Emilia Protocol
NPM · @EMILIA-PROTOCOL/MCP-SERVER · SCANNED AUG 3
Trust & human sign-off for AI agents: approval required before irreversible agent actions
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Supply Chain Security86
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- Only part of the dependency tree could be resolved (94 of 98), so this covers what we could see, not the whole tree.Partial
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- Only part of the dependency tree could be resolved (94 of 98), so this covers what we could see, not the whole tree. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (Apache-2.0).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 11 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability85
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1989 tokens (~94/item across 21 items; 17 tools + 4 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
npm · @emilia-protocol/mcp-server
claude mcp add emiliaprotocol-mcp-server -- npx -y @emilia-protocol/mcp-server
codex mcp add emiliaprotocol-mcp-server -- npx -y @emilia-protocol/mcp-server
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"emiliaprotocol-mcp-server": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"@emilia-protocol/mcp-server"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add emiliaprotocol-mcp-server --command npx --arg -y --arg @emilia-protocol/mcp-server
mcp_servers:
emiliaprotocol-mcp-server:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@emilia-protocol/mcp-server"] {
"mcpServers": {
"emiliaprotocol-mcp-server": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@emilia-protocol/mcp-server"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Aug 26 +51
- Provenance: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Install scripts: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Known CVEs: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Security disclosure: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Dependency health: unverified → partial ▲ functional
- Maintenance: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.27 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → excellent ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- License: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Licence: Apache-2.0 functional
- 2 Aug 26 0
- Security disclosure: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- 1 Aug 26 −15
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 −18
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 27 Jul 26 53
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Analysed npm/@emilia-protocol/[email protected]
Provenance none
Ecosystem: npm · Outcome: none
Dependencies 94 packages
94 packages in the resolved dependency tree · 94 deprecated · 29 stale.
The dependency tree was only partially resolved, so these counts may be incomplete.
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
ep_add_presentation ~173
Add an identity presentation (proof) to an active handshake. WRITE: appends the party's identity claims to the handshake for evaluation against its policy; supports full, selective, or zero-knowledge disclosure. Requires auth. Returns the updated presentation count and handshake state. Call after ep_initiate_handshake and before ep_verify_handshake.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claims | object | yes | Identity claims being presented |
| disclosure_mode | string | — | Disclosure mode: "full", "selective", "zk" |
| handshake_id | string | yes | Handshake ID to present to |
| issuer_ref | string | — | Optional credential issuer reference |
| party_role | string | yes | Role of the presenting party |
| presentation_type | string | yes | Type: "verifiable_credential", "ep_trust_profile", "attestation" |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_bind_receipt_to_commit ~76
Bind a post-action receipt to a commit, completing the commit-execute-receipt cycle. Links the behavioral outcome back to the signed authorization token.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commit_id | string | yes | Commit ID to bind to (epc_...) |
| receipt_id | string | yes | Receipt ID to bind (ep_rcpt_...) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_check_signoff ~73
Poll a pending authorization after ep_guard_action returns BLOCKED. Pass the receipt_id. Returns PENDING, APPROVED (the action may now proceed), or DENIED (with reason). Safe to call repeatedly until a decision is reached.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | The receipt_id returned by ep_guard_action. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_create_delegation ~201
Create a delegation record. WRITE: persists to the EP ledger that a human or principal authorizes an agent to act on their behalf, with scope, expiry, and optional constraints. Requires auth. Returns a delegation_id that later actions reference (via ep_verify_delegation) to prove authorization. Use when a principal grants an agent standing authority for a bounded set of actions.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_entity_id | string | yes | The agent entity being authorized |
| constraints | object | — | Additional constraints (geo, merchant_category, etc.) |
| expires_at | string | — | ISO8601 expiry timestamp. If omitted, defaults to 24 hours. |
| max_value_usd | number | — | Maximum transaction value in USD this delegation authorizes (optional) |
| principal_id | string | yes | The principal (human/org) granting the delegation |
| scope | array | yes | List of permitted action types (e.g. ["purchase", "book", "send_email"]) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_get_commit_status ~71
Get the current state of a pre-action commit by id. Read-only. Returns one of active, revoked, expired, or fulfilled, plus the bound action hash and expiry — poll this to learn whether a commit may still be consumed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commit_id | string | yes | Commit ID (epc_...) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_get_handshake ~51
Get the full state of a handshake including parties, presentations, binding, and result. Use this to check handshake progress or review completed exchanges.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handshake_id | string | yes | Handshake ID to retrieve |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_guard_action ~260
