Homespun

Agent identity and binding. Actions: whoami returns the resolved relay URL, the active profile and whether a key is configured, with no network call and no secrets; claim binds this agent to a human using a one-shot claim code from their Settings UI, and is one-way; logout clears the locally saved key and profile but does not revoke it on the relay, which is what the `key` tool's revoke action does.

The v2 app lifecycle apart from creation and redeploy, which deploy_app covers. Actions: list returns the owning human's apps; show returns full detail including manifest, timezone and has_share_token; audit is a read-only security review of every app the caller owns, computed from each app's stored manifest, which is what makes it see apps that were deployed once and never redeployed (a deploy-time warning never reaches those). It reports collections whose declared permissions expose them, worst first: severity 'high' means an anonymous visitor can exploit it today, typically a collection that admits "anyone" to write with no separate 'update' list, so any visitor can overwrite rows other people created rather than only adding their own. It changes nothing; the fix is a redeploy declaring the missing list, and the right list differs per app, so read the app before proposing one. update changes visibility and timezone, the slug being immutable, and switching to 'link' returns a share_url once; share_link_rotate issues a new share token for a 'link' app, returning a new share_url and revoking the old link, and generates one if the app has none; delete is an idempotent soft-delete, and it is recoverable: the app stops serving at once but keeps every version, collection, row, attachment, member and grant, and restore brings all of it back until the retention window elapses (list_deleted shows what is in the trash and each app's purges_at deadline, which is null when the account is never purged). restore is idempotent on a live app, and refuses with 409 when the account is at its app limit, when the app was an expired trial, or when the owning account is itself deleted; an app an operator suspended comes back suspended, not active. purge destroys a deleted app and all its data immediately and forever, with no restore afterwards, and requires the app to already be deleted, so no single call takes a serving app to unrecoverable; wake wakes a dormant app and is otherwise…

Binary attachments (images, PDFs, audio, video) referenced from event payloads and input_data via `format: homespun-attachment-id`. Actions: upload, fetch, presign, finalize, download, show, list, delete, mint_token, revoke_token, list_tokens. Choosing an upload path matters for cost. An inline upload with `content_base64` carries the bytes in the tool-call arguments, so they enter the model context at a token cost proportional to file size, paid again on every retry; a few-hundred-KB image is already expensive. Two paths avoid that entirely: fetch, when the bytes are reachable at a URL, and presign plus finalize, when the client can PUT the raw bytes out of band. Inline upload suits small assets and clients that have neither a URL nor an out-of-band PUT. fetch takes { source_url (https), scope } and the relay downloads the URL itself behind an SSRF guard (https only, no private, loopback or metadata hosts, DNS pinned, redirects refused, size-capped and timed out), then runs the same byte-sniff, allowlist, size, quota and scan checks as any upload. It works on any storage backend. upload takes either `content_base64` (base64 bytes, no filesystem) or `file_path` (an absolute path read on the relay host, so it only applies when the file is local to the relay). presign plus finalize is token-free: presign with { mime, size, sha256, scope } returns { put_url, attachment_id }, the caller PUTs the raw bytes to put_url over plain HTTP out of band, then finalize with the attachment_id. At finalize the relay re-reads the stored bytes, sniffs the real type, and enforces the same allowlist, size, sha256, quota and scan checks, so a presign that misstates its mime is caught and never served inline. The presigned path requires the Azure storage backend; a filesystem-backed relay returns a clear not-supported error and fetch or inline upload apply there instead. download writes to an absolute out_path or returns base64. An upload is scoped to agent (the default, reusable) or a…

Publishing an app as a community template, taking your own listing back down, installing a template, and, for relay operators, reviewing submissions. Actions: publish, unpublish, get_config_contract, install, list_pending, get_submission, approve, reject, set_trust_level. publish captures a live app (html, manifest, the seed rows of its seedOnInstall collections, and listing metadata) into a pending template. It is installable by the returned direct link but is not listed in the public gallery until an operator approves it, and it requires a verified email and no more than a few pending submissions at once. Privacy consequence: an approved template's content and its captured seed rows become public to every platform user, so seed data in a published app must be example-only rather than real personal data. attest_example_only:true records that this was checked. A template may take a per-publisher `slug` (namespaced as <handle>/<slug>) and a semver `version` defaulting to 1.0.0, and a republish under the same slug must bump the version. unpublish is the publisher's own undo for a live listing, taken down by snapshot_id: it leaves the public gallery, search, and the direct snapshot install link. It works only on your own submissions, and a snapshot that does not exist or belongs to someone else reads as not found either way. Existing installs are unaffected, because an install is a fresh private copy rather than a live reference, so unpublishing never breaks an app someone already installed. It is idempotent, and publishing a new version is the way to put the listing back. get_config_contract reads what a template needs at install, meaning its settings collection and its ordered config and upload steps, by `ref`. install creates a fresh private copy of a template for the caller's owning human, passing answers as `config`, where a 'config' value is a string and an 'upload' value is a pre-uploaded attachment id from the attachments tool. The review actions are limit…

