Apexly
REMOTE · MCP.APEXLY.DEV
Add, check, diagnose and remove your SaaS customers' custom domains from any MCP client.
Available components
Last scanned (10 hours ago)
Scores higher than 83% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 6 Nov 2026.
Category Cloud Infrastructure
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability74
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1104 tokens (~138/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage96
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 87% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 4 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 29 Oct 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 28 Oct 26 +41
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 87 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
- 26 Oct 26 36
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 6 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.apexly.dev | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 24 Oct 2026 | 22 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6155a600af5c66882430178177c8e75d8b1 |
| SANs: mcp.apexly.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.apexly.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | DS published | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| apexly.dev. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self';base-uri 'self';font-src 'self' https: data:;form-action 'self';frame-ancestors 'self';img-src 'self' data:;object-src 'none';script-src 'self';script-src-attr 'none';style-src 'self' https: 'unsafe-inline';upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | No resource metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_domain Add a custom domain ~237
Add a customer's hostname (e.g. careers.acme.com or acme.com) to the app this API key belongs to. Idempotent: adding a hostname the app already has returns the existing domain. The domain starts in pending_dns; the customer must then add the DNS record in status_explained / get_dns_instructions, or open the connect_url to be guided through it. Apexly checks DNS every 15 seconds and issues the TLS certificate itself. With a test key (sk_test_…) the domain is a sandbox one that goes active by itself in about 30 seconds. Never invent a hostname: ask the user which one.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| apex_redirect | string | – | Apex domains only: also serve www.<apex> and redirect it |
| hostname | string | yes | The customer's hostname, no scheme or path, e.g. careers.acme.com |
| metadata | object | – | Any JSON object up to 4 KB, e.g. {"customer": "Acme", "tenant_id": "42"} |
| origin | string | – | Per-domain origin override (paid plans); omit to use the app origin |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
delete_domain Delete a domain ~96
Remove a domain: it stops being served within 5 seconds and its certificate is dropped. Irreversible (adding the hostname again starts over with a new record). Only call it after the user explicitly confirmed deleting this hostname, and pass confirm: true.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm | boolean | – | Must be true: the user confirmed deleting this domain |
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
diagnose_domain Diagnose a domain ~196
Why a domain is not live and what to change (the domain doctor, same as GET /v1/domains/{id}/diagnose): runs every check live (the record at 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 and the domain's own nameservers, other A and stale AAAA records, the Cloudflare proxy, CAA, the certificate, the origin, the www pair). Each check is pass, fail, warn or skip with what we saw (detail) and what to change (fix); blocking_check_id is the one to fix first. status_explained says why the domain is in its status. Use it when a domain stays in pending_dns, dns_broken or cert_failed, then relay the fix to the customer. Results are reused for 20 seconds.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_connect_url Get the connect page link ~89
The link to send the customer (the domain owner): a page branded with the app that detects their DNS provider, shows the exact record with copy buttons and tells them when the domain is live. Prefer it when the customer is not technical. It is safe to share with the customer, not publicly.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_dns_instructions DNS instructions for the customer ~108
The exact DNS record(s) the customer must add for this domain, plus step-by-step instructions for their DNS provider (detected from the domain's nameservers: GoDaddy, Cloudflare, Namecheap, Route 53 and ~40 more; generic steps otherwise). Record names are relative to the registrable domain ("careers" in acme.com, "@" for the apex).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_domain Get a domain ~103
Current state of one domain: status (pending_dns → verifying → issuing → active; or dns_broken, cert_failed, held, expired), the DNS record the customer must add, the connect_url and the certificate. status_explained says in one sentence why it is in that status and what to do next. Use it to poll after create_domain or verify_domain.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_domains List domains ~95
The app's domains, newest first, one page at a time. Pass next_cursor back as cursor for the next page (null means there are no more). Filter by status or by hostname prefix to find a domain id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | string | – | next_cursor of the previous page |
| hostname | string | – | Hostname prefix, e.g. careers. |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_domain Check a domain now ~90
Queue a DNS check right away instead of waiting for the next scheduled one; use it after the customer says they added the record. On cert_failed it retries the certificate. At most one per 15 seconds per domain. The check runs in the background: call get_domain a few seconds later for the result.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Apexly MCP server?
Apexly is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.apexly.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-apexly-mcp 'https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp'
What is the Apexly MCP server?
Apexly is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.apexly/mcp. Add, check, diagnose and remove your SaaS customers' custom domains from any MCP client. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp).
Is the Apexly MCP server safe to use?
Apexly scores 81 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Apexly MCP server expose?
Apexly exposes 8 tools: create_domain, get_domain, list_domains, verify_domain, get_connect_url, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,014 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Apexly MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Apexly asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Apexly MCP server still maintained?
Apexly is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 6 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Apexly MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Apexly, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.