com.policylayer/registry
REMOTE · API.POLICYLAYER.COM
The MCP server that vets MCP servers: identity, risk grade and per-tool risk before you install.
Available components
Last scanned (4 days ago)
Scores higher than 0% of remote servers
Unreachable for 7 days in a row. Last reached 10 Nov 2026.
Category Security
Dead
Every channel of this server has been unreachable for long enough to be marked dead. Its trust score is pinned to 0 and does not recover automatically: even once the server responds again it stays dead until it is manually reinstated.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 502. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Checks we ran (5)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
Checks we could not complete (6)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it.
- Schema quality in Schema Quality & AI Usability (scores 0 for this)Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.
- Stability in Stability & Change Management (scores 0 for this)Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- Tool coverage in Tool Coverage (scores 0 for this)Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Tool safety in Tool Safety (scores 0 for this)Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.
- Capabilities in Capabilities (scores 0 for this)Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 17 Nov 26 −16
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 16 Nov 26 −16
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 15 Nov 26 −17
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 14 Nov 26 −16
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 13 Nov 26 −16
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 9 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 17 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.policylayer.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.policylayer.com | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Oct 2026 | 8 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 6e7cd7c4caa63e443b495e45c49251f0d97 |
| SANs: api.policylayer.com | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.policylayer.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| policylayer.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 502 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.policylayer.com/mcp | HTTP error | 502 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.policylayer.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.policylayer.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_mcp_server ~134
Check an MCP server against the PolicyLayer registry BEFORE installing or allowing it. Accepts a registry slug, an npm package name (scoped or not), a remote server URL (https://…), or a server name. Returns the full published record: identity verification with its evidence, risk grade, auth posture, freshness, and the tool surface listed riskiest-first. A server the registry does not know is queued for scanning by this very call — check back shortly.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | string | yes | Registry slug, npm package name (e.g. @acme/mcp-server), remote URL, or server name. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_mcp_stack ~118
Check a whole MCP stack against the PolicyLayer registry in one call — up to 25 servers, each given as candidate identifiers (npm package name, registry slug, or remote URL) tried in order until one resolves. Returns the published record for every hit — plus a deterministic verdict (attention signals and a suggested action) — and the lookup status for every miss; counts, grades and flagged tools come from the published records only. Costs one rate-limit unit per server.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| servers | array | yes | One entry per server in the stack. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_tool ~95
One tool's full risk classification on a published MCP server: category, severity, risk analysis and evidence, OWASP classes, parameter schema and the recommended policy default. Use when deciding whether to allow a specific tool call, e.g. "should execute_sql on this server be permitted?"
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | string | yes | Registry slug or npm package name of the server. |
| tool | string | yes | Tool name as the server declares it. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_change_events ~134
The registry change feed: tool-surface drift, auth-posture flips, impostor flags, version bumps — every event the freshness watchers emit, id-cursored so a consumer resumes exactly where it stopped. Requires a Registry Licence key (Authorization: Bearer plr_...); self-serve at https://policylayer.com/registry/pricing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after_id | number | – | Return events with id greater than this cursor (default 0). |
| limit | number | – | Max events (1-1000, default 200). |
| severity | string | – | Minimum severity: that level and above. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_registry ~113
Search the PolicyLayer registry of published MCP servers by name, slug or package substring. Returns candidate matches with risk grade, identity confidence (verified / unverified / mismatch — mismatch means it claims to be an official server with no verifiable link to the brand) and tool count — follow up with check_mcp_server on the match you meant.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | number | – | Max matches to return (1-20, default 10). |
| query | string | yes | Substring to match against slug, name and packages. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the com.policylayer/registry MCP server?
com.policylayer/registry is a hosted endpoint at https://api.policylayer.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.policylayer.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-policylayer-registry 'https://api.policylayer.com/mcp'
What is the com.policylayer/registry MCP server?
com.policylayer/registry is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.policylayer/registry. The MCP server that vets MCP servers: identity, risk grade and per-tool risk before you install. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.policylayer.com/mcp).
Is the com.policylayer/registry MCP server safe to use?
com.policylayer/registry scores 0 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the com.policylayer/registry MCP server expose?
com.policylayer/registry exposes 5 tools: check_mcp_server, check_mcp_stack, search_registry, check_tool, get_change_events. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 594 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the com.policylayer/registry MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for com.policylayer/registry. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the com.policylayer/registry MCP server still maintained?
com.policylayer/registry has been unreachable for long enough that we treat it as dead, and its score is pinned to zero. We last reached this channel on 10 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the com.policylayer/registry MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 5 checks on com.policylayer/registry, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 1 more. 6 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about com.policylayer/registry: Authorization, Schema quality, Stability, Tool coverage and 2 more. 5 categories score 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.