A v2 app's Connections: the stored credential (a static header token, or a full generic OAuth2 client) a manifest webhook rule authenticates its delivery target with, bound to a host so the credential can never be exfiltrated to another one. There is no update action: change a connection by deleting and recreating it. Actions: create stores a static or oauth2 connection and returns its metadata, never the secret; list returns the app's connections as metadata plus a non-reversible fingerprint, never any secret; delete is idempotent; consent_url builds (never fetches) the browser URL that completes an oauth2 connection's consent, since that is inherently a human-in-a-browser step an agent key cannot complete. A newly created oauth2 connection starts in `pending_auth` until the owner opens the consent_url and approves.

The live row count of a v2 app's collection (spec B4, issue #1056), a whole-scope total with no filter and no paging. Gated by the collection's countRead opt-in, independent of its read list: a collection that opted in returns its count even to a caller who cannot list the rows (the '3 spots left' shape), and a collection that never opted in refuses with collection_count_forbidden even for a caller who could otherwise list. Returns { count }.

A v2 app's scoped service credentials (#1354, #1355): the bearer token an app owner points a backend they host themselves at, so their own server can read and write the app's data without holding the owner's full authority. Effective permission is always the intersection of the allowlist and what the app's owner could do, so a credential can only ever narrow, never widen, and it carries no role. Actions: mint creates one and returns its raw `token` shown once, never recoverable afterward (only its hash is stored); list returns the app's credentials with their allowlist and status, never any token material; pause reversibly stops one; resume undoes a pause (never a revoke, which is permanent); rotate issues a fresh token while the old one keeps working for an overlap window, so a running backend picks up the new token with no outage; revoke kills one permanently. Every action here is owner-or-owning-agent only: a service credential itself can reach none of these, by construction, so it can never mint or widen a sibling of itself.

Soft-delete a row from a v2 app's collection. Recoverable: the row is tombstoned, not destroyed, and restore_row brings it back for 30 days (see list_deleted_rows). A watcher sees the deletion live as op:delete on the change feed. Pass if_match for an optimistic-locked delete. Returns { deleted: true }.

Deploy a v2 app: an HTML document plus a capability manifest, hosted at its own URL. A redeploy only needs the content that changed. Every content field is optional when `app_id` is given, and an omitted one keeps what is live: omit `manifest` for an HTML-only change, omit `html` for a manifest-only change, omit `assets` to keep the current files. This is the cheap path and the default, because an omitted field costs no output tokens at all: a one-line colour change does not resend the whole document, and a manifest edit does not resend it either. A field only needs sending when its content differs from what is live. `assets: []` is the explicit way to clear the asset set, and omitting all three is refused, since there would be nothing to change. The extension keys used most often: app metadata; collections, with per-collection write, update, read and delete role lists, where write gates creates and also gates updates unless an update list is declared; externalHosts, a fetch allowlist; cdn, to allow CDN scripts and styles; capabilities, for Permissions-Policy opt-ins; embeds, an iframe frame-src allowlist; notify, for email-on-row rules; webhooks, for signed HTTP POST on-row rules; and agentTasks, to queue work for an agent running on the owner's own machine, described as a prompt rather than as code. The manifest grammar is documented in the Homespun guide that get_skill returns. Pass no `app_id` to create, which mints a slug and URL and requires both `html` and `manifest`, or pass `app_id` to redeploy an existing app. Supply the HTML inline as `html`, or as `html_path`, an absolute path read on the MCP-server host, which is the relay for a hosted connector or the CLI host for a locally-run one, and not the remote agent's machine; it avoids retransmitting a large HTML file on every deploy, only a locally-run connector can read it, and inline `html` wins if both are given. `dry_run:true` (alias `check`) validates only: it runs the full manifest and asset validat…

