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com.getplexa/mcp

NPM · @GETPLEXA/MCP · SCANNED SEP 20

Economic-safety tools for trading agents: executable quote + rug/honeypot pretrade check via x402.

Available components

0 this week 79 Trust /100
Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security99
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
  • 31 of 114 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
Schema Quality & AI Usability55
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3380 tokens (~1690/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management90
  • Stability observed for 27 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Install

How do I install the com.getplexa/mcp server?

com.getplexa/mcp runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @getplexa/mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

npm · @getplexa/mcp

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add com-getplexa-mcp -- npx -y @getplexa/mcp
// .cursor/mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-getplexa-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@getplexa/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
// .vscode/mcp.json
{
  "servers": {
    "com-getplexa-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@getplexa/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
# add to Codex CLI
codex mcp add com-getplexa-mcp -- npx -y @getplexa/mcp
// opencode.json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-getplexa-mcp": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": [
        "npx",
        "-y",
        "@getplexa/mcp"
      ],
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
# add to OpenClaw
openclaw mcp add com-getplexa-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg @getplexa/mcp
# ~/.hermes/config.yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-getplexa-mcp:
    command: "npx"
    args: ["-y", "@getplexa/mcp"]
// ~/.netclaw/config/netclaw.json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "com-getplexa-mcp": {
      "Transport": "stdio",
      "Command": "npx",
      "Arguments": [
        "-y",
        "@getplexa/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
# add to Vellum
assistant mcp add com-getplexa-mcp -t stdio -c npx -a -y @getplexa/mcp
// mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-getplexa-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@getplexa/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 19 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 17 Sept 26 −3
    • Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
  • 16 Sept 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 14 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 12 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 10 Sept 26 −3
    • Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
  • 9 Sept 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 7 Sept 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/@getplexa/mcp@0.1.9

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem npm

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Dependencies 114 packages
Packages resolved 114
Stale 31
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 2 exposed · ~3,380 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
plexa_pretrade_check ~2,271

Two-level economic-safety check for an ERC-20 on Base, Polygon or Arbitrum before buying it. LEVEL 1 — verdict: "avoid" ONLY when a listed trap is PROVEN on-chain at that block (NO_EXIT_VENUE: no pool exists to sell back into; EXIT_LIQUIDITY_DRAINED: the counter-asset pot is smaller than 5% of the size you asked about — the pot is an upper bound on what a sale can return, so under 5% you recover at most 5 cents on the dollar; TRADING_DISABLED: the token's own trading gate reads false). "clear" means none of them fired — it is NOT a safety rating and NOT a prediction, so do not treat it as "safe". LEVEL 2 — risk_profile: token age, holder concentration (ANY token age: top-1/top-10 share of supply computed from holder balances and on-chain totalSupply; the data age travels in the response, and a vendor outage answers "unknown" with an explicit reason, never a clean default), liquidity structure including exitLiquidityUsd (the dollars a sell can actually reach, across up to TWO hops: pairs against WETH/USDC directly, plus pairs against any other counter asset whose own exit we confirmed — see EXIT MEASURABILITY below), oracle availability, and fee-on-transfer / blacklist / limit fingerprints — reported as measured DATA with plain-language notes, not as severities. Weigh them yourself: on 40 outcome-labelled Base tokens those structural factors marked live and dead tokens at the same rate, which is why they no longer produce a verdict. CONFIDENCE means different things on the two branches: on "avoid" it is confidence in the TRIGGER, which is a measurement taken that call, so it is always "high" — do NOT gate on it (`if confidence < high: ignore` would skip a proven trap); on "clear" it is how complete the checks were, and there it is worth reading. Gaps are always reported explicitly in `reasons` and as nulls in `risk_profile`. FRESHNESS AND COMPLETENESS: `validUntil` (epoch ms) is until when asking again returns THIS answer — a statement about our recomputation, not a…

