Aguara MCP
OCI · GHCR.IO/GARAGON/MCP-AGUARA:0.8.0 · SCANNED AUG 3
Scan skills, MCP configs, and agent content for injection and supply-chain risks. Offline, no LLM.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Supply Chain Security0
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- CVE data not yet available for this package.Unverified
- Install-script risk not yet assessed.Unverified
- Dependency-health data not yet available.Unverified
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 32 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 992 tokens (~198/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Unverified: 2 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
oci · ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0
claude mcp add garagon-mcp-aguara -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0
codex mcp add garagon-mcp-aguara -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"garagon-mcp-aguara": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"docker",
"run",
"--rm",
"-i",
"ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} mcp_servers:
garagon-mcp-aguara:
command: "docker"
args: ["run", "--rm", "-i", "ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0"] {
"mcpServers": {
"garagon-mcp-aguara": {
"command": "docker",
"args": [
"run",
"--rm",
"-i",
"ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 31 Jul 26 −5
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Jul 26 +30
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- 26 Jul 26 11
First indexed and scored.
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Analysed oci/ghcr.io/garagon/mcp-aguara:0.8.0
Provenance none
Ecosystem: oci · Outcome: none
Reason: no_attestation
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
check_mcp_config ~196
Check an MCP server configuration (JSON) for security issues before adding it to a client. Detects dangerous command shapes in `command`/`args`, credential exposure in `env`, unsafe argument injection, and tool-poisoning patterns. Use on any MCP server config block (`mcpServers` entries from Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, etc.) before installing or enabling it. Sensitive matches are redacted in the response.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| config | string | yes | The MCP configuration as a JSON string |
| disabled_rules | array | — | List of rule IDs to disable (e.g., ["PROMPT_INJECTION_001"]) |
| min_severity | string | — | Minimum severity to report: INFO, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, or CRITICAL |
| scan_profile | string | — | Scan profile: strict (default, all rules), content-aware (reduced FP for known tools), or minimal (flag-only mode) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
discover_mcp ~86
Discover MCP server configurations on the local machine by reading known MCP client config files (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, and others). Returns the server definitions including commands, arguments, and environment variables. Read-only: this tool never executes the discovered commands and never connects to any server; pair with `check_mcp_config` to evaluate each definition before acting on it.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
explain_rule ~121
Get detailed information about a specific security rule by ID. Resolves both YAML rules (returns patterns plus true/false-positive examples) and analyzer-emitted rules from ci-trust, pkgmeta, jsrisk, pyrisk, rsbuild, npm-policy, pnpm-policy, agent-policy, NLP, toxic-flow, and rug-pull (returns severity, category, analyzer name, description, and remediation; analyzer rules have no inline patterns or examples).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| rule_id | string | yes | The rule ID to explain (e.g., PROMPT_INJECTION_001) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_rules ~151
List the security rules cataloged by Aguara. Returns 250 detections (193 YAML pattern rules + 57 analyzer-emitted rules from ci-trust, pkgmeta, jsrisk, pyrisk, rsbuild, npm-policy, pnpm-policy, agent-policy, NLP, toxic-flow, and rug-pull analyzers) spanning multiple threat categories. Optionally filter by category (e.g. `prompt-injection`, `exfiltration`, `credential-leak`, `supply-chain`, `mcp-attack`, `toxic-flow`, `agent-trust`).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| category | string | — | Filter rules by category (e.g., prompt-injection, exfiltration, credential-leak) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_content ~398
Scan text for security threats before acting on it. Works on agent skills, READMEs, tool definitions, MCP server descriptions, prompts, package manifest content (package.json), GitHub Actions workflow YAML when filename contains `.github/workflows/`, Claude Code settings when filename is `.claude/settings.json` or `.claude/settings.local.json`, agent instruction files (`.cursorrules`, `.windsurfrules`, `.clinerules`, `AGENTS.md`, `copilot-instructions.md`), npm install-trust policy when filename is `.npmrc` or `package.json`, and pnpm policy when filename is `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. Detects prompt injection (pattern + NLP), credential leaks, data exfiltration, command execution, supply-chain patterns, MCP attacks, package metadata risks, JavaScript / Python / Rust install-time payload shapes, GitHub Actions trust chains, risky agent host configuration, weakened npm / pnpm supply-chain settings, and Unicode / encoding evasion. Findings are categorized by severity with remediation hints. Sensitive matches are redacted before output. Supports context-aware false-positive reduction via tool_name.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | The text content to scan (e.g., skill description, README, tool definition) |
| disabled_rules | array | — | List of rule IDs to disable (e.g., ["PROMPT_INJECTION_001"]) |
| filename | string | — | Filename hint for the content (affects rule matching). Default: skill.md |
| min_severity | string | — | Minimum severity to report: INFO, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, or CRITICAL |
| scan_profile | string | — | Scan profile: strict (default, all rules), content-aware (reduced FP for known tools), or minimal (flag-only mode) |
| tool_name | string | — | Tool that generated the content (e.g., Bash, Edit, WebFetch). Enables context-aware false-positive reduction |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.