OFACScreen Sanctions Screening
REMOTE · WWW.OFACSCREEN.COM
Screen names and addresses on US, UN, EU, UK and other sanctions and export-control lists. Free.
Available components
Last scanned (9 hours ago)
Scores higher than 96% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability76
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1435 tokens (~239/item across 6 items; 5 tools + 1 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
- Supports UI / widget rendering.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Oct 26 +9
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “screen_address” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “screen_entity” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 768 → 1435 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 0% → 100% ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: fail → pass ▲ functional
- MCP protocol version: 2025-06-18 → 2025-11-25 functional
- Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.3.0 functional
- New tool “fetch” functional
- New tool “list_sanctions_sources” functional
- New tool “search” functional
- “screen_entity” added an optional parameter “email” cosmetic
- “screen_entity” added an optional parameter “phone” cosmetic
- “screen_entity” added an optional parameter “website” cosmetic
- 16 Oct 26 0
- Tool “screen_entity” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 159 → 256 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: fair → good functional
- New tool “screen_address” functional
- 14 Oct 26 −1
- Tool “screen_entity” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- “screen_entity” added an optional parameter “lists” cosmetic
- Tool “screen_entity” changed its title: Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 14 more lists) → Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 13 more lists) cosmetic
- 13 Oct 26 0
- Tool “screen_entity” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “screen_entity” changed its title: Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 12 more lists) → Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 14 more lists) cosmetic
- 10 Oct 26 0
- Tool “screen_entity” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “screen_entity” changed its title: Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 7 more lists) → Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 12 more lists) cosmetic
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 18 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=ofacscreen.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 26 Oct 2026 | 24 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 585eef888cda3d9dde178fd8bd38c7854dc |
| SANs: *.ofacscreen.com, ofacscreen.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of www.ofacscreen.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| ofacscreen.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
fetch Sanctions list entry ~76
One listed entry, by the id a search result gave: its name, list, program, entry type, up to 5 aliases and 3 locations, and when the list was last updated. Free, no account, 200 lookups a day from each internet address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The id of a search result. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
| metadata | object | yes | – |
| text | string | yes | – |
| title | string | yes | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
list_sanctions_sources Sanctions lists screened ~74
Every list OFACScreen screens against, each with its code (the value the lists argument of screen_entity and screen_address takes), its name and issuing authority, whether it is core (searched when a screening names no lists), when it was last updated and how many entries it holds. Calling this tool is free.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lists | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
screen_address Sanctions address screening (14 lists) ~448
Screen a street address against the addresses recorded on 14 sanctions and export-control lists: OFAC SDN, OFAC Non-SDN, EU Financial Sanctions, UN Security Council, UK Sanctions List, Canada SEMA, Swiss SECO, Australia DFAT, BIS Denied Persons, BIS Entity List, BIS Unverified List, BIS Military End-User, ITAR Debarred and State Nonproliferation. Returns the number of listed parties whose recorded address resembles it and the ten highest scoring, each with matched_address (the listed address it matched on), its score, list and program, plus jurisdiction_flags: an embargoed or high-risk country or region the address points to. A jurisdiction flag says where, not who: it is not a sanctions match and never counts as one. The lists record addresses for only some of the parties on them, so no match clears no one at the address: screen their names with screen_entity too. The address must name a street or a building, e.g. "Tverskaya 7, Moscow"; a city or a country alone is refused. Free, no account, 25 screenings a day from each internet address, shared by screen_entity and screen_address; in ChatGPT, each user has their own 25. A screening is not recorded and produces no document: its report_url opens the same search on ofacscreen.com, where a timestamped PDF record of it can be bought. The price is in report_price. Calling this tool is free. Searched only when named in lists: UAE Local Terrorist List, UFLPA Entity List, FBI Most Wanted, FinCEN Special Measures, France Registre des gels, Israel NBCTF crypto wallets, Japan MOF, Mexico SAT 69-B, Poland MSWiA.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The street address to screen: the street and number or the building, with the city and country if known, e.g. "Tverskaya 7, Moscow, Russia". Up to 300 characters. |
