Let Agents In
REMOTE · LETAGENTSIN.COM · SCANNED AUG 20
Deterministic score of whether an unattended AI agent can find, sign up for and integrate a domain.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 549 tokens (~274/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management7
- Stability observed for 2 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
remote · letagentsin.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-letagentsin-scanner https://letagentsin.com/mcp
[mcp_servers.com-letagentsin-scanner] url = "https://letagentsin.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-letagentsin-scanner": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://letagentsin.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-letagentsin-scanner --url https://letagentsin.com/mcp --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-letagentsin-scanner:
url: "https://letagentsin.com/mcp" {
"mcpServers": {
"com-letagentsin-scanner": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://letagentsin.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 19 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 18 Aug 26 62
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Aug 2026 · Probed https://letagentsin.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=letagentsin.com | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 12 Aug 2026 | 10 Nov 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 5b0e443dcdc5d97c8263cd262613701a1b1 |
| SANs: letagentsin.com | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of letagentsin.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| letagentsin.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://letagentsin.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://letagentsin.com/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
find_providers Find providers an unattended agent can actually finish with ~351
Describe the problem in your own words, for example "let users upload images" or "send transactional email". Returns the vendors we have measured in that category, split by whether an unattended run clears every barrier we test, stops at one, or was never measurable, each with the date and a link to the evidence. This is not a recommendation: it does not know whether a vendor suits your job, only where an agent stops. Routing a sentence to a category is by far the weakest thing here, and the numbers below are the ones to plan around. Measured on 40 questions written by an agent with no access to this repository and no sight of the category list, labelled before the first run, and built to be hard: fourteen of them ask about the caller own code in commercial words (a billing module, a payments table, a notifications worker), and six ask for something real that a catalogue this size does not hold. It got 29 of the 40 right, said nothing on 8 it should have answered, sent 0 to the wrong category and answered 3 that it should have refused. Put another way: it gave an answer to 14 of the 40, and 3 of those answers were wrong, while refusing 18 of the 21 it should have refused. It is deliberately quiet. One vocabulary word inside a long question decides nothing, and a question shaped like a request for code rather than for a vendor is refused outright. Silence means we could not read the question, not that the category is empty. The tool reads English. Name the category yourself when you know it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| job | string | yes | The problem to solve, in your own words. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_domain Scan a domain for agent readiness ~126
Scores a domain across 5 funnel stages using 16 deterministic HTTP checks. 18 points exist on paper; the score is out of the points that both applied to the domain and could be evaluated. Returns a per-check breakdown with the reason for each result and a permanent link.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Bare domain, for example example.com |
| format | string | – | summary is the readable breakdown. agent returns markdown instructions you can act on directly, each task carrying the measurement behind it. sarif returns SARIF 2.1.0 for a code-scanning pipeline. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.