Enforcer
REMOTE · API.INSTRUXI.DEV
Identity and authorization in one system: allow, deny, the reason, and a record.
Available components
Last scanned (1 hour ago)
Scores higher than 35% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security97
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server supports Client ID Metadata Documents, the current MCP client-registration mechanism. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify streamable-http. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. See how to fix → Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. See how to fix → Unverified
Unverified: 6 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm. Claim this server and supply a read-only token to verify it and lift the score.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 +11
- HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: fail → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- 2 Nov 26 −11
- HTTPS: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: pass → fail ▼ security
- 25 Oct 26 +1
- Authorization: partial → pass ▲ security
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.33 → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → pass ▲ security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 19 Sept 26 0
- Server version: 0.9.2 → 0.9.3 functional
- 18 Sept 26 0
- Server version: 0.8.0 → 0.9.2 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=instruxi.dev | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 19 Sept 2026 | 18 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 581118d57bf1b4e6a37de44105f2b3a9371 |
| SANs: *.instruxi.dev, instruxi.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.instruxi.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| instruxi.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On connection |
| HTTP status | 401 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.instruxi.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", scope="enforcer:read policy:self enforcer:graph-runs.write enforcer:graph-observations.write enforcer:graph-nodes.write enforcer:graph-edges.write enforcer:graph-graph-import.write enforcer:graph-graph-templates.write enforcer:graph-validation.write enforcer:graph-graphs.write enforcer:graph-epochs.write enforcer:files-files.write enforcer:files-sharing.write enforcer:invites.write enforcer:groups.write enforcer:group-types.write enforcer:tickets.write enforcer:contacts.write enforcer:connections.write enforcer:email-templates.write enforcer:terms.write enforcer:referrals.write enforcer:support.write enforcer:telemetry.write enforcer:account-policies.write enforcer:directory.write enforcer:tenants.write enforcer:accounts.write enforcer:wf-jobs.write enforcer:wf-schedule.write enforcer:wf-crews.write enforcer:wf-catalog.write enforcer:wf-comms.write enforcer:checkin-checkins.write enforcer:checkin-waypoints.write enfo
Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.instruxi.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", scope="enforcer:read policy:self enforcer:graph-runs.write enforcer:graph-observations.write enforcer:graph-nodes.write enforcer:graph-edges.write enforcer:graph-graph-import.write enforcer:graph-graph-templates.write enforcer:graph-validation.write enforcer:graph-graphs.write enforcer:graph-epochs.write enforcer:files-files.write enforcer:files-sharing.write enforcer:invites.write enforcer:groups.write enforcer:group-types.write enforcer:tickets.write enforcer:contacts.write enforcer:connections.write enforcer:email-templates.write enforcer:terms.write enforcer:referrals.write enforcer:support.write enforcer:telemetry.write enforcer:account-policies.write enforcer:directory.write enforcer:tenants.write enforcer:accounts.write enforcer:wf-jobs.write enforcer:wf-schedule.write enforcer:wf-crews.write enforcer:wf-catalog.write enforcer:wf-comms.write enforcer:checkin-checkins.write enforcer:checkin-waypoints.write enfo| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| www-authenticate | Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.instruxi.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp", scope="enforcer:read policy:self enforcer:graph-runs.write enforcer:graph-observations.write enforcer:graph-nodes.write enforcer:graph-edges.write enforcer:graph-graph-import.write enforcer:graph-graph-templates.write enforcer:graph-validation.write enforcer:graph-graphs.write enforcer:graph-epochs.write enforcer:files-files.write enforcer:files-sharing.write enforcer:invites.write enforcer:groups.write enforcer:group-types.write enforcer:tickets.write enforcer:contacts.write enforcer:connections.write enforcer:email-templates.write enforcer:terms.write enforcer:referrals.write enforcer:support.write enforcer:telemetry.write enforcer:account-policies.write enforcer:directory.write enforcer:tenants.write enforcer:accounts.write enforcer:wf-jobs.write enforcer:wf-schedule.write enforcer:wf-crews.write enforcer:wf-catalog.write enforcer:wf-comms.write enforcer:checkin-checkins.write enforcer:checkin-waypoints.write enfo |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://api.instruxi.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://api.instruxi.dev |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp | Auth required | 401 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.instruxi.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
