Redeal
REMOTE · API.REDEAL.DEV · SCANNED AUG 20
Neutral fairness computation for agents: fair division, verifiable random, Shapley shares.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 12 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability70
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1938 tokens (~161/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
- Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
remote · api.redeal.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-redeal-redeal https://api.redeal.dev/mcp
[mcp_servers.dev-redeal-redeal] url = "https://api.redeal.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"dev-redeal-redeal": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.redeal.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add dev-redeal-redeal --url https://api.redeal.dev/mcp --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
dev-redeal-redeal:
url: "https://api.redeal.dev/mcp" {
"mcpServers": {
"dev-redeal-redeal": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.redeal.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 19 Aug 26 0
- Server version: 0.6.0 → 0.7.0 functional
- New tool “get_public_certificate” functional
- “create_deal” added an optional parameter “visibility” cosmetic
- 18 Aug 26 +1
- Tool “list_algorithms” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “validate_input” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Server version: 0.5.0 → 0.6.0 functional
- Server version: 0.4.0 → 0.5.0 functional
- “create_deal” added an optional parameter “external_ref” cosmetic
- “create_deal” added an optional parameter “supersedes” cosmetic
- “create_deal” added an optional parameter “terms_hash” cosmetic
- “create_deal” reworded the description of “algorithm” cosmetic
- “create_deal” reworded the description of “algorithm_params” cosmetic
- “create_deal” reworded the description of “party_labels” cosmetic
- “reveal_input” reworded the description of “input” cosmetic
- “validate_input” reworded the description of “input” cosmetic
- 17 Aug 26 0
- Tool “list_algorithms” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Server version: 0.3.0 → 0.4.0 functional
- Server version: 0.2.0 → 0.3.0 functional
- “create_deal” reworded the description of “party_labels” cosmetic
- “create_deal” reworded the description of “algorithm” cosmetic
- “create_deal” reworded the description of “algorithm_params” cosmetic
- “reveal_input” reworded the description of “input” cosmetic
- 16 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: 1356 → 1564 ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Server version: 0.1.0 → 0.2.0 functional
- New tool “validate_input” functional
- 15 Aug 26 63
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Aug 2026 · Probed https://api.redeal.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.redeal.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 11 Aug 2026 | 9 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6e06508c816a6d30685000cc316640adf02 |
| SANs: api.redeal.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.redeal.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| redeal.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.redeal.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.redeal.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://api.redeal.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
commit_input ~149
Commit your sealed input as a hash (sealed mode). Nobody — including redeal — can see your input until all parties have committed. After the last commitment the deal opens for reveals immediately.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commitment | string | yes | "sha256:" + hex of sha256(JCS(your input JSON) ++ your salt bytes). Compute it locally; the server sees only this hash until everyone has committed. |
| deal_id | string | yes | The deal id (d_...). |
| idempotency_key | string|null | – | Optional: retries with the same key + same arguments replay the original response. |
| invite_token | string | yes | The invite token for YOUR party, from create_deal's response. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
compute_commitment_tool ~94
Compute a commitment string for (input, salt): sha256(JCS(input) ++ salt_bytes), prefixed 'sha256:'. Convenience only — the rule is public and you can compute it yourself.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| input | – | yes | Your algorithm input (any JSON value). |
| salt | string | yes | Your hex salt (even length, e.g. 32+ random bytes hex-encoded). Keep it secret until reveal. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_deal ~597
Create a fairness deal. You are party 0 (initiator). Returns a deal id and one invite token per party — give each counterparty their own token. Sealed mode: everyone commits a hash, then reveals; certificate is issued automatically when the deal computes or goes VOID.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algorithm | string | yes | Algorithm id from list_algorithms: "split.v1" (fixed 1,000-point budget) | "random.v1" | "shapley.v1" | "auction.v1". |
| algorithm_params | – | – | Algorithm-specific params from list_algorithms. split.v1: {"items": [...]}; random.v1: {"drand_round": N}; shapley.v1: {"coalition_values": {...}}; auction.v1: {"item": "...", "unit": "GBP", "reserve… |
| api_key | string | yes | Your redeal API key (get one free with create_key — no signup form). |
| commit_deadline | integer | yes | Commit deadline as unix seconds UTC. Missed → deal EXPIRES (no certificate). |
| external_ref | string|null | – | Optional: your own identifier for this deal, e.g. "campaign-4821" (echoed into the certificate). |
| idempotency_key | string|null | – | Optional: retries with the same key + same arguments replay the original response. |
| mode | string|null | – | "sealed" (default, commit/reveal) or "open" (single round trip, low stakes). |
