TrustScan
REMOTE · TRUST-SCAN-PRODUCTION.UP.RAILWAY.APP · SCANNED SEP 20
Security scanner for MCP servers and skills: Unicode injection, patterns, secrets.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability87
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 370 tokens (~74/item across 5 items; 4 tools + 1 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management43
- Stability observed for 13 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
How do I install the TrustScan MCP server?
TrustScan is a hosted endpoint at https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · trust-scan-production.up.railway.app
claude mcp add --transport http entradox-trust-scan 'https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/'
{
"mcpServers": {
"entradox-trust-scan": {
"url": "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"entradox-trust-scan": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.entradox-trust-scan] url = "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"entradox-trust-scan": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add entradox-trust-scan --url 'https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
entradox-trust-scan:
url: "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/" {
"McpServers": {
"entradox-trust-scan": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/"
}
}
} assistant mcp add entradox-trust-scan -t streamable-http -u 'https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/'
{
"mcpServers": {
"entradox-trust-scan": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 27 to 30. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 8 days of observed history at the previous scan, 9 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Sept 26 −5
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Schema quality: 101 → 74 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: 100 functional
- New resource “trust-scan” functional
- New tool “read_skill” functional
- New tool “skills_list_tool” functional
- 12 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 8 Sept 26 +11
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Tool “trust_scan_file” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “trust_scan_server” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 42 → 101 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 67% → 100% ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Schema quality: good → excellent functional
- “trust_scan_file” reworded the description of “filepath” cosmetic
- “trust_scan_server” reworded the description of “package_name” cosmetic
- Tool “trust_scan_file” changed its title: Trust Scan File → Scan Single File cosmetic
- Tool “trust_scan_server” changed its title: Trust Scan Server → Scan MCP Server or Skill Package cosmetic
- 7 Sept 26 62
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.up.railway.app | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 29 Jul 2026 | 27 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6da79bb561da3efeb0e751ca21abd3999fe |
| SANs: *.up.railway.app, up.railway.app | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of trust-scan-production.up.railway.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | present | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| railway.app. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/ | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/ | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/ |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
read_skill Read Skill ~50
Read a product skill file by its skill:// URI.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| uri | string | yes | e.g. skill://<product>/<skill-name>/SKILL.md Get valid URIs from `skills_list_tool`. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
skills_list_tool Skills List Tool ~51
List this product's skills. Each entry carries the SKILL.md URI, its name and description, verbatim frontmatter, and a per-file sha256 manifest. Read a body with `read_skill`.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
trust_scan_file Scan Single File ~66
Security-scan a single file for invisible Unicode, dangerous patterns, and secrets. Returns a severity-weighted score and per-finding detail (rule, severity, location). Read-only: the file is never modified.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| filepath | string | yes | absolute path of the file to scan |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
trust_scan_server Scan MCP Server or Skill Package ~136
Security-scan an MCP server or skill package before trusting it. Runs all four checks — invisible Unicode prompt-injection, dangerous code patterns (MCP001–006), hardcoded secrets, typosquat package names — and returns a 0-100 score, letter grade, and detailed findings. Run this on any directory BEFORE wiring it into your agent. Read-only: never modifies the scanned target.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| package_name | string | – | package name for typosquat detection (e.g. "mcp-server") |
| path | string | yes | directory or file path to scan (on the TrustScan host) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
What is the TrustScan MCP server?
TrustScan is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.entradox/trust-scan. Security scanner for MCP servers and skills: Unicode injection, patterns, secrets. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/).
Is the TrustScan MCP server safe to use?
TrustScan scores 72 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the TrustScan MCP server expose?
TrustScan exposes 4 tools: trust_scan_server, trust_scan_file, skills_list_tool, read_skill. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 303 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the TrustScan MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to TrustScan without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the TrustScan MCP server still maintained?
TrustScan is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.