ARBITER
REMOTE · API.GRIP.FYI
Decision arbitration, action routing, workflow control, deployment remediation, persistent memory.
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 61% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category AI and Machine Learning
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability76
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 363 tokens (~181/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (11)
- TLS certificate
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (2)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
- HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 25 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 24 Oct 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 12 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.93 → pass security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.grip.fyi/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=grip.fyi | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 1 Oct 2026 | 30 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 61c6433894a53fb0ea7287d642cdfd5 |
| SANs: grip.fyi, *.grip.fyi | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.grip.fyi. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| fyi. | DS published | 6839 | 8 | Verified |
| grip.fyi. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.grip.fyi/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.grip.fyi/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
arbiter_compare ~215
Paid ARBITER finite-candidate measurement for contextual choice. Use when a caller already has an explicit candidate field and needs it ordered against a query, current state, intent, context, question, or perspective. query is the situation to measure. candidates is the finite caller-supplied field to order. top_k optionally limits returned results. Returns MCP text content containing the JSON result from POST /v1/compare with the supplied candidates ordered by measured coherence. Does not generate candidates or execute the selected action. Deterministic for identical inputs and engine state. Price: $0.01 USDC on Base per call. MCP identity: fyi.grip/arbiter.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| candidates | array | yes | Finite caller-supplied candidate field to order. ARBITER measures these candidates and does not generate them. |
| query | string | yes | Current state, context, intent, question, or perspective to measure against the candidate field. |
| top_k | integer | – | Optional maximum number of highest-ranked candidates to return. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
arbiter_embed ~148
Paid ARBITER deterministic persistent machine representation. Use when a caller needs representations of supplied text for storage, indexing, retrieval, clustering, reuse, or later comparison. Use arbiter_compare instead when an explicit finite candidate field needs ordering now. texts is one or more supplied strings. Returns MCP text content containing the JSON result from POST /v1/embed. Does not store, retrieve, update, delete, or rank records. Deterministic for identical inputs and engine state. Price: $0.01 USDC on Base per call. MCP identity: fyi.grip/arbiter.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| texts | array | yes | One or more supplied text values to convert into deterministic persistent machine representations. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ARBITER MCP server?
ARBITER is a hosted endpoint at https://api.grip.fyi/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.grip.fyi
claude mcp add --transport http fyi-grip-arbiter 'https://api.grip.fyi/mcp'
What is the ARBITER MCP server?
ARBITER is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as fyi.grip/arbiter. Decision arbitration, action routing, workflow control, deployment remediation, persistent memory. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.grip.fyi/mcp).
Is the ARBITER MCP server safe to use?
ARBITER scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ARBITER MCP server expose?
ARBITER exposes 2 tools: arbiter_compare, arbiter_embed. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 363 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ARBITER MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ARBITER without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ARBITER MCP server still maintained?
ARBITER is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the ARBITER MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 11 checks on ARBITER, covering TLS certificate, HSTS header, DNSSEC, Transport and 7 more. 2 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about ARBITER: Authorization and HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.