NameTypeReqDescription
chainstringOptional. The endpoint accepts base | polygon | arbitrum | matic | arbitrum-one | arb | eip155:8453 | eip155:137 | eip155:42161; the safety verdict is served on base, polygon and arbitrum — every net…
sizeUSDstringOptional USD notional for the executable-quote sub-result, e.g. "1000" (default 1000). A STRING, not a number; positive, no thousands separator ("1,000" is rejected).
tokenstringyesToken to vet before buying. ERC-20 contract address (0x + 40 hex) on the chain this server is configured for. Not a symbol.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

plexa_quote ~1,109

Get EXECUTABLE on-chain liquidity for a swap (Base / Polygon / Arbitrum) before trading: the real fill price under a given size (not the mid/spot quote), price impact in bps, realizable depth, the route (per-leg dex/pool/fee), worst-case slippage, and a confidence rating. Sources Uniswap v3, Aerodrome, Aerodrome Slipstream (concentrated liquidity) and Uniswap v4 via canonical on-chain quoters — v4 is SIMULATED per pool through the canonical V4Quoter so hooks execute; a pool whose hook rejects the simulation is left out of the route rather than guessed at. On Polygon and Arbitrum the quoters are Uniswap v3 and Algebra (QuickSwap, Camelot). Call this when an agent needs to know what price a swap of a specific size will ACTUALLY execute at, especially for thin/long-tail tokens. `spotPrice` is NULLABLE: when no reference mid is defensible at this size, `spotPrice` and `priceImpactBps` come back null rather than confidently wrong — an impact measured against a moving origin is worse than no impact at all. Every response carries `validUntil` (epoch ms): asking again before it returns the same answer. It is a statement about when WE recompute, not a promise that the market held still. Cost: $0.02 USDC per call via x402 (paid automatically by the configured wallet). FIRST CALL FROM A NEW WALLET IS FREE: the full response, every field, same engine as a paid call — only the COUNT is limited (one per wallet, shared across both endpoints). Sign the x402 payment as usual; nothing is settled on-chain for that first call. You do not have to take that on trust: every 200 response carries `freeTrialApplied` — true when THAT call was served free, false when it was billed. MARKET CROSS-CHECK: every quote also carries `marketRoute` {source, amountOut, impactBps, splitTop[{venue, share}]} — what an aggregator offers for the SAME input in the same minute — plus `divergenceBps` (how far OUR output is from it; negative means we give less) and `singleRouteOnly`. `singleRouteOnly: true` mea…

NameTypeReqDescription
chainstringOptional chain override for THIS quote. Accepted: base | polygon | arbitrum | matic | arbitrum-one | arb | eip155:8453 | eip155:137 | eip155:42161 (case is normalized for you). Omit to use the server…
sizeInstringTrade size as a human amount of tokenIn, e.g. "1.5" for 1.5 WETH. A STRING, not a number. Provide at least one of sizeIn or sizeUSD; if you send both, sizeUSD wins and sizeIn is ignored.
sizeUSDstringTrade size as a USD notional, e.g. "5000". A STRING, not a number; positive, no thousands separator ("5,000" is rejected) and no exponent. Provide at least one of sizeIn or sizeUSD; if you send both,…
tokenInstringyesToken being sold. ERC-20 contract address (0x + 40 hex) on the chain this server is configured for. Not a symbol.
tokenOutstringyesToken being bought. ERC-20 contract address (0x + 40 hex) on the chain this server is configured for. Not a symbol.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Common questions

What is the com.getplexa/mcp server?

com.getplexa/mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as com.getplexa/mcp. Economic-safety tools for trading agents: executable quote + rug/honeypot pretrade check via x402. This page covers its npm package (@getplexa/mcp).

Is the com.getplexa/mcp server safe to use?

com.getplexa/mcp scores 79 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 20 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the com.getplexa/mcp server expose?

com.getplexa/mcp exposes 2 tools: plexa_quote, plexa_pretrade_check. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,380 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the com.getplexa/mcp server still maintained?

com.getplexa/mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the com.getplexa/mcp server under?

com.getplexa/mcp declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.