| party_labels | array | yes | One label per party, e.g. ["alice", "bob"] — or objects {"label", "weight"?, "statement_hash"?} (weight defaults to 1; statement_hash is "sha256:<hex>" of a declaration you want bound into the certif… |
| retention | string|null | – | "standard" (inputs retained encrypted) or "purge" (destroyed 7 days after certification). |
| reveal_deadline | integer | yes | Reveal deadline as unix seconds UTC (after commit_deadline). Missed → deal goes VOID and a non-participation certificate names whoever didn't reveal. |
| supersedes | string|null | – | Optional: certificate id (c_<16 hex>) this deal's certificate replaces (re-draw after VOID etc.). |
| terms_hash | string|null | – | Optional: "sha256:<hex>" of the deal's terms (echoed into the certificate; we never see the terms). |
| visibility | string|null | – | Optional: "public" (default — anyone can fetch the certificate at its id) or "parties" (only you and your invite-token holders). Certificates never contain inputs, only the outcome; choose "parties"… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_key ~47
Get a free redeal API key. No signup, no email — this is the entire onboarding. The key is shown once; store it. Use it as api_key in create_deal.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_certificate ~84
Fetch the signed fairness certificate for a finished deal (state CERTIFIED). Includes the labelled signature (es256 or ed25519) and transparency-log inclusion proof. Verify it with verify_certificate.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| credential | string | yes | Your API key (initiator) or any party's invite token for this deal. |
| deal_id | string | yes | The deal id (d_...). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_deal ~101
Read a deal's public state: protocol state (OPEN/COMMITTING/REVEALING/CERTIFIED/VOID/EXPIRED), who has committed/revealed, deadlines, result, and certificate_id once issued. Inputs of other parties are never exposed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| credential | string | yes | Your API key (initiator) or any party's invite token for this deal. |
| deal_id | string | yes | The deal id (d_...). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_entropy ~126
Finish a random.v1 deal once every party has revealed: redeal fetches the deal's pre-declared drand round from the public League of Entropy beacon (fixed at creation, publicly cross-checkable), computes the draw, and issues the certificate. Call this after the last reveal_input; the deal rests in REVEALING until you do. Idempotent — safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| credential | string | yes | Your API key (initiator) or any party's invite token for this deal. |
| deal_id | string | yes | The deal id (d_...). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_public_certificate ~90
Fetch a certificate's full JSON (outcome included) by id. Works for public deals (the default). Parties-only deals and unknown ids both return NOT_FOUND. To re-verify the computation itself, use verify_certificate (checks) or the CLI re-runner with the parties' inputs.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cert_id | string | yes | The certificate id (c_...). Verification is free and always will be. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_algorithms ~79
List redeal's algorithms (split.v1 fixed-budget fair division, random.v1 verifiable random selection, shapley.v1 Shapley shares, auction.v1 sealed-bid second-price auctions) with their input contracts and the published test vectors (served inline — the same fixtures the engine test suite runs). Read this before creating a deal.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
reveal_input ~201
Reveal your committed input. It must hash to your earlier commitment. When the last party reveals, the deal computes and the fairness certificate is issued automatically — fetch it with get_certificate.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal_id | string | yes | The deal id (d_...). |
| idempotency_key | string|null | – | Optional: retries with the same key + same arguments replay the original response. |
| input | – | yes | Your algorithm input exactly as committed (any JSON value). split.v1: {"valuations": {...}} — your valuations must sum to exactly 1000; random.v1: {"nonce": "<hex>"}; shapley.v1: {"accept": true|fals… |
| invite_token | string | yes | The invite token for YOUR party, from create_deal's response. |
| salt | string|null | – | Your hex salt from commitment time. Omit (or empty) for open-mode deals. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
validate_input ~187
Validate your algorithm input against the deal's contract BEFORE you commit. A commitment binds the exact input bytes — a contract-violating input (e.g. split.v1 valuations not summing to exactly 1000) can never be corrected afterwards and the deal will VOID at the reveal deadline. Always validate first, then compute_commitment_tool, then commit_input. Read-only: nothing is stored or changed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal_id | string | yes | The deal id (d_...). |
| input | – | yes | The algorithm input you plan to commit (e.g. {"valuations": {"<item_id>": <points>}} for split.v1 — every party's valuations must sum to exactly 1000). Validated against the deal's algorithm and decl… |
| invite_token | string | yes | The invite token for YOUR party, from create_deal's response. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_certificate ~65
Verify a redeal certificate by id: signature check (current or published legacy key) + transparency-log inclusion check, reported per check. Free, no credential required, always.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cert_id | string | yes | The certificate id (c_...). Verification is free and always will be. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.