Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification
REMOTE · X402.PROFESSORSAUSAGES.COM
Email, phone, domain, URL & OFAC verification; phishing and IBAN checks via x402.
Available components
Last scanned (15 hours ago)
Scores higher than 59% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 12 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS check failed: the endpoint is reachable over plaintext HTTP. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability81
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2039 tokens (~169/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 12 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 13 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 12 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 9 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 22 Sept 26 0
- HTTPS: unverified → fail ▼ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://x402.professorsausages.com/mcp/trust
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=professorsausages.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 25 Oct 2026 | 23 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d1cf008402c61bd30e0afb661870c9e5 |
| SANs: professorsausages.com, x402.professorsausages.com, *.x402.professorsausages.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of x402.professorsausages.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| professorsausages.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://x402.professorsausages.com/mcp/trust | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://x402.professorsausages.com/mcp/trust | Served over HTTP | 200 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
address_screen Screen a crypto address against OFAC ~177
Screen a crypto address against the full live OFAC SDN list, segmented by chain. Returns a verdict with the matching SDN entries as evidence — never a silent all-clear. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The address to screen, in that chain's native format. |
| chain | string | – | Which chain the address belongs to. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
domain_intel Domain registration & DNS card ~212
RDAP registration card for a domain (creation/expiry dates, registrar, statuses, nameservers, DNSSEC) plus derived risk flags like domain age. view='dns' returns a live multi-record DNS summary (A/AAAA/CNAME/MX/NS/TXT/SOA/CAA + SPF/DMARC); view='live' re-reads the registry at the moment you ask. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Registrable domain name. |
| view | string | – | Which read to perform. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
email_check Email deliverability signals ~162
Deliverability signals for one address: RFC5322 syntax, live MX/SPF/DMARC over DNS-over-HTTPS, disposable/role-account flags. Signals with evidence — not a guaranteed inbox verdict. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | The address to check. | |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
find_data Find the right data source ~103
Describe the data you need in plain language (e.g. 'Apple risk factors 2023', 'is this token a honeypot', 'is this email deliverable', 'read this page'). Searches this server's datasets first, then the whole Professor Sausages catalog, and returns matching endpoints with method, URL, price, and how to call them. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| task | string | yes | What you're trying to find or do, in your own words |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
iban_check IBAN validate & decode ~175
Validate an IBAN (length + mod-97 check digits). view='decode' resolves it to country, bank and account parts; view='format' returns electronic and paper (grouped) forms. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| iban | string | yes | The IBAN, spaces optional. |
| view | string | – | Which operation to run. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
phone_check Phone number validation ~171
Validate and normalize a phone number: E.164 form, line type, region, and a verdict. Pure CPU, no third-party lookup. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| number | string | yes | The number, ideally in E.164. |
| region | string | – | ISO-3166 region hint for national-format numbers. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
pricing Price list ~44
Every endpoint this server fronts, with its exact per-call USD price (x402, USDC on Base) and a one-line summary, read live from the route table. Free.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
request_data Request missing data ~110
The suggestion box: ask for data we don't have (a pre-2015 filing, an uncovered ticker, an unsupported chain, a whole dataset). Requests feed the nightly ingestion queue — filings are usually available within ~24h. Include contact if you want to hear back. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contact | string | – | Optional: URL/email/handle for follow-up |
| description | string | yes | What data you need, in your own words |
| use_case | string | – | Optional: what you're building |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
sanctions_entity Full OFAC dossier ~164
The complete OFAC record for one entity number: all aliases, addresses, sanctions programs, and extracted identifiers (passports, tax ids, DOBs). Use after sanctions_screen returns a candidate. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | OFAC ent_num from a screen result. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
sanctions_screen OFAC sanctions name screen ~222
Fuzzy-screen a name against the full OFAC SDN + Consolidated lists. Returns match / possible_match / no_match with scored candidates and the aliases that matched — never a silent all-clear. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Max candidates to return. |
| list | string | – | Which OFAC list(s) to screen against. |
| min_score | integer | – | Minimum fuzzy score (0-100) for a candidate to be returned. |
| name | string | yes | Name to screen. |
| type | string | – | Restrict to one party type. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
url_screen Phishing / malicious URL screen ~171
Screen a URL against the URLhaus blocklist snapshot plus deterministic live heuristics (redirect chain, host reputation signals, lookalike patterns). Returns a verdict with the rules that fired. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| follow | boolean | – | Follow the redirect chain before judging. |
| url | string | yes | Absolute URL to screen. |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vessel_screen Maritime sanctions screen ~185
Screen vessels against OFAC maritime designations by fuzzy name, exact call sign, or IMO number, with flag filtering. Paid: call without x_payment to receive this call's exact terms (amount, asset, network), sign them, then call again with x_payment. The free `pricing` tool lists every price at once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| call_sign | string | – | Exact call sign. |
| flag | string | – | Flag state filter. |
| imo | string | – | IMO number. |
| limit | integer | – | Max results. |
| name | string | – | Vessel name (fuzzy). |
| x_payment | string | – | Optional signed x402 payment payload (base64, what the X-PAYMENT header carries). Omit to receive the exact payment terms; sign them (e.g. @x402/fetch) and call again with this argument to settle and… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server?
Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification is a hosted endpoint at https://x402.professorsausages.com/mcp/trust, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · x402.professorsausages.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-professorsausages-sausage-trust 'https://x402.professorsausages.com/mcp/trust'
What is the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server?
Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.professorsausages/sausage-trust. Email, phone, domain, URL & OFAC verification; phishing and IBAN checks via x402. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://x402.professorsausages.com/mcp/trust).
Is the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server safe to use?
Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification scores 73 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server expose?
Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification exposes 12 tools: find_data, pricing, request_data, email_check, phone_check, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,896 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server still maintained?
Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Professor Sausages — Trust & Verification: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.