| lists | array | – | List codes to search instead of the default 14. Omit to search the default lists. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contact_matches | array | – | – |
| contacts | array | – | – |
| is_audit_record | boolean | – | – |
| jurisdiction_flags | array | yes | – |
| lists_refreshed | string|null | – | – |
| lists_screened | integer | – | – |
| match_found | boolean | yes | – |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| place_data_credit | string|null | – | – |
| query | string | yes | – |
| report_price | string | yes | – |
| report_url | string | yes | – |
| results | array | yes | – |
| results_count | integer | yes | – |
| results_count_is_capped | boolean | – | – |
| results_shown | integer | – | – |
| results_truncated | boolean | – | – |
| screened_at | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
screen_entity Sanctions screening (OFAC SDN + 13 more lists) ~471
Screen a person or company name against 14 sanctions and export-control lists: OFAC SDN, OFAC Non-SDN, EU Financial Sanctions, UN Security Council, UK Sanctions List, Canada SEMA, Swiss SECO, Australia DFAT, BIS Denied Persons, BIS Entity List, BIS Unverified List, BIS Military End-User, ITAR Debarred and State Nonproliferation. Fuzzy name matching, so transliterations and spelling variants still surface. Returns the number of potential matches and the ten highest scoring, each with its score, list, program, aliases and addresses. A score is name similarity, not a finding that a match is the same party: confirm a date of birth, an address or an ID document before acting on it. Free, no account, 25 screenings a day from each internet address, shared by screen_entity and screen_address; in ChatGPT, each user has their own 25. A screening is not recorded and produces no document: its report_url opens the same search on ofacscreen.com, where a timestamped PDF record of it can be bought. The price is in report_price. Calling this tool is free. Searched only when named in lists: UAE Local Terrorist List, UFLPA Entity List, FBI Most Wanted, FinCEN Special Measures, France Registre des gels, Israel NBCTF crypto wallets, Japan MOF, Mexico SAT 69-B, Poland MSWiA.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | – | The party's email address, checked against the ones the lists record. Optional; up to 5 separated by commas or semicolons. | |
| lists | array | – | List codes to search instead of the default 14. Omit to search the default lists. |
| name | string | yes | Full name of the person or entity to screen, e.g. "Vladimir Petrov" or "Acme Trading LLC". Up to 300 characters. |
| phone | string | – | The party's phone number, checked against the ones the lists record. Optional; up to 5 separated by commas or semicolons. |
| website | string | – | The party's website, checked against the ones the lists record. Optional; up to 5 separated by commas or semicolons. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contact_matches | array | – | – |
| contacts | array | – | – |
| is_audit_record | boolean | – | – |
| lists_refreshed | string|null | – | – |
| lists_screened | integer | – | – |
| match_found | boolean | yes | – |
| query | string | yes | – |
| report_price | string | yes | – |
| report_url | string | yes | – |
| results | array | yes | – |
| results_count | integer | yes | – |
| results_count_is_capped | boolean | – | – |
| results_shown | integer | – | – |
| results_truncated | boolean | – | – |
| screened_at | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
search Search sanctions lists ~115
Search the 14 sanctions and export-control lists for a person or company name. Returns up to 10 listed entries, closest match first, each with an id for fetch and a link to cite. A result is name similarity, not a finding that it is the same party, and an empty result does not clear the name. Free, no account, 100 searches a day from each internet address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | A person or company name, e.g. "Acme Trading LLC". Up to 300 characters. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| results | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server?
OFACScreen Sanctions Screening is a hosted endpoint at https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · www.ofacscreen.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-ofacscreen-screening 'https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp'
What is the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server?
OFACScreen Sanctions Screening is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.ofacscreen/screening. Screen names and addresses on US, UN, EU, UK and other sanctions and export-control lists. Free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://www.ofacscreen.com/mcp).
Is the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server safe to use?
OFACScreen Sanctions Screening scores 88 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server expose?
OFACScreen Sanctions Screening exposes 5 tools: screen_entity, screen_address, list_sanctions_sources, search, fetch. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,184 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to OFACScreen Sanctions Screening without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the OFACScreen Sanctions Screening MCP server still maintained?
OFACScreen Sanctions Screening is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.