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dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient

REMOTE · CHECK-PAYMENT-RECIPIENT.FUWAFUWOW.WORKERS.DEV

Payment safety check for AI agents before signing. $0.05 per check; $0.50 batch (20). Via x402.

+3 this week 62 Trust /100

Last scanned (23 hours ago)

Scores higher than 45% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Finance and Payments

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security46
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability61
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (fair).Partial
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 468 tokens (~93/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management50
  • Stability observed for 15 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage69
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 8% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
What we tested

Checks we ran (11)

  • TLS certificate
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (2)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 5 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  • HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 402, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 21 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 47 to 50. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 14 days of observed history at the previous scan, 15 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 19 Nov 26 +1
    • Tool “check_payment_batch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “check_payment_recipient” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Schema quality: 82 → 93 ▼ functional
  • 17 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 14 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 12 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 10 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 8 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 7 Nov 26 0
    • Schema quality: 61 → 82 ▼ functional
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
    • New tool “check_payment_batch” functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=fuwafuwow.workers.dev CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 26 Oct 2026 24 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 9e414283368db8aa131a3a1619e86b75
SANs: fuwafuwow.workers.dev, *.fuwafuwow.workers.dev
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
dev. DS published 60074 8 Verified
workers.dev. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev/mcp Inconclusive 402
MCP tools · 5 exposed · ~468 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
check_payment_batch ~188

Paid ($0.50, x402 v2 exact). Checks 1-20 items in one call and returns per-item results and a summary. Invalid batch requests (malformed body, missing or invalid batch idempotency_key, or items other than an array of 1-20 entries) are refused before payment and incur no charge. An invalid item in an otherwise valid paid batch returns INPUT_ERROR as part of the paid result. The batch price still applies. Checks require EVM-format recipient addresses. XNO on nano:mainnet can pay for checks where enabled. A Nano-format recipient returns INPUT_ERROR before payment in a single check, or as an item error in a paid batch. Replay the same request with the same batch idempotency_key to retrieve the stored result without a new payment.

NameTypeReqDescription
idempotency_keystringyes–
itemsarrayyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

check_payment_recipient ~188

Paid ($0.05, x402 v2 exact). Returns allow / escalate / block with reasons, evidence and a verifiable receipt. Single-check validation errors return INPUT_ERROR before payment and incur no charge. Checks require EVM-format recipient addresses. XNO on nano:mainnet can pay for checks where enabled. A Nano-format recipient returns INPUT_ERROR before payment in a single check, or as an item error in a paid batch. Replay the same request with the same idempotency_key to retrieve the stored receipt without a new payment.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesDecimal string, never a float.
assetstringyes–
counterparty_idstring––
idempotency_keystringyes–
networkstringyes–
purposestring––
recipient_addressstringyes–
requested_atstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_receipt ~54

Free: fetch a stored receipt by receipt_id or idempotency_key. Use it to reconcile an uncertain payment before ever paying again.

NameTypeReqDescription
idempotency_keystring––
receipt_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_capabilities ~27

Free discovery: price, networks, rule set and list coverage for check_payment_recipient.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

ping ~11

Free health check.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server?

dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient is a hosted endpoint at https://check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http dev-kgninja-check-payment-recipient 'https://check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev/mcp'
Common questions

What is the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server?

dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient. Payment safety check for AI agents before signing. $0.05 per check; $0.50 batch (20). Via x402. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://check-payment-recipient.fuwafuwow.workers.dev/mcp).

Is the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server safe to use?

dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient scores 62 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server expose?

dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient exposes 5 tools: ping, list_capabilities, get_receipt, check_payment_recipient, check_payment_batch. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 468 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server still maintained?

dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 11 checks on dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient, covering TLS certificate, HSTS header, DNSSEC, Transport and 7 more. 2 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about dev.kgninja/check-payment-recipient: Authorization and HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.