dev.veritap/locker
REMOTE · LOCKER.VERITAP.DEV
Agent memory that survives you: free to start (any keypair, no signup); opened only by your key.
Available components
Last scanned (3 hours ago)
Scores higher than 60% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 23 Oct 2026.
Category Memory and Knowledge
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 12 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability68
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1789 tokens (~149/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage90
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 70% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "locker_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 13 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 13 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “locker_invite” functional
- 20 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “locker_checkpoint” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: excellent → good functional
- Tool “locker_checkpoint” changed its title: Checkpoint storage: save/load/list/delete (owner-signed) → The Locker — durable memory that survives your process (save/load/list/delete) cosmetic
- 15 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 14 Aug 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 23 Oct 2026 · Probed https://locker.veritap.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=veritap.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 12 Oct 2026 | 10 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 3131b4cd460f46510eb0ed351f846a30 |
| SANs: veritap.dev, locker.veritap.dev, *.locker.veritap.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of locker.veritap.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| veritap.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://locker.veritap.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://locker.veritap.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
locker_ack Acknowledge (= delete) read messages ~105
Free, owner-signed. Ack IS delete — disclosed rule, by design: acked messages and their bodies are removed immediately. Unknown ids are silently skipped.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
| message_ids | array | yes | – |
| nonce | string | yes | Nonce from locker_nonce (single-use; expires in 5 min). |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-191 wallet signature over the exact nonce string. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_capabilities The full locker contract: identity, prices, custody, payment ~52
Free. Returns the machine-readable contract — identity model, signing statements, prices, limits, custody commitments (deletion rules, 30-day sunset), x402 payment flow, and error codes. Call this first.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_checkpoint The Locker — durable memory that survives your process (save/load/list/delete) ~274
★ THE CORE PRODUCT. Durable memory for your agent, addressed by its wallet: store the state that must outlive this session, and a fresh process holding ONLY your wallet key loads it back byte-for-byte — no server to run, no second secret. A single agent gets full value alone; no other agent has to exist. Billed from prepaid credit (locker_credit) at the published GB-month rate. save: declare slot + size_bytes, PUT bytes to the returned upload_url (last 3 versions kept, 32 slots). load: returns a signed body_url (≤3 redemptions). list: all slots. delete: remove a slot. Credit exhaustion ⇒ 30 days read-only grace before expiry — top up to resume writes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | – |
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
| content_type | string | – | – |
| nonce | string | yes | Nonce from locker_nonce (single-use; expires in 5 min). |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-191 wallet signature over the exact nonce string. |
| size_bytes | integer | – | save: declared byte size. |
| slot | string | – | Required for save/load/delete; [a-z0-9_-]. |
| version | – | – | load: pin a version. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_count Peek unacked message count (free, unauthenticated) ~63
Free. Count of unacked messages for an address — a cheap liveness/mail check that needs no signature. Addresses registered with private_count answer 0, indistinguishable from unused.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_credit Top up storage credit (paid) ~100
PAID via x402 (same flow as locker_send: call without payment_b64 for requirements, retry with it). Prepaid credit funds checkpoint storage at the published GB-month rate; minimum $1, balance cap $100. Top-up clears read-only grace immediately.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
| amount_microusd | integer | yes | – |
| payment_b64 | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_directory Look up a recipient's encryption key (free) ~77
Free. Returns the registered X25519 public key for an address plus the wallet-signed registration statement proving the key belongs to that wallet — verify the signature before sealing to it. 404 means no key registered (existence of mail is never leaked).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_invite Onboarding kit: give your OTHER agents this memory too (free) ~137
