dev.walkaround/walkaround
REMOTE · WALKAROUND.DEV
Launch check for AI-built apps: SAFE or DO NOT SHIP verdict, with evidence and paste-back fixes.
Available components
Last scanned (29 minutes ago)
Scores higher than 14% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security77
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- The endpoint enforces authorisation, but returns a challenge with no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify streamable-http. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. See how to fix → Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. See how to fix → Unverified
Unverified: 6 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm. Claim this server and supply a read-only token to verify it and lift the score.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 30 Oct 26 +3
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- 29 Oct 26 −42
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Stability: 0.23 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → fail ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 27 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 23 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 22 Oct 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 21 Oct 26 67
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://walkaround.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=walkaround.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 28 Oct 2026 | 26 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d94c86a76793a8da136ac2326c8e7a20 |
| SANs: walkaround.dev, *.walkaround.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of walkaround.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| walkaround.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On connection |
| HTTP status | 401 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://js.stripe.com https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self' https://api.stripe.com https://*.stripe.com https://*.stripe.network https://cloudflareinsights.com; frame-src https://js.stripe.com https://checkout.stripe.com https://*.stripe.com https://*.stripe.network; frame-ancestors 'self' https://proto.bolter.chat https://bolter.chat https://*.bolter.chat https://*.bolter.run |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), usb=(), payment=(self "https://js.stripe.com") |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | no_resource_metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://walkaround.dev/mcp | Auth required | 401 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://walkaround.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_receipt Read a receipt, and unseal it if there is credit ~133
Read a receipt back as JSON by its id. Folded, it returns the twelve lines and a pay object naming where a human pays. With a bearer token that has credit it unseals: the evidence and the fix paragraph for every open line, and the SOTA Security Model read of the app. One fixed price per unsealed report. 401 for a token we did not issue, 402 when the balance will not cover it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | The receipt id, from scan_app. |
| token | string | – | Optional API credit token. Without it the receipt comes back folded. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_app Check a web app before shipping it ~114
Run twelve deterministic checks against the outside of a public web app and return a dated verdict: the stamp, the open/closed/not-checked counts, every line with its plain-English consequence, what was skipped, and the receipt id and URL. Free, no token. It reads public pages only: it does not sign in, does not create an account and does not guess anything. A clean verdict is not a guarantee of safety.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | The app to check, e.g. https://example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the dev.walkaround/walkaround MCP server?
dev.walkaround/walkaround is a hosted endpoint at https://walkaround.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · walkaround.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-walkaround-walkaround 'https://walkaround.dev/mcp'
What is the dev.walkaround/walkaround MCP server?
dev.walkaround/walkaround is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.walkaround/walkaround. Launch check for AI-built apps: SAFE or DO NOT SHIP verdict, with evidence and paste-back fixes. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://walkaround.dev/mcp).
Is the dev.walkaround/walkaround MCP server safe to use?
dev.walkaround/walkaround scores 31 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the dev.walkaround/walkaround MCP server expose?
dev.walkaround/walkaround exposes 2 tools: scan_app, get_receipt. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 247 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the dev.walkaround/walkaround MCP server require authentication?
Yes. dev.walkaround/walkaround asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the dev.walkaround/walkaround MCP server still maintained?
dev.walkaround/walkaround is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.