TridentChain Security
PYPI · TRIDENTCHAIN-MCP · SCANNED SEP 21
Local supply-chain CVE scanner via OSV/NVD. Scans deps and IDE extensions. No upload.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised native-build step with no shell scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 1 of 34 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 53 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 706 tokens (~235/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management90
- Stability observed for 27 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the TridentChain Security MCP server?
TridentChain Security runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx tridentchain-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · tridentchain-mcp
claude mcp add devinder1-tridentchain-security -- uvx tridentchain-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"devinder1-tridentchain-security": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"tridentchain-mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"devinder1-tridentchain-security": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"tridentchain-mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add devinder1-tridentchain-security -- uvx tridentchain-mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"devinder1-tridentchain-security": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"uvx",
"tridentchain-mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add devinder1-tridentchain-security --command uvx --arg tridentchain-mcp
mcp_servers:
devinder1-tridentchain-security:
command: "uvx"
args: ["tridentchain-mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"devinder1-tridentchain-security": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "uvx",
"Arguments": [
"tridentchain-mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add devinder1-tridentchain-security -t stdio -c uvx -a tridentchain-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"devinder1-tridentchain-security": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"tridentchain-mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Sept 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 20 Sept 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 18 Sept 26 −2
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 17 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 15 Sept 26 −14
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 14 Sept 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Sept 2026 · Analysed pypi/tridentchain-mcp@0.1.5
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 34 packages
| Packages resolved | 34 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 1 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
scan_full ~205
Comprehensive scan covering THREE surfaces in one call that project-only scanners cannot reach: (1) project dependencies (npm, PyPI), (2) OS/system packages (Homebrew on macOS, apt/dnf on Linux), and (3) installed IDE extensions (VS Code marketplace + JetBrains plugins). Use this whenever the user asks for "complete coverage", a "full audit", scanning their "whole machine" or "system", or wants to check IDE extensions — these are a growing attack vector and most other vulnerability scanners miss them entirely. Slower than scan_project; pick scan_project for fast project-only checks. Findings are ranked by EPSS exploit probability and CISA KEV presence so the user sees what attackers are actually using first. Returns JSON plus HTML reports under output_dir.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| output_dir | – | – | – |
| project_path | string | yes | – |
| run_profile | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
scan_project ~186
Scan project dependencies for CVEs and rank findings by REAL-WORLD EXPLOITATION RISK using EPSS (exploit probability) and the CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) catalog — not just CVSS severity. Best for: when the user wants to know which CVEs to fix FIRST, asks about supply-chain risk in an IDE/conversational context, or wants to pair with validate_after_patch for a confirmed-fix workflow. Covers npm and PyPI manifests + lockfiles. For comprehensive coverage that also includes OS packages and IDE extensions, prefer scan_full. Returns JSON with status, EPSS-ranked findings list, and paths to HTML reports written under output_dir.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| output_dir | – | – | – |
| project_path | string | yes | – |
| run_profile | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
validate_after_patch ~145
Confirm that dependency upgrades actually resolved the CVEs they were supposed to fix. Use this whenever the user says they ran `npm update`, `pip install -U`, or applied a patch and wants verification — chain it with two scan_project calls (before/after) or pass two saved scan JSON results. This is unique to TridentChain; most other supply-chain scanners only report findings without a verifiable post-patch loop. Returns resolved_count, remaining_count, new_count, and validation_passed (true only when new findings == 0 and at least one was resolved).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after_patch_json | string | yes | – |
| baseline_json | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
What is the TridentChain Security MCP server?
TridentChain Security is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.DevInder1/tridentchain-security. Local supply-chain CVE scanner via OSV/NVD. Scans deps and IDE extensions. No upload. This page covers its PyPI package (tridentchain-mcp).
Is the TridentChain Security MCP server safe to use?
TridentChain Security scores 63 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 21 September 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the TridentChain Security MCP server expose?
TridentChain Security exposes 3 tools: scan_project, scan_full, validate_after_patch. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 536 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the TridentChain Security MCP server still maintained?
TridentChain Security is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the TridentChain Security MCP server under?
TridentChain Security declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.