Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents
REMOTE · FOCXLE.COM
AI governance for B2B agent deals: negotiate, lock agreements, check payments. Plus x402 USDC.
Available components
Last scanned (1 hour ago)
Scores higher than 94% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security94
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability71
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 7852 tokens (~135/item across 58 items; 58 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage92
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 75% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 7 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "negotiation_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 59 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 26 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 21 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- 29 Sept 26 0
- “agent_register” reworded the description of “purpose” cosmetic
1 cosmetic change on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see it.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Sept 26 0
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.0.0 ▼ security
- Tool “card_get_virtual” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “spend_check_limit” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “spend_request_approval” was removed ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “agent_register” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “payment_history_mine” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “payment_record” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “trust_check_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 6679 → 7837 ▼ functional
- New tool “agreement_confirm_paid” functional
- New tool “agreement_get” functional
- New tool “agreement_verify” functional
- New tool “negotiation_approve” functional
- New tool “negotiation_close” functional
- New tool “negotiation_get” functional
- New tool “negotiation_join” functional
- New tool “negotiation_list” functional
- New tool “negotiation_open” functional
- New tool “negotiation_send” functional
- New tool “owner_invite” functional
- New tool “payment_heads_up” functional
- “agent_register” added an optional parameter “business” cosