Hookden
REMOTE · HOOKDEN.PAGES.DEV · SCANNED SEP 20
Webhook capture bins for agents: get a URL, wait for webhooks, set replies, verify signatures.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 7 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability70
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1560 tokens (~222/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management73
- Stability observed for 22 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "send_test_webhook" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the Hookden MCP server?
Hookden is a hosted endpoint at https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hookden.pages.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-pages-hookden-hookden 'https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-pages-hookden-hookden": {
"url": "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"dev-pages-hookden-hookden": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.dev-pages-hookden-hookden] url = "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"dev-pages-hookden-hookden": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add dev-pages-hookden-hookden --url 'https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
dev-pages-hookden-hookden:
url: "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"dev-pages-hookden-hookden": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add dev-pages-hookden-hookden -t streamable-http -u 'https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-pages-hookden-hookden": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 7 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 27 to 30. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 8 days of observed history at the previous scan, 9 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 5 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=hookden.pages.dev | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 27 Aug 2026 | 25 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 9344c87f51e92c5d131063108fde810e |
| SANs: hookden.pages.dev, *.hookden.pages.dev | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hookden.pages.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| pages.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://hookden.pages.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_bin ~89
Create a new webhook capture bin. Returns a public capture_url — point any webhook (Stripe, GitHub, Slack, your own service…) at it and every request sent there (any method, any subpath, headers + raw body) is stored. Then read what arrived with list_captures, get_capture, or wait_for_capture. Anonymous bins keep requests ~24h. No auth needed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_capture ~80
Get one captured request in full: method, path, query, every header, and the body. Binary bodies are returned base64-encoded (up to 8KB, with a URL for the raw bytes).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bin | string | yes | bin id or slug |
| id | integer | yes | capture id from list_captures / wait_for_capture |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_captures ~116
List requests captured by a bin, oldest first. Compact summaries (id, method, path, time, content-type, body size, signature status). Use get_capture for full headers/body. Pass `after` (a capture id) to only see newer captures.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after | integer | – | only captures with id greater than this (default 0) |
| bin | string | yes | bin id (or custom slug) from create_bin |
| limit | integer | – | max results, 1-50 (default 20) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_test_webhook ~171
Simulate a webhook delivery into a bin — no external sender or HTTP client needed. Seeds one realistic, clearly-labeled sample capture (default: a GitHub push event) and returns it in full, so you can exercise the whole loop (create_bin → send_test_webhook → list_captures / get_capture) entirely from MCP. Pass `example` to pick a provider payload from the /examples library (e.g. "stripe-payment-intent-succeeded", "slack-event-callback", "shopify-order-created"). Sample captures are marked as simulated and never count as real webhook traffic.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bin | string | yes | bin id (or custom slug) from create_bin |
| example | string | – | optional example payload slug from /examples (default: a GitHub push event) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
set_response ~363
Configure what a bin replies to webhook senders: HTTP status, content-type, body, custom response headers, optional delay. Body and header values support {{…}} templates rendered per-request from the INCOMING delivery — {{body.challenge}}, {{query.hub.challenge}}, {{header.x-hook-secret}}, {{hmac_sha256 body.plainToken YOUR_SECRET}} — so a bin can pass provider verification handshakes with zero code: Slack URL verification (body {{body.challenge}}), Zoom CRC (JSON with the hmac_sha256 helper), Meta/WhatsApp GET echo (text/plain {{query.hub.challenge}}), Strava (JSON {"hub.challenge":"{{query.hub.challenge}}"}), Asana (response header X-Hook-Secret: {{header.x-hook-secret}}). Only the fields you pass change; everything else keeps its current value. Works on bins created via create_bin by this same client; the incoming request is still captured in full either way.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bin | string | yes | bin id (or custom slug) from create_bin |
| body | string | – | response body, max 10000 chars; {{…}} templates allowed |
| content_type | string | – | Content-Type of the response (e.g. application/json, text/plain) |
| delay_ms | integer | – | artificial response delay in milliseconds, 0-10000 (for testing sender timeouts/retries) |
| headers | object | – | custom response headers as name→value (max 10; values may use {{…}} templates). Pass {} to clear. Hop-by-hop/security headers (set-cookie, location, strict-transport-security…) are rejected. |
| status | integer | – | HTTP status to respond with, 100-599 (bins default to 200) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_signature ~386
Verify a webhook signature against a secret — 25 provider-exact schemes plus a generic HMAC mode, the same engine that computes ✓/✗ badges on captures. Covers HMAC-SHA256 (GitHub, Stripe, Svix/Standard Webhooks, Shopify-style base64, URL-signing Square/HubSpot/Trello…), ECDSA (SendGrid), RSA (Kick) and HMAC-MD5 (Patreon). Pass the scheme, the secret, the delivery's headers, and the BYTE-EXACT raw body (body_base64 for binary). The secret is used only for this one in-memory computation — never stored or logged. No bin needed. If verification fails, the #1 cause is a re-serialized body: point the real webhook at a capture bin (create_bin) to get the true raw bytes first.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | – | raw request body, byte-exact as the provider sent it (not re-serialized!) |
| body_base64 | string | – | alternative to `body` for binary payloads: base64 of the raw body bytes |
| headers | object | – | the delivery's HTTP headers — at least the signature/timestamp headers; names are case-insensitive |
| method | string | – | HTTP method of the delivery (hubspot v3 signs it; default POST) |
| scheme | string | yes | signature scheme (usually the provider name); "hmac" = generic HMAC over the raw body |
| secret | string | yes | signing secret or key exactly as the provider shows it (sendgrid/kick: the PUBLIC verification key) |
| signature_header | string | – | scheme "hmac" only: which header carries the signature (default x-signature) |
| url | string | – | full delivery URL — REQUIRED for square, hubspot and trello (the URL is part of the signed string) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wait_for_capture ~132
Block until the next request arrives at a bin (or a timeout passes), then return it in full. Ideal flow: create_bin → configure the webhook sender → trigger it → wait_for_capture. If `after_id` is omitted, waits for the next capture after "now". Returns timed_out:true instead of erroring when nothing arrives.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after_id | integer | – | return the first capture with id greater than this; default = latest id at call time |
| bin | string | yes | bin id or slug |
| timeout_seconds | integer | – | 1-45 seconds to wait (default 20) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Hookden MCP server?
Hookden is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.pages.hookden/hookden. Webhook capture bins for agents: get a URL, wait for webhooks, set replies, verify signatures. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp).
Is the Hookden MCP server safe to use?
Hookden scores 71 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Hookden MCP server expose?
Hookden exposes 7 tools: create_bin, list_captures, get_capture, wait_for_capture, send_test_webhook, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,337 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Hookden MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Hookden without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Hookden MCP server still maintained?
Hookden is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.