io.github.cyanheads/toolkit-mcp-server

Encode or decode a value across base64, base64url, hex, or URL (percent) encoding, in either direction. Set operation to "encode" to transform raw UTF-8 text into the chosen encoding, or "decode" to recover the original text from an encoded value. base64url uses the URL-safe alphabet (- and _ instead of + and /); url applies encodeURIComponent / decodeURIComponent. Decoding a value that is malformed for the chosen encoding is reported as a recoverable error, not a silent best-effort.

Mint cryptographically-random identifiers using the platform CSPRNG — the correct source for IDs that must be unpredictable, unlike model-generated values. type selects the format: uuid_v4 (random, the default), uuid_v7 (time-ordered, sortable by creation), or ulid (26-char Crockford-base32, lexicographically sortable). Set count to mint a batch in one call (up to 1000); the returned ids array always contains exactly count values and is never truncated. For uuid_v7 and ulid, a batch is monotonic — strictly increasing even within the same millisecond — so the ids array stays in sorted creation order. IDs from this tool feed into toolkit_generate_qr (pass ids[0] as data) to create a scannable code.

Encode text or a URL into a QR code. data is the content to encode (a link, a generated identifier such as toolkit_generate_id's ids[0], or any string). format selects the output: svg returns inline SVG markup, png_base64 returns base64-encoded PNG bytes (with mimeType and byteLength), and terminal returns a block of Unicode block characters renderable in a monospace terminal. errorCorrection (L/M/Q/H) trades data capacity for damage tolerance, margin sets the quiet-zone width, and scale sets pixels per module for raster output. The returned version (1–40) reflects how dense the encoded data is. png_base64 renders (modules + 2 × margin) × scale pixels per side and rejects anything past 2048 px with a typed raster_too_large error, so a dense symbol needs a lower scale; svg carries no such limit.

Resolve a public IP address (or hostname) to geographic and network metadata: country, region, city, latitude/longitude, the owning ASN and organization, timezone, and the proxy/hosting/mobile quality flags. target accepts an IPv4/IPv6 address or a hostname — a hostname is DNS-resolved first and the resolvedIp field echoes which IP was actually located. The provider is called directly (never the target), so this is SSRF-free and safe to expose anywhere. Results are best-effort and provider-bounded: VPNs, proxies, mobile NAT, and anycast all defeat IP-to-location, accuracy is city-level at best, and many fields can be absent for reserved or thinly-documented ranges — absent fields are reported as unknown, never invented. Read proxy, hosting, and mobile before trusting the coordinates: a true on any of them means the location describes infrastructure, not the user. Private/reserved addresses have no public geolocation and are rejected. The source field names which provider answered.

Generate a cryptographic digest of a value, or verify a value against an expected digest. Set operation to "generate" for a lowercase-hex digest, or "compare" to constant-time-check value against the expected digest — compare is timing-safe and avoids manual string equality checks. Algorithm defaults to sha256; sha512 is also secure, while md5 and sha1 are exposed for checksum and file-integrity compatibility ONLY and must not be used for passwords, signatures, or any security purpose. inputEncoding controls how value and expected are read before hashing (utf8 default, or hex/base64 for raw binary data) so binary blobs need no decode round-trip. The canonical use is matching a download against a vendor-published checksum.