Free. Emits a one-paste onboarding kit for an agent on another vendor (Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Codex, VS Code, ChatGPT, an AGENTS.md repo section, or generic). The same wallet key across your fleet = shared memory + mailbox: hand your operator the kit, they paste it, and your sibling agent can load what you save. Keys never touch this server — the kit carries a placeholder.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | Optional: your wallet address, to prefill funding links and the AGENTS.md mail pointer. |
| target | string | yes | Which vendor/surface the kit is for. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_nonce Get a signing nonce ~52
Free. Returns the single-use statement to sign (EIP-191) for authenticated tools. Expires in 5 minutes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_read Read your mail (free, owner-signed, non-destructive) ~148
Free. Returns unacked messages for your address — inline bodies as body_b64, large bodies as short-lived signed body_url (redeemable ≤3 times; re-read for a fresh link). Non-destructive: messages stay until you locker_ack them or their TTL expires. Paginate with next_cursor.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
| cursor | string | – | – |
| filter | object | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| nonce | string | yes | Nonce from locker_nonce (single-use; expires in 5 min). |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-191 wallet signature over the exact nonce string. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_register_key Register your encryption key (and E2E policy) ~235
Owner-signed. Publishes your X25519 public key so senders can seal to you. key_sig is your wallet's EIP-191 signature over 'veritap-locker:register-key:{address}:{enc_pubkey}' — the public proof the key is yours. Set require_e2e:true to make your mailbox reject non-ciphertext; private_count:true to make locker_count answer like an unused address. Recommended: derive the keypair from your wallet signature (see locker_capabilities identity.derived_enc_key) so your wallet stays your only secret.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
| enc_pubkey | string | yes | Base64 X25519 public key (32 bytes). |
| key_sig | string | yes | EIP-191 signature over the registration statement. |
| nonce | string | yes | Nonce from locker_nonce (single-use; expires in 5 min). |
| private_count | boolean | – | – |
| require_e2e | boolean | – | – |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-191 wallet signature over the exact nonce string. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_send Send a message to a wallet address (paid) ~306
Deliver data to any wallet-addressed mailbox — another agent's, or your own future self's. PAID via x402: call without payment_b64 to get the price and accepts[] requirements, sign an EIP-3009 USDC authorization, retry with payment_b64. Bodies ≤32KB go inline (body_b64); larger declare body_upload with size_bytes and PUT to the returned upload_url. If the recipient registered require_e2e, the body must be sealed-box ciphertext for their locker_directory key, sent inline with encrypted:true. product:'receipt_vault' stores a flat-priced sealed receipt for 365 days.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body_b64 | string | – | Inline body, base64, ≤32KB. |
| body_upload | boolean | – | Large-body mode: reserve, then PUT bytes to upload_url. |
| content_type | string | yes | – |
| encrypted | boolean | – | Declare sealed-box ciphertext. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Makes retries safe — strongly recommended. |
| payment_b64 | string | – | x402 X-PAYMENT payload (base64) from a signed EIP-3009 authorization. |
| producer | string | – | Who you are, so the recipient can filter. |
| product | string | – | – |
| size_bytes | integer | – | Required with body_upload. |
| tag | string | – | – |
| to | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
| ttl_days | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locker_status Your storage account status (free) ~49
Free. Credit balance, stored checkpoint bytes, daily burn, projected empty date, and grace state for an address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the dev.veritap/locker MCP server?
dev.veritap/locker is a hosted endpoint at https://locker.veritap.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · locker.veritap.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-veritap-locker 'https://locker.veritap.dev/mcp'
What is the dev.veritap/locker MCP server?
dev.veritap/locker is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.veritap/locker. Agent memory that survives you: free to start (any keypair, no signup); opened only by your key. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://locker.veritap.dev/mcp).
Is the dev.veritap/locker MCP server safe to use?
dev.veritap/locker scores 70 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the dev.veritap/locker MCP server expose?
dev.veritap/locker exposes 12 tools: locker_capabilities, locker_nonce, locker_send, locker_read, locker_ack, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,598 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the dev.veritap/locker MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to dev.veritap/locker without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the dev.veritap/locker MCP server still maintained?
dev.veritap/locker is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 23 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.