Fetter MCP
REMOTE · MCP.FETTER.IO
Real-time package and vulnerability data (Python, npm, Cargo, Go, and more) for AI coding agents.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 61% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability64
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 802 tokens (~200/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management83
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 30 days we've observed: 0 tool removals, 1 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 1 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “is_vulnerable” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “lookup” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “most_recent_not_vulnerable” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- “lookup” changed the type of “cvss_filter”: string → string|null ▼ functional
- “lookup” changed the type of “limit”: integer → integer|null ▼ functional
- “lookup” changed the type of “retain_passing”: boolean → boolean|null ▼ functional
- MCP protocol: fail → pass ▲ functional
- MCP protocol version: 2025-03-26 → 2026-07-28 functional
- Server version: 1.0.1 → 2.0.0 functional
- New tool “list_ecosystems” functional
- “is_vulnerable” added an optional parameter “ecosystem” cosmetic
- “lookup” added an optional parameter “ecosystem” cosmetic
- “most_recent_not_vulnerable” added an optional parameter “ecosystem” cosmetic
- “is_vulnerable” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “lookup” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “lookup” reworded the description of “retain_passing” cosmetic
- “most_recent_not_vulnerable” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- 13 Nov 26 +10
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- 12 Nov 26 −10
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- 9 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.fetter.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.fetter.io | CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01,O=Amazon,C=US | 26 Jul 2026 | 8 Feb 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 87b62283998d681a809e306e722e57d |
| SANs: mcp.fetter.io, www.mcp.fetter.io | ||||||
| CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01,O=Amazon,C=US (CA) | CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US | 23 Aug 2022 | 23 Aug 2030 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 77312380b9d6688a33b1ed9bf9ccda68e0e0f |
| CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US (CA) | CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2,O=Starfield Technologies\, Inc.,L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US | 25 May 2015 | 31 Dec 2037 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 67f944a2a27cdf3fac2ae2b01f908eeb9c4c6 |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.fetter.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | DS published | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| fetter.io. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.fetter.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.fetter.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.fetter.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
is_vulnerable ~199
Check if a specific package version has known vulnerabilities. Requires an exact version: 'requests==2.31.0' for Python (the default ecosystem), or 'name@version' for other ecosystems (e.g., 'lodash@4.17.15' with ecosystem 'npm').
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string|null | – | The package ecosystem: "python" (default), "npm", "cargo", "gha", "vscode", "go", "ruby", "php", or "swift". Call `list_ecosystems` for name formats and examples. |
| name | string | yes | The exact package name and version. For Python, use "==" (e.g., "requests==2.31.0"). For other ecosystems, use "name@version" (e.g., "lodash@4.17.15", "time@=0.1.43", "tj-actions/changed-files@v35"). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_ecosystems ~37
List the package ecosystems this server supports, with the default ecosystem, each ecosystem's registry, its package name format, and example names.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
lookup ~340
Look up a package by name and (optionally) version requirement to find which versions are available and/or have vulnerabilities. Supports multiple ecosystems via `ecosystem` (default: python).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cvss_filter | string|null | – | CVSS score filter: "all" to show all vulnerabilities, "max" to show only the maximum observed score, or a number (0.0-10.0) to filter by threshold |
| ecosystem | string|null | – | The package ecosystem: "python" (default), "npm", "cargo", "gha", "vscode", "go", "ruby", "php", or "swift". Call `list_ecosystems` for name formats and examples. |
| limit | integer|null | – | When the name is not an exact version, limit the number of recent versions to check. |
| name | string | yes | The package name with an optional requirement. For Python, a PEP 508 specifier (e.g., "requests", "numpy>=2.0", "flask==3.0.0"). For other ecosystems, "name" or "name@requirement" in the ecosystem's… |
| retain_passing | boolean|null | – | When the name is not an exact version, setting this to true will return references for all versions, including those with no vulnerabilities (default: false) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
most_recent_not_vulnerable ~154
Find the most recent version of a package that has no known vulnerabilities. Supports multiple ecosystems via `ecosystem` (default: python).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string|null | – | The package ecosystem: "python" (default), "npm", "cargo", "gha", "vscode", "go", "ruby", "php", or "swift". Call `list_ecosystems` for name formats and examples. |
| name | string | yes | The package name to look up. For Python, a name only (e.g., "requests"). For other ecosystems, a name (e.g., "lodash", "serde", "actions/checkout"), optionally with an "@requirement" range to search… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Fetter MCP server?
Fetter MCP is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.fetter.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.fetter.io
claude mcp add --transport http fetter-io-fetter-mcp 'https://mcp.fetter.io/mcp'
What is the Fetter MCP server?
Fetter MCP is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.fetter-io/fetter-mcp. Real-time package and vulnerability data (Python, npm, Cargo, Go, and more) for AI coding agents. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.fetter.io/mcp).
Is the Fetter MCP server safe to use?
Fetter MCP scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Fetter MCP server expose?
Fetter MCP exposes 4 tools: is_vulnerable, list_ecosystems, lookup, most_recent_not_vulnerable. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 730 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Fetter MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Fetter MCP without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Fetter MCP server still maintained?
Fetter MCP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Fetter MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Fetter MCP, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Fetter MCP: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.