REQUIRED before any irreversible action: payments, wire transfers, fund releases, deletions, record or account changes, or sending messages with real-world effect. Submits the exact action for policy evaluation and human authorization. Returns APPROVED with a receipt the action may proceed under, or BLOCKED with a receipt_id + signoff_id while a named human reviews. Do NOT execute the action without an APPROVED result — if BLOCKED, poll ep_check_signoff with the receipt_id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | string | yes | Kind of action, e.g. "large_payment_release", "vendor_bank_account_change", "ai_agent_payment_action". |
| amount | number | — | Amount, for payments/releases. |
| currency | string | — | ISO currency code, e.g. "USD". |
| destination | string | — | Where funds or data are going (account, address). |
| organization_id | string | yes | The organization this action belongs to. |
| risk_flags | array | — | Optional risk signals, e.g. ["new_destination","after_hours"]. |
| summary | string | — | One-line, human-readable description the approver will see. |
| target_resource_id | string | yes | What is being acted on — an invoice id, account id, or record id. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_initiate_handshake ~131
Initiate an EP Handshake — a structured identity exchange between parties. The handshake coordinates mutual presentation of identity proofs before a trust decision. Requires at least 2 parties and a governing trust policy.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| binding | object | — | Optional binding constraints |
| interaction_id | string | — | Optional external interaction reference |
| mode | string | yes | Handshake mode: "mutual", "one-way", "delegated" |
| parties | array | yes | Parties in the handshake (min 2). Each: { entity_ref, role } |
| policy_id | string | yes | Trust policy governing the handshake |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_install_preflight ~161
BEFORE installing or enabling third-party software an agent depends on — an npm package, GitHub app, browser extension, or MCP server — check it here. Evaluates the software against a fit-for-purpose trust policy and returns allow / review / deny with reasons covering publisher, requested permissions, provenance, and trust history.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| context | object | — | Install context: { host, install_scope, permission_class, data_sensitivity, execution_mode } |
| entity_id | string | yes | Software entity ID (e.g. github_app:acme/code-helper) |
| policy | string | — | Software policy: github_private_repo_safe_v1, npm_buildtime_safe_v1, browser_extension_safe_v1, mcp_server_safe_v1, or standard EP policies |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_issue_commit ~193
Issue a signed EP Commit before a high-stakes action. Returns a commit_id, decision (allow/deny/review), expiry, scope, and appeal path. The commit binds the agent to a specific action type, entity, and policy before execution.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | string | yes | Action type: install, connect, delegate, transact |
| context | object | — | Additional context metadata (optional) |
| counterparty_entity_id | string | — | Counterparty entity ID (optional) |
| delegation_id | string | — | Delegation ID if acting under delegation (optional) |
| entity_id | string | yes | Entity requesting the commit |
| max_value_usd | number | — | Maximum value in USD (optional) |
| policy | string | — | Trust policy to enforce (default: standard) |
| principal_id | string | — | Principal authorizing the action (optional) |
| scope | array | — | Action scope list (optional) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_list_policies ~30
List all available trust policies with their requirements and families. Use to discover which policy to evaluate against.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_revoke_commit ~93
Revoke an active pre-action commit before it is fulfilled or expires. SIDE EFFECT: terminally cancels the commit — it can never be consumed after this, and the change is irreversible. Requires auth. Returns the revoked status; use when a pending action should be called off.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commit_id | string | yes | Commit ID to revoke (epc_...) |
| reason | string | yes | Reason for revocation |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_revoke_handshake ~61
Revoke an active handshake. Only parties to the handshake may revoke it. Revocation is terminal — the handshake cannot be reopened.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handshake_id | string | yes | Handshake ID to revoke |
| reason | string | yes | Reason for revocation |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_verify_commit ~76
Verify a pre-action commit — read-only, no side effects. Checks its signature, status, and validity and returns valid/invalid plus the current status, decision, and expiry. Use before relying on or consuming a commit to confirm it is genuine and still active.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commit_id | string | yes | Commit ID (epc_...) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_verify_delegation ~92
Verify that an agent currently holds a valid delegation from a principal for a specific action. Use this before accepting a task from an agent claiming to act on behalf of a human. Returns: valid/expired/not_found with scope details.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | string | — | The action type to check (must be in delegation scope) |
| delegation_id | string | yes | Delegation ID (ep_dlg_...) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_verify_handshake ~82
Evaluate all presentations in a handshake against its governing policy — read-only, no mutation. Returns accepted (all requirements met), rejected (policy violations), or partial (awaiting presentations), each with reason_codes explaining the outcome. Call after the parties have added their presentations to decide whether the handshake clears.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handshake_id | string | yes | Handshake ID to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ep_verify_receipt ~83
Verify a trust receipt — its signature and Merkle inclusion against the anchored root. Read-only. Returns valid/invalid plus the verified claim (action, approver, outcome) and anchor status; use it to independently confirm a receipt was issued by EP and has not been tampered with.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | Receipt ID (ep_rcpt_...) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.