Program (e.g. "Iran"), flag state, or vessel name |
| year | string | – | Filter by year (2018-2024) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_sanctions ~32
Check vessel/entity against OFAC sanctions
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | – |
| type | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_status ~60
Database statistics plus per-dataset freshness: how recently each dataset was refreshed by our pipeline, how old its newest record is, and whether it is ok / lagging / stale / empty. Call this to decide how much to trust anything else this server returns.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_top_exporters ~73
Top oil exporting countries by value/volume (a ranking — no query needed). Optional `product` or `query` recognizes a product keyword (crude/refined/lng/coal/iron_ore).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| product | string | – | – |
| query | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shipping_vessel_types ~16
Fleet breakdown by vessel type
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server?
global.rootz.ship/maritime is a hosted endpoint at https://ship.rootz.global/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · ship.rootz.global
claude mcp add --transport http global-rootz-ship-maritime 'https://ship.rootz.global/mcp'
What is the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server?
global.rootz.ship/maritime is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as global.rootz.ship/maritime. Signed global shipping & commodity data: oil, LNG, grain, sanctions, fleet, emissions. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://ship.rootz.global/mcp).
Is the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server safe to use?
global.rootz.ship/maritime scores 73 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server expose?
global.rootz.ship/maritime exposes 16 tools: shipping_oil_trade, shipping_sanctions, shipping_fleet, shipping_oil_prices, shipping_status, and 11 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,432 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to global.rootz.ship/maritime without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server still maintained?
global.rootz.ship/maritime is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the global.rootz.ship/maritime MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on global.rootz.ship/maritime, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about global.rootz.ship/maritime: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.