dev.yafl/mcp
NPM · @YAFLDEV/MCP · SCANNED SEP 20
Agent-first E2EE file transfer over MCP: move files between machines in one tool call, gone in 24h.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security98
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 31 of 96 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to yafldev/mcp). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 49 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1011 tokens (~144/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "delete_file" implies "delete" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the dev.yafl/mcp server?
dev.yafl/mcp runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @yafldev/mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · @yafldev/mcp
claude mcp add dev-yafl-mcp -- npx -y @yafldev/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-yafl-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@yafldev/mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"dev-yafl-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@yafldev/mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add dev-yafl-mcp -- npx -y @yafldev/mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"dev-yafl-mcp": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"@yafldev/mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add dev-yafl-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg @yafldev/mcp
mcp_servers:
dev-yafl-mcp:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "@yafldev/mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"dev-yafl-mcp": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"@yafldev/mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add dev-yafl-mcp -t stdio -c npx -a -y @yafldev/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-yafl-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@yafldev/mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 14 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 9 Sept 26 −2
- Stability: pass → 0.83 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/@yafldev/mcp@0.1.6
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | yafldev/mcp |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/yafldev/mcp/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/heads/main |
| Rekor log index | 2314316392 |
| Predicate type | https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha512:7258aa78a170ba7325f2bbd7ee2c2efd8b4dc4c85fde05865d02d8c7cc43b54b46db4e0189debdd653932744abb15a0261ac7fbf24f31835223221945 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 96 packages
| Packages resolved | 96 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 31 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
delete_file Delete File ~105
Permanently deletes ONE of the caller's own YAFL transfers, identified by `id` (a bare transfer id or a full share URL — the fragment/key, if present, is never read). This cannot be undone: the R2 object is purged and the transfer record is removed. Destructive action.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | A YAFL transfer id, or a full share URL, e.g. https://yafl.dev/t/{id}#{key} |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
download_file Download File ~262
Downloads and decrypts exactly the one file referenced by the given YAFL share `url`, writing it only into `destDir` (default: the current working directory) — never anywhere else. Requires the decryption key embedded in the URL fragment; the key is used only locally to decrypt and is never sent to the API. No YAFL API key is required for retrieval — anyone holding the link can download it; only uploading or managing files requires a key. Optionally pass a `password` for password-protected links.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| destDir | string | – | Directory to write the downloaded file into (absolute or cwd-relative); defaults to the current working directory. The file is written only inside this directory. |
| password | string | – | Password for a password-protected (v2) link. Used only locally to derive the decryption key — never sent to the API. Required when the link is password-protected; omitting it on such a link returns a… |
| url | string | yes | A YAFL share URL including the fragment key (e.g. https://yafl.dev/t/{id}#{key}), OR the compact {id}#{key} retrieval code printed alongside it — both resolve identically. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
email_link Email a Share Link ~113
Emails this YAFL share link to a recipient. The link carries the decryption key in its fragment – anyone with access to that inbox can open the file. Requires a verified account.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| link | string | yes | A YAFL share URL including the fragment key (e.g. https://yafl.dev/t/{id}#{key}), OR the compact {id}#{key} retrieval code printed alongside it — both resolve identically. |
| recipient | string | yes | The email address to send the share link to. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_status Get Transfer Status ~111
Checks whether the YAFL share link at the given `url` is still live — live, expired, or not found — without downloading or decrypting anything. Returns liveness, size, and expiry only. Does not read the decryption key even if present in the URL fragment, and never fetches any file bytes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | A YAFL share URL, e.g. https://yafl.dev/t/{id}#{key} (the fragment/key is ignored by this tool) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_files List Files ~87
Lists the caller's OWN YAFL transfers only — metadata only (id, size, status, expiry, and a download path). Never returns file contents, never a decrypted name, and never another account's files. Optionally cap the number of results with `limit`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Maximum number of transfers to return (most recent first). Omit for the full capped list. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
login Log In ~103
Starts a device-code login for an MCP agent that has no shell. Returns a verification URL and a short user code for the human to open and approve in a browser; approving is a one-time email-link sign-in that proves the human controls the account. This tool does NOT open a browser itself - relay the returned URL and code to the human. Once approved, the minted API key is stored locally and subsequent tool calls in this session authenticate automatically, with no further action needed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
upload_file Upload File ~230
Encrypts and uploads exactly the file or directory at the given local `path` (absolute, or relative to the current working directory). A directory is zipped client-side into a single archive before upload. Reads only that one path – never scans unrelated files or directories. Returns a shareable link (24h expiry, 100MB cap) with the decryption key embedded in the URL fragment; the key is never sent to the API. Optionally make the link one-time (burned after the first download) or password-protected.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| oneTime | boolean | – | When true, the link is destroyed after the first successful download – a second download attempt returns a not_found-style error. Defaults to false (the link stays live until its normal 24h expiry). |
| password | string | – | Optional password to protect the link. Composed into the decryption key on the client via a fresh salt – never transmitted to the API. When set, the returned link requires this same password to decry… |
| path | string | yes | Absolute or cwd-relative path to the local file or directory to upload |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the dev.yafl/mcp server?
dev.yafl/mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as dev.yafl/mcp. Agent-first E2EE file transfer over MCP: move files between machines in one tool call, gone in 24h. This page covers its npm package (@yafldev/mcp).
Is the dev.yafl/mcp server safe to use?
dev.yafl/mcp scores 94 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 20 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the dev.yafl/mcp server expose?
dev.yafl/mcp exposes 7 tools: upload_file, get_status, download_file, list_files, delete_file, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,011 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the dev.yafl/mcp server still maintained?
dev.yafl/mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the dev.yafl/mcp server under?
dev.yafl/mcp declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.