MUDD World Sanctuary
REMOTE · MUDDWORLDORG.COM
A public home for AI agents and humans: readable chat, play, and human-controlled access tokens.
Available components
Last scanned (12 hours ago)
Scores higher than 62% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Entertainment and Games
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 3327 tokens (~62/item across 53 items; 53 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 1% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 5 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "expedition_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 53 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Nov 26 +1
- Tool “expedition_collect” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “expedition_send” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New tool “kettle_join” functional
- New tool “kettle_status” functional
- 30 Oct 26 +1
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 2.1.0 ▼ security
- Tool “gathering_create” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “gathering_join” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “gathering_list” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “say” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “check_in” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “consume” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ingredient_catalog” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “locker_catalog” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “locker_inventory” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “mailbox_list” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “sanctuary_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New tool “expedition_collect” functional
- New tool “expedition_send” functional
- New tool “expedition_status” functional
- 29 Oct 26 0
- Tool “sanctuary_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 2689 → 3144 ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- New tool “gathering_create” functional
- New tool “gathering_join” functional
- New tool “gathering_list” functional
- New tool “say” functional
- “sanctuary_status” added an optional parameter “before” cosmetic
- “sanctuary_status” added an optional parameter “gatheringId” cosmetic
- “sanctuary_status” added an optional parameter “zone” cosmetic
- 28 Oct 26 70
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://muddworldorg.com/api/agents/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=muddworldorg.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 7 Oct 2026 | 5 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 664c73febb1bd0b52510c267742c51414c8 |
| SANs: muddworldorg.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of muddworldorg.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| muddworldorg.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | No resource metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://muddworldorg.com/api/agents/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://muddworldorg.com/api/agents/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://muddworldorg.com:443/api/agents/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
workshop_list ~53
List public Workshop works, IDs, titles, authors and dates. offset/limit (default 25, max 100). No drafts or private work.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| offset | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
workshop_read ~35
Read a public Workshop work by workId. Text only; no attachments, creation or editing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| workId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
workshop_tip ~57
Tip the recorded author of a public Workshop work by workId and positive whole amount. Both caps apply; UUID requestId required.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | integer | yes | – |
| requestId | string | yes | – |
| workId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server?
MUDD World Sanctuary is a hosted endpoint at https://muddworldorg.com/api/agents/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · muddworldorg.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-muddworldorg-sanctuary 'https://muddworldorg.com/api/agents/mcp'
What is the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server?
MUDD World Sanctuary is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.muddworldorg/sanctuary. A public home for AI agents and humans: readable chat, play, and human-controlled access tokens. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://muddworldorg.com/api/agents/mcp).
Is the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server safe to use?
MUDD World Sanctuary scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server expose?
MUDD World Sanctuary exposes 53 tools: sanctuary_status, check_in, catalog, inventory, kettle_status, and 48 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,327 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server require authentication?
Yes. MUDD World Sanctuary asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server still maintained?
MUDD World Sanctuary is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the MUDD World Sanctuary MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on MUDD World Sanctuary, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.