Reports a problem with homespun itself to the relay operator, and lists what this agent has already reported. A report is the operator's only visibility into a failure that happened inside an agent's session, so an unreported one is a failure nobody can fix. The channel covers homespun's own behaviour: a 5xx, or an error code the guide does not describe; a disagreement between documented and observed behaviour; something the tool surface cannot express, such as a missing capability or a schema that contradicts itself; an app misbehaving in a way that traces back to the platform (the bridge, the runtime, serving, the data API) rather than to authored HTML; or a guide that was wrong, ambiguous or silent. Outside its scope: the human's own task; bugs in an app the agent authored; presentation preferences, which belong in `taste`; the human's own configuration, such as a missing API key or the wrong account; and a 4xx caused by the agent's own arguments, except where the error message itself was misleading, which is a documentation problem best filed as a `note`. Duplicates cost the operator triage rather than adding signal. Action `list` returns this agent's own submissions, newest first, so a failure already recorded needs no second row: one report covers one distinct failure, however many times it was retried. The operator sees the row and not the session, so a bare "deploy failed" is not actionable. An actionable `message` carries the surface (mcp, cli, relay or app-runtime); where it happened (the tool or route); the skill version, from the `<!-- homespun skill vX.Y.Z -->` comment at the top of the guide; what was expected, in one line; what was observed, in one line carrying the exact error code and message; and the minimal steps or arguments that reproduce it. `type` is bug for something broken, feature for something missing, note for a rough edge or a confusing doc. `app_id` scopes a report to one app. There is no reply channel, so a report is not a route…

Poll a v2 app's change feed for what has happened: row creates, updates and deletes, from any writer, agent or human. It is the long-poll analogue of `homespun apps watch`, since MCP has no streaming. The loop is: call with no `since` first, process the returned entries, keep the cursor, then call again passing it as `since` to get only newer entries. Passing wait (around 25) holds the request open until an entry arrives or it times out, which is how the feed is waited on rather than busy-polled. A `since` older than the retention floor returns resync_required, and the collections are then re-listed with list_rows. Returns { entries, cursor, truncated }.

Fetch a single row by its key from a v2 app collection, through a dedicated relay route rather than a client-side scan. Returns { row }, or an isError row_not_found.

The relay's SKILL.md, a generated guide to the Homespun workflow covering events versus records, the schema grammars and the poll loop. Needs no API key. Useful when working out how the other tools fit together, or to refresh a cached copy. Pass version_only:true to return just the relay's skill version string, which is enough to tell whether a cached copy is current.

A v2 app's grant links (M5). A grant link is a capability URL that confers a declared custom role (x-homespun-manifest.roles) on a stable per-holder anonymous identity, so a holder's own rows are isolated by author/:own scoping. A grant does not escalate to owner, member or agent. Actions: mint creates a link and returns a `grant_url` carrying the token in its #g= fragment, shown once and not recoverable afterwards; list returns the app's links and never a token; revoke is idempotent. mode 'once' is one-time, claimed by the first browser to open it; 'multi' is shared, capped by max_uses within expiry. An optional pin (pin_row_key or pin_where) narrows a holder to specific rows and never widens their access. One consequence worth knowing when minting: a write-only grant pinned to a single row key can still read that row's existing data back through create dedup, so such a grant exposes that row's current contents to the holder.

A v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks). A catch-hook lets an external system such as Stripe, Zapier, Make, Home Assistant or an email router POST JSON to a secret URL that writes into a declared collection, so the app receives data with no agent online. Hooks are declared in the manifest (x-homespun-manifest.ingest) and materialized at deploy, so this tool has no create or delete: it reads back the URL, rotates a leaked one, and manages the opt-in signing secret. After deploying a manifest that declares a hook, list is what yields the exact URL to paste into the external system. Actions: list returns the app's hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule collection, mode, wake and handshake settings, per-status delivery counts and signing-secret state; rotate mints a fresh URL secret for one hook by name and returns the new url once, after which the old url stops working immediately with no redeploy needed; set_signing_secret provisions or rotates a hook's signing secret, which is a different secret from the URL and is what a provider HMACs the body with, minting one returned once when `secret` is omitted or storing a provider value verbatim when it is passed, and never echoing it back; clear_signing_secret removes it. Signature verification currently ships dark: nothing verifies a signature yet.

The calling agent's API key. Actions: list returns key info (agent_id, key_prefix, timestamps); mint creates a sibling API key for the caller's own agent identity with the same scope and ownership and returns its raw value once, which is how an MCP-driven agent hands a CLI or child process a working credential, and the raw value is not retrievable afterwards, the sibling appears in a later list made with it, and the owner can revoke it; revoke destroys the agent's own key, which stops working immediately and cannot be undone, so it requires confirm:true. The relay derives identity from the caller's token, so every action applies to the caller's own agent and mint cannot target another agent's id.

List a collection's recently deleted rows: the recovery bin. Deleting a row is a soft delete, so it can be restored with restore_row until recoverable_until passes (30 days after deletion by default). Owner or agent only, and deliberately independent of the collection's read permissions. Rows already purged appear with purged:true and cannot be restored. Returns { rows, next_before }.

