MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR
REMOTE · MODELMARKET.DEV
Scan MCP tool definitions for poisoning, look up server history, count tool-list tokens. Free.
Available components
Last scanned (16 hours ago)
Scores higher than 61% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 22 Oct 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability69
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 572 tokens (~143/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management7
- Stability observed for 2 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 22 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 21 Oct 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 20 Oct 26 70
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Oct 2026 · Probed https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=modelmarket.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 29 Sept 2026 | 28 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 676c19725090b70834a37df124c11ac463f |
| SANs: modelmarket.dev, www.modelmarket.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of modelmarket.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| modelmarket.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
histor_check Server history (HISTOR) ~92
Look up an MCP server in HISTOR, a public append-only log of MCP tool sets: when its tool set was first pinned, how often it changed, and what the pattern scan found. HISTOR answers from its own observations and never contacts the server.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| endpoint | string | – | https URL of the MCP server |
| name | string | – | Or its registry name, e.g. io.github.owner/server |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tool_list_cost Tool list token cost ~110
How many tokens an MCP server's tool list adds to every model request, what that costs per 1,000 requests, the heaviest tools, and where it sits among 18,204 packages and 16,170 remote servers. Send a tools/list or name a server HISTOR observes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | string | – | Or a server HISTOR observes: https endpoint, npm:<package>, pypi:<package> or registry name |
| tools | array | – | A tools/list result |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warden_scan Scan tool definitions (WARDEN) ~110
Scan an MCP server's tools/list with WARDEN, the open-source MCP firewall: static rules and a threat list over every name, description, schema and annotation. Returns allow or block and each finding with its rule and severity. Quoted fragments of the scanned text are left out of the answer.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | object | – | Optional {name, url} to label the verdict |
| tools | array | yes | The server's tools/list result: [{name, description, inputSchema, ...}] |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
x402_check x402 payment check ~183
Check a signed x402 USDC payment before submitting it: recovers the EIP-712 signer, runs USDC's own checks and the seller's terms, and when the signature fails names the domain it was really made for (e.g. Base Sepolia's 'USDC' used on Base, where USDC is 'USD Coin').
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| authorization | object | – | Instead of x_payment: from, to, value, validAfter, validBefore, nonce |
| network | string | – | With authorization: base, base-sepolia, … or eip155:<id> |
| requirements | object | – | The 402's accepts entry: payTo, amount, asset, network |
| signature | string | – | With authorization: the 65-byte hex signature |
| x_payment | string | – | The X-PAYMENT header (base64) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR server?
MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR is a hosted endpoint at https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · modelmarket.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-modelmarket-mcp-security 'https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security'
What is the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR server?
MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR is listed in the public MCP registry as dev.modelmarket/mcp-security. Scan MCP tool definitions for poisoning, look up server history, count tool-list tokens. Free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://modelmarket.dev/tools/mcp/security).
Is the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR server safe to use?
MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR scores 71 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR server expose?
MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR exposes 4 tools: warden_scan, histor_check, tool_list_cost, x402_check. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 495 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR server require authentication?
No. We connected to MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR server still maintained?
MCP security checks — WARDEN and HISTOR is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.