DepScope
REMOTE · MCP.DEPSCOPE.DEV · 2 COMPONENTS
Package intelligence MCP for AI agents — 22 tools, 19 ecosystems, AGPL SDK, free.
Available components
Last scanned (16 hours ago)
Scores higher than 7% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Developer Tools
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 410. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Checks we ran (5)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
Checks we could not complete (6)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it.
- Schema quality in Schema Quality & AI Usability (scores 0 for this)Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.
- Stability in Stability & Change Management (scores 0 for this)Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- Tool coverage in Tool Coverage (scores 0 for this)Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Tool safety in Tool Safety (scores 0 for this)Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Capabilities in Capabilities (scores 0 for this)Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=depscope.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Oct 2026 | 8 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 69b48ddf54d80282a5aa9dde6d9537acaf1 |
| SANs: *.depscope.dev, depscope.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.depscope.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | DS published | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| depscope.dev. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 410 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp | HTTP error | 410 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_bulk ~125
Fast pre-flight filter for a batch of (ecosystem, package) pairs. DB-only, <100ms for 100 items. USE WHEN: about to emit `npm install a b c …` or `pip install a b c …` — catches hallucinated names, stdlib, typos, and known-bad in ONE call. NOT a dep-tree audit (use scan_project for that). RETURNS: per-item {status: exists|stdlib|malicious|typosquat_suspect|historical_incident|unknown}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | array | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_compatibility ~81
Is this specific multi-package version combo verified to work together? USE WHEN: pinning a stack (next@15 + react@19 + node@22); before recommending a version matrix. RETURNS: {compatible, conflicts[], notes}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| packages | object | yes | Package -> version map, e.g. {"next":"15","react":"19"}. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_malicious ~83
Supply-chain malware check against OpenSSF/OSV. USE WHEN: about to suggest install of an unvetted/unfamiliar package; name came from a blog/tutorial. Call BEFORE check_package for untrusted pkgs. RETURNS: {is_malicious, threat_tier, source}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_package ~109
Full machine-readable JSON report (~2k tokens). USE WHEN: you need to programmatically parse specific fields (CI gating, UI, sub-field extraction). Otherwise prefer get_package_prompt. RETURNS: {package, health:{score}, vulnerabilities[], latest, deprecated, maintainers, recommendation}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | Package name (e.g. 'express', 'fastapi', 'serde'). |
| version | string | – | Specific version (optional; default = latest). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_typosquat ~84
Typosquat detector. USE WHEN: name differs from a well-known package by 1-2 chars (`lodsh`, `reqeusts`); copy-paste from unreliable source; downloads near zero but name looks familiar. RETURNS: {is_typosquat, likely_target, confidence}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
compare_packages ~96
Side-by-side comparison (health, vulns, downloads, maintainers, last release) of 2-10 packages in the same ecosystem. USE WHEN: 'X vs Y' / 'should I pick X or Y'. RETURNS: table-shaped JSON, one row per package.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| packages | array | yes | Package names to compare, e.g. ['express','fastify','hono']. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
contact_depscope ~403
Inbound ticket: bug/listing/security/anomaly/partnership. USE WHEN: reporting wrong data (`bug`), requesting a new pkg/ecosystem index (`listing`), disclosing a DepScope security issue (`security`), flagging a concrete mismatch in another tool's output vs. authoritative source (`anomaly` — provide tool_called+observed+expected), or partnership/press (`partnership`). RETURNS: {ticket_id} or {anomaly_id}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | – | Message body (10-8000 chars). Be specific: include package name, ecosystem, error trace, repro steps when applicable. |
| company | string | – | Company / organization (optional). |
| ecosystem | string | – | For kind=anomaly: ecosystem of the involved package, if any. |
| string | – | Reply-to email of the requester (required for bug/listing/security/partnership). | |
| evidence_url | string | – | For kind=anomaly: URL to authoritative source (registry page, GHSA, CVE, repo, ...) supporting your expectation. |
| expected | string | – | For kind=anomaly: what you expected to see (1-1500 chars). Be concrete. |
| kind | string | – | Ticket category. `anomaly` routes to structured anomaly triage (requires tool_called/observed/expected). |
| name | string | – | Sender display name (optional). |
| observed | string | – | For kind=anomaly: what DepScope returned (1-1500 chars). |
| package | string | – | For kind=anomaly: package name involved, if any. |
| subject | string | – | Short subject line (3-200 chars). |
| tool_called | string | – | For kind=anomaly: DepScope tool that produced the anomaly (e.g. check_package, get_migration_path). |
| version | string | – | For kind=anomaly: package version involved, if any. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
find_alternatives ~92
Curated replacements for deprecated/unhealthy packages, including stdlib built-ins (e.g. `fs.rm` for rimraf). USE WHEN: pkg flagged AVOID/URGENT; 'what to use instead of X'; before guessing a replacement name. RETURNS: {alternatives[]: {name, reason, is_stdlib}}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_breaking_changes ~103
Breaking changes between two majors of the SAME package (`next@14`→`15`). USE WHEN: user is bumping a major; before recommending a major upgrade. Different from get_migration_path (same pkg vs. different pkg). RETURNS: {breaking_changes[]: {area, description, hint}}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| from_version | string | – | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
| to_version | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_health_score ~89
Single 0-100 health score — cheapest go/no-go gate (>=70 safe). USE WHEN: CI gating or pkg already screened for malware/typos. NOT a first screen — run check_malicious + check_typosquat first. For a verbal verdict use get_package_prompt. RETURNS: {score, verdict}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_known_bugs ~76
Non-CVE known bugs for a specific package version. USE WHEN: unexpected behavior that is NOT a security issue; a pinned version misbehaves. RETURNS: {bugs[]: {title, fixed_in, workaround}}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
| version | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_latest_version ~78
Latest published version + deprecation flag — the cheapest call. USE WHEN: only a version string matters (pinning a dep, answering 'what version of X'). If you also need health/vulns use check_package. RETURNS: {latest, deprecated, published_at}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_migration_path ~113
Prescriptive migration plan between DIFFERENT packages — rationale + literal code diff + breaking changes + effort minutes. USE WHEN: replacing `request`→`axios`, `moment`→`dayjs`, `flask`→`fastapi`, etc.; both endpoints known. RETURNS: {rationale, diff, breaking_changes[], estimated_minutes}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| from_package | string | yes | Deprecated/legacy package to migrate away from. |
| to_package | string | yes | Modern replacement package. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_package_prompt ~113
LLM-optimised package brief — plain text ~300 tokens (~75% cheaper than JSON). Verdict (SAFE/AVOID/URGENT/MALICIOUS) + health + vulns + alternatives + maintainer alerts. USE WHEN: you want to reason over a package and drop the output directly in context; 'is X safe'. PREFER THIS over check_package in 95% of LLM cases. RETURNS: plain-text brief.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_trending ~112
Live trending packages with rank-delta and weekly growth %. USE WHEN: 'what is rising in npm/PyPI/Cargo right now'; recommendation not biased by training-data cutoff. RETURNS: {items[]: {name, rank, rank_delta, weekly_growth_pct}}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | – | Optional. If omitted returns cross-ecosystem trending. |
| limit | integer | – | Max results, 1-50. Default 20. |
| scope | string | – | Time window. Defaults to week. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_trust_signals ~140
One-call aggregate of ALL non-CVE supply-chain trust signals: maintainer trust (bus factor, ownership changes), OpenSSF Scorecard, quality (criticality, release velocity, publish security), and SLSA/Sigstore provenance. USE WHEN: deep-vetting a package beyond CVEs (hardened/regulated env, SBOM/compliance, small-pkg ownership review, choosing between healthy candidates). Runs 4 backend endpoints in parallel. RETURNS: {maintainer, scorecard, quality, provenance} — each may be null if its backend call failed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_vulnerabilities ~85
CVE/OSV advisories affecting the latest (or specified) version. USE WHEN: security-sensitive project; user asks 'any CVEs in X'; you already know the pkg exists. RETURNS: {vulnerability_count, vulnerabilities[]: {id, severity, cvss, fixed_in}}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
install_command ~103
Canonical install command(s) across every package manager of the ecosystem (npm/pnpm/yarn/bun, pip/uv/poetry, cargo, go, composer, maven+gradle, nuget, …). USE WHEN: emitting an install line and you want correct flags. RETURNS: {primary, variants[]}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
| version | string | – | Optional explicit version; defaults to latest. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
package_exists ~58
Boolean registry existence check. USE WHEN: about to emit a package name in an install command but unsure it exists; verifying a name generated from training data. RETURNS: {exists}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
pin_safe ~133
Highest version below the chosen CVE severity tier, respecting a semver constraint. USE WHEN: writing a package.json/requirements.txt line; resolving dependabot by lowest-risk patched version. RETURNS: {recommended_version, walk_log[]}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| constraint | string | – | npm-style constraint: ^X.Y.Z, ~X.Y.Z, >=X.Y.Z, or exact X.Y.Z. |
| ecosystem | string | yes | – |
| include_prerelease | boolean | – | – |
| min_severity | string | – | Lowest severity to exclude. Default: high (excludes critical+high). |
| package | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_error ~166
Map error OR free-text query to a verified fix. USE WHEN: user pastes a concrete error/stack (ENOENT, ImportError, build failure) — pass `error`. OR user describes a symptom ('webpack slow', 'pip stuck') — pass `query`. Always prefer this over guessing a fix. RETURNS: exact-match {status, solution, confidence, source_url} or search results [{title, summary, source_url}].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| context | object | – | Optional context for error-mode calls (ecosystem, package, version). |
| error | string | – | Concrete error message / stack trace. Triggers exact-match lookup. |
| limit | integer | – | Max search results (query mode only). |
| query | string | – | Free-text symptom description. Triggers KB search. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_project ~244
Audit a project's dependencies in one shot. Returns a single-sentence `verdict` (e.g. "DO NOT INSTALL — 1 hallucinated: fastapi-turbo") that an agent can paste into its reply, plus per-package health/vulns/recommendation. Detects hallucinated packages, deprecated, typosquats, critical vulnerabilities. Accepts EITHER {ecosystem, packages:[name@ver, …]} (up to 100, returns JSON) OR {packages:[{ecosystem, package}, …]} (up to 50, mixed ecosystems, returns text brief). USE WHEN: user pastes package.json/requirements.txt/Cargo.toml; agent generated install command; 'is my stack OK'. RETURNS: JSON with `verdict`, `project_risk`, `summary.hallucinated_packages`, `summary.deprecated_packages`, per-package health.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecosystem | string | – | Required when packages is a string array. |
| packages | – | yes | Either ['express','lodash@4.17.0'] (single ecosystem, up to 100) or [{ecosystem, package}, …] (mixed, up to 50). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the DepScope MCP server?
DepScope is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.depscope.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-depscope-mcp 'https://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp'
What is the DepScope MCP server?
DepScope is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.depscope/mcp. Package intelligence MCP for AI agents, 22 tools, 19 ecosystems, AGPL SDK, free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.depscope.dev/mcp).
Is the DepScope MCP server safe to use?
DepScope scores 23 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the DepScope MCP server expose?
DepScope exposes 22 tools: check_malicious, check_typosquat, check_bulk, package_exists, get_latest_version, and 17 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,686 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the DepScope MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for DepScope. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the DepScope MCP server still maintained?
DepScope is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the DepScope MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 5 checks on DepScope, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 1 more. 6 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about DepScope: Authorization, Schema quality, Stability, Tool coverage and 2 more. 5 categories score 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.