getAuthConfig Auth Config Bootstrap ~128
Public bootstrap for a tenant's login UI: whether this tenant uses native OTP/passkey/SIWE or Privy custom auth, plus the public privy_app_id (never a secret). Call this before getSiweNonce when you do not already know the tenant's auth scheme. tenant_code is a join secret — do not log it or repeat it into a customer-visible channel.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| response_format | string | – | concise (default): no nulls, audit timestamps, provider ids or nested tenant/role. detailed: every field. |
| tenant_code | string | – | tenant routing code |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
getSiweNonce Request SIWE nonce ~102
Public: issue a single-use SIWE nonce for wallet_address (optionally scoped by tenant_code). Embed the nonce in an EIP-4361 message, have the wallet sign it, then call login with provider: siwe. Dedicated SIWE agent auth is an authorized pattern — this is how an agent signs in with a wallet without raw HTTP. Do not log tenant_code. The nonce is not a credential.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
login Login ~196
Authenticate and receive an access/refresh token pair. Accepted providers: siwe (message + signature from getSiweNonce — preferred for dedicated agents), email_otp (email + otp from requestOtp), phone_otp (phone + otp from requestSms). Passkey, Privy and SSO are not agent tools. The server does not adopt the minted tokens as the session credential; return them to the operator to set ENFORCER_BEARER_TOKEN. Do not log, quote, or repeat otp codes, signatures, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | Login/register body. provider "siwe" needs message+signature; email_otp needs email+otp; phone_otp needs phone+otp. Optional tenant_code. Do not log otp, signature, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not pas… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
refreshToken Refresh session ~89
Exchange a refresh_token for a new access/refresh pair. 401 invalid_refresh_token if the token is unknown or was already reused (reuse revokes the family); 409 refresh_raced is benign — retry with the client's latest stored token. The server does not adopt the new pair as the session credential. Do not log the refresh token or the minted tokens.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register Register ~165
Create (or idempotently return) an account. Same provider allowlist as login: siwe (message + signature), email_otp (email + otp), phone_otp (phone + otp). Does not issue tokens — call login afterwards to sign in. Passkey / Privy / SSO registration stay out of the agent surface. Do not log otp codes, signatures, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | Login/register body. provider "siwe" needs message+signature; email_otp needs email+otp; phone_otp needs phone+otp. Optional tenant_code. Do not log otp, signature, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not pas… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
requestOtp Request email OTP ~139
Public: email a one-time login/registration code to `email` (optionally scoped by tenant_code). Always 200 {message:"code sent"} on success. Local/dev deployments with expose_dev_otp may echo the code as `dev_otp` — treat that as a secret. Then call login with provider: email_otp, the same email, and the otp. Intentional for harnesses that cannot SIWE; SIWE remains the preferred dedicated-agent path. Do not log the code, dev_otp, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
requestSms Request SMS login code ~112
Public: start a Twilio Verify SMS login challenge to `phone`, scoped by tenant_code. 400 if SMS verification is not configured for the tenant or if rate-limited. Then call login with provider: phone_otp, the same phone, and the otp. Intentional for harnesses that cannot SIWE; SIWE remains the preferred dedicated-agent path. Do not log the SMS code or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Enforcer MCP server?
Enforcer is a hosted endpoint at https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.instruxi.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3 'https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp'
What is the Enforcer MCP server?
Enforcer is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.instruxi.enforcer/v3. Identity and authorization in one system: allow, deny, the reason, and a record. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp).
Is the Enforcer MCP server safe to use?
Enforcer scores 39 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Enforcer MCP server expose?
Enforcer exposes 7 tools: getAuthConfig, getSiweNonce, login, refreshToken, register, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 931 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Enforcer MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Enforcer asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Enforcer MCP server still maintained?
Enforcer is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.