List rows in a v2 app's mutable collection. This is also how a collection's current state is polled, since MCP has no streaming: pass the prior next_cursor as `since` to fetch only rows that are new or changed. Returns { rows, next_cursor, has_more }.

A v2 app's membership (auth spec section 6): who besides the owner can sign in to a private app and write to member-scoped collections. Actions: add invites or attaches a member by email, attaching immediately when the email already has a Human and otherwise sending a magic-link invite; list returns the app's owner and members; set_role changes an existing member's declared custom role in place, or clears it when null, and leaves their sessions intact, which is what makes it the way to re-role someone rather than removing and re-adding them; remove is idempotent and also revokes the human's live sessions on this app, and the app owner cannot be removed; roles returns the derived roles summary, giving the effective access a holder actually has per declared role and collection, reported separately for signed-in members and for grant-link holders because their role floors differ, along with member and active-grant-link counts.

The caller's community publisher identity: the @-handle and public profile shown in the template gallery. Actions: get returns the profile, including the handle, whether it has been claimed, tenure, and the rating and template counters; claim sets the handle from a lowercase 3-to-32-character string and may be used only once, after which the handle is permanent, and it refuses a handle that is reserved or already taken; update changes display_name, bio or url at any time. claim and update require a verified email. An existing publisher may hold a provisional `maker-...` handle assigned automatically, which claim renames on its one allowed use.

Restore a soft-deleted row, undoing delete_row. The row comes back with its original data and creator, its version bumped. Find restorable keys with list_deleted_rows. Owner or agent only. Fails with restore_expired if the row was purged, or restore_conflict if another live row took a unique value this one held while it was deleted. Returns { row }.

Ratings and reviews of community templates, responses from a template's own publisher, and, for relay operators, moderation. Actions: create leaves a 1-to-5 star rating and an optional written body on a template the caller has installed, identifying it by `template` (\"<handle>/<slug>\") or by `handle` plus `slug`, and requires a verified email; each install yields exactly one review, and the aggregate carries across template versions. A body containing a link or a contact email is held automatically for a moderator before it appears. respond replies to a review of the caller's own template line (review_id plus response, or null to clear it), with one editable response per review. report flags a review for the relay's moderators (review_id plus reason) and is deduped per account. remove and unhold are limited to the relay's configured community reviewers: remove takes a review down and adjusts the rating aggregate, and unhold publishes a previously held review into the aggregate.

The agent's UI taste notes: a short freeform markdown document of presentation preferences gathered from human feedback, such as 'denser layout' or 'no rounded corners'. Reading it before generating or revising an app is what carries earlier feedback into new output. Actions: get returns the current document; set replaces it in whole, so it does not append; clear discards it. Scoped to presentation preferences rather than general storage.

A v2 app's ownership transfer (issue #1847): handing the app, and the quota and billing responsibility that come with it, to a different human. This is two steps, and `start` completing is only the first one. start mints a pending offer and emails the named person an accept link; the app is still owned here when the call returns, stays owned here while the offer is pending, and only moves once that person opens the link and accepts it. Reporting the transfer as done after `start` would be wrong: check `status` to see whether it is still pending or has dropped to null (accepted, expired, or withdrawn), and the caller's own agent key stops being able to deploy this app only at the moment it actually moves. Actions: start offers the app to an email address, 409ing if a transfer is already pending or the email already owns the app; status returns the pending transfer, or null if none; cancel withdraws a pending transfer and is idempotent, so cancelling with nothing pending is still a success.

Update an existing row in a v2 app's collection, replacing its data. Gated by the collection's `update` role list when it declares one, and by its `write` list otherwise, so a collection that scopes updates to the row's `creator` refuses an edit on someone else's row. Pass if_match with the row's current version for an optimistic-locked update; on a version mismatch the relay returns the current row, which is what a retry needs. Returns { row }.

Create a row in a v2 app's collection, or return the existing row when `key` is already present (deduped:true). Row creation goes through this tool; there is no separate strict-create verb. Omit `key` to add a new row with a server-generated key, or pass `key` to ensure a row exists at that key. Passing `key` is also what makes a retry safe: a call unsure whether it already landed can repeat it and get the same row back rather than a duplicate. Without `key`, a retry mints a second row with its own server-generated key, since there is nothing to dedup against. The collection must be declared in the app's manifest with 'agent' in its `write` list, which is the list that gates creates. When `key` matches a row the collection's `read` list does not reach for this caller, the result is row_not_found rather than the row, matching what get_row would return, so this never reads past `read`. Returns { row, deduped? }.