dev.cz-agents/sanctions
REMOTE · SANCTIONS.CZ-AGENTS.DEV · 2 COMPONENTS · SCANNED SEP 20
Sanctions screening for KYC/AML — EU FSF + OFAC SDN checks for Czech companies & individuals.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 6 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 746 tokens (~124/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 94% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the dev.cz-agents/sanctions MCP server?
dev.cz-agents/sanctions is a hosted endpoint at https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · sanctions.cz-agents.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-cz-agents-sanctions 'https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-cz-agents-sanctions": {
"url": "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"dev-cz-agents-sanctions": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.dev-cz-agents-sanctions] url = "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"dev-cz-agents-sanctions": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add dev-cz-agents-sanctions --url 'https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
dev-cz-agents-sanctions:
url: "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"dev-cz-agents-sanctions": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add dev-cz-agents-sanctions -t streamable-http -u 'https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"dev-cz-agents-sanctions": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 26 Aug 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 23 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Jul 26 0
- Tool coverage: 100% → 94% ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 601 → 746 ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 27 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=cz-agents.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 12 Aug 2026 | 10 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 598c9c9b6bc9d3a215029ec54fd11ecbb0b |
| SANs: *.cz-agents.dev, cz-agents.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of sanctions.cz-agents.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| cz-agents.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_ico ~90
Check whether a Czech IČO (or any company by IČO) appears on sanctions lists. Direct exact-ID lookup; pass `name` to also fuzzy-match if no direct hit.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ico | string | yes | Czech IČO (7-8 digits) or comparable national company ID. |
| name | string | – | Optional company name for fuzzy fallback if IČO not directly listed. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_listing ~70
Retrieve the full record for a single sanctions listing by its ID (format: `${source}:${source_list_id}`, e.g. "ofac:12345" or "eu:EU.123.789").
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Internal listing ID, e.g. "ofac:12345". |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_recent_updates ~78
List sanctions added/removed/modified since a given date. Use for daily monitoring against a watchlist.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| since | string | yes | ISO date or datetime, e.g. "2026-04-01" or "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z". |
| source | string | – | Optional source filter. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rescreen_portfolio ~145
PAID. Re-screen your own list of subjects against sanctions-list changes since a given date. Answers "which of MY clients were affected", which list_recent_updates cannot: that tool returns the global change feed, this one intersects it with your portfolio. Requires payment via x402; call without payment first to receive the terms.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| since | string | yes | ISO date of the last screening, e.g. "2026-07-01". |
| source | string | – | – |
| subjects | array | yes | Up to 11 subjects per paid call (batch cap sized to the per-call price, not per-subject). Each needs at least a name or an ICO. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_entity ~79
Fuzzy-search a sanctioned entity (company, organization) by name. Optional country narrows results.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| country | string | – | Country filter (name or ISO code). |
| limit | integer | – | Max results (default 20). |
| name | string | yes | Company / organization name. |
| threshold | integer | – | Min confidence (default 80). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_person ~143
Fuzzy-search a sanctioned person by name across all loaded lists. Optional date of birth and nationality narrow results. Returns matches with confidence scores (0-100). 100 = exact ID match, 80+ = strong fuzzy match, lower = review needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dob | string | – | YYYY or YYYY-MM-DD. Optional, narrows matches. |
| limit | integer | – | Max results (default 20). |
| name | string | yes | Full name. Cyrillic / Arabic / Chinese tolerated; transliteration applied. |
| nationality | string | – | Country name or ISO code. Optional. |
| threshold | integer | – | Min confidence to include in results (default 80). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the dev.cz-agents/sanctions MCP server?
dev.cz-agents/sanctions is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.cz-agents/sanctions. Sanctions screening for KYC/AML, EU FSF + OFAC SDN checks for Czech companies & individuals. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp).
Is the dev.cz-agents/sanctions MCP server safe to use?
dev.cz-agents/sanctions scores 79 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the dev.cz-agents/sanctions MCP server expose?
dev.cz-agents/sanctions exposes 6 tools: search_person, search_entity, check_ico, get_listing, list_recent_updates, rescreen_portfolio. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 605 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the dev.cz-agents/sanctions MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to dev.cz-agents/sanctions without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the dev.cz-agents/sanctions MCP server still maintained?
dev.cz-agents/sanctions is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.