openaccess
REMOTE · OPENACCESS.LOGICSRC.COM
Logicsrc OAuth grant hub (openaccess.logicsrc.com)
Available components
Last scanned (12 hours ago)
Scores higher than 46% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Recent critical change
Authorization (18 Nov 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (revoke_grant). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 528 tokens (~52/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +14
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
- HSTS header: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.20 ▲ functional
- 17 Nov 26 −12
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 15 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- Authorization: fail → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.07 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 13 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Nov 26 +57
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
- HSTS header: unverified → fail ▼ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- 11 Nov 26 4
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=openaccess.logicsrc.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 25 Sept 2026 | 24 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 595646cd21a8a076a380bfc1a0a8c4fcbae |
| SANs: openaccess.logicsrc.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of openaccess.logicsrc.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| logicsrc.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
cancel_entitlement Cancel Subscription ~49
Ask the seller to cancel. The standing stays until the seller reports the cancellation; the seller's cancel link comes back too.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The entitlement id, from my_entitlements. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_entitlement Check Entitlement ~30
Does the principal hold this product in good standing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| product | string | yes | <host>/<slug> |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
delegate_grant Delegate Grant ~166
Hand a narrower grant to an agent: a subset of this token's scopes, limits no larger, an expiry no later. Answers a refresh token for the agent, shown once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expires_in | integer | – | Seconds until the child expires. |
| for | string | – | The agent's OpenProfile.md URL, so the app can see who holds it. |
| grant | string | – | Which of the principal's grants to delegate from. Defaults to the token's own grant. |
| lifetime | string | – | e.g. "500 USD" |
| per_call | string | – | e.g. "5 USD" |
| per_day | string | – | e.g. "50 USD", a rolling day |
| scope | string | yes | Space-separated scopes, a subset of the parent's. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_app Get App ~35
One app in full: its descriptor as the hub last read it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The app id: its host. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_apps List Apps ~36
The apps this hub knows: their scopes, what they sell, what they honour.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | – | A word to match. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
my_entitlements My Entitlements ~33
Every product the principal holds, with pay, cancel, manage and promote links filled in, and which apps honour each.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
my_grants My Grants ~37
Every grant the principal gave, per app, with children delegated to agents.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| app | string | – | Only this app, by id. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_app Register App ~45
Register an app by any URL on its origin. The hub reads /.well-known/openaccess.json there and lists what it found.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | The app's URL. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
revoke_grant Revoke Grant ~40
Revoke one of the principal's grants and every child delegated from it. The app hears at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The grant id. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
whoami Who Am I ~26
The principal behind the token, the grant it rides on, and its scopes and limits.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the openaccess MCP server?
openaccess is a hosted endpoint at https://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · openaccess.logicsrc.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-profullstack-openaccess 'https://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp'
What is the openaccess MCP server?
openaccess is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.profullstack/openaccess. Logicsrc OAuth grant hub (openaccess.logicsrc.com). This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://openaccess.logicsrc.com/mcp).
Is the openaccess MCP server safe to use?
openaccess scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the openaccess MCP server expose?
openaccess exposes 10 tools: whoami, my_grants, my_entitlements, delegate_grant, revoke_grant, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 497 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the openaccess MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to openaccess without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the openaccess MCP server still maintained?
openaccess is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the openaccess MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on openaccess, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.