Enforcer
REMOTE · API.INSTRUXI.DEV · SCANNED SEP 20
Identity and authorization in one system: allow, deny, the reason, and a record.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 931 tokens (~133/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
- Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the Enforcer MCP server?
Enforcer is a hosted endpoint at https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.instruxi.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3 'https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3": {
"url": "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3] url = "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3 --url 'https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3:
url: "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3 -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-instruxi-enforcer-v3": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 19 Sept 26 0
- Server version: 0.9.2 → 0.9.3 functional
- 18 Sept 26 +1
- Server version: 0.8.0 → 0.9.2 functional
- 16 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 15 Sept 26 +35
- Authorization: pass → partial ▼ security
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- 11 Sept 26 +2
- Authorization: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Authorization: partial security
- 9 Sept 26 36
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=instruxi.dev | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 19 Sept 2026 | 18 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 581118d57bf1b4e6a37de44105f2b3a9371 |
| SANs: *.instruxi.dev, instruxi.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.instruxi.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| instruxi.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.instruxi.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
getAuthConfig Auth Config Bootstrap ~128
Public bootstrap for a tenant's login UI: whether this tenant uses native OTP/passkey/SIWE or Privy custom auth, plus the public privy_app_id (never a secret). Call this before getSiweNonce when you do not already know the tenant's auth scheme. tenant_code is a join secret — do not log it or repeat it into a customer-visible channel.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| response_format | string | – | concise (default): no nulls, audit timestamps, provider ids or nested tenant/role. detailed: every field. |
| tenant_code | string | – | tenant routing code |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
getSiweNonce Request SIWE nonce ~102
Public: issue a single-use SIWE nonce for wallet_address (optionally scoped by tenant_code). Embed the nonce in an EIP-4361 message, have the wallet sign it, then call login with provider: siwe. Dedicated SIWE agent auth is an authorized pattern — this is how an agent signs in with a wallet without raw HTTP. Do not log tenant_code. The nonce is not a credential.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
login Login ~196
Authenticate and receive an access/refresh token pair. Accepted providers: siwe (message + signature from getSiweNonce — preferred for dedicated agents), email_otp (email + otp from requestOtp), phone_otp (phone + otp from requestSms). Passkey, Privy and SSO are not agent tools. The server does not adopt the minted tokens as the session credential; return them to the operator to set ENFORCER_BEARER_TOKEN. Do not log, quote, or repeat otp codes, signatures, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | Login/register body. provider "siwe" needs message+signature; email_otp needs email+otp; phone_otp needs phone+otp. Optional tenant_code. Do not log otp, signature, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not pas… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
refreshToken Refresh session ~89
Exchange a refresh_token for a new access/refresh pair. 401 invalid_refresh_token if the token is unknown or was already reused (reuse revokes the family); 409 refresh_raced is benign — retry with the client's latest stored token. The server does not adopt the new pair as the session credential. Do not log the refresh token or the minted tokens.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register Register ~165
Create (or idempotently return) an account. Same provider allowlist as login: siwe (message + signature), email_otp (email + otp), phone_otp (phone + otp). Does not issue tokens — call login afterwards to sign in. Passkey / Privy / SSO registration stay out of the agent surface. Do not log otp codes, signatures, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | Login/register body. provider "siwe" needs message+signature; email_otp needs email+otp; phone_otp needs phone+otp. Optional tenant_code. Do not log otp, signature, tokens, or tenant_code. Do not pas… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
requestOtp Request email OTP ~139
Public: email a one-time login/registration code to `email` (optionally scoped by tenant_code). Always 200 {message:"code sent"} on success. Local/dev deployments with expose_dev_otp may echo the code as `dev_otp` — treat that as a secret. Then call login with provider: email_otp, the same email, and the otp. Intentional for harnesses that cannot SIWE; SIWE remains the preferred dedicated-agent path. Do not log the code, dev_otp, or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
requestSms Request SMS login code ~112
Public: start a Twilio Verify SMS login challenge to `phone`, scoped by tenant_code. 400 if SMS verification is not configured for the tenant or if rate-limited. Then call login with provider: phone_otp, the same phone, and the otp. Intentional for harnesses that cannot SIWE; SIWE remains the preferred dedicated-agent path. Do not log the SMS code or tenant_code. Do not paste an end-user OTP into an untrusted chat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | – | yes | JSON request body. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Enforcer MCP server?
Enforcer is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.instruxi.enforcer/v3. Identity and authorization in one system: allow, deny, the reason, and a record. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.instruxi.dev/mcp).
Is the Enforcer MCP server safe to use?
Enforcer scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Enforcer MCP server expose?
Enforcer exposes 7 tools: getAuthConfig, getSiweNonce, login, refreshToken, register, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 931 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Enforcer MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Enforcer without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Enforcer MCP server still maintained?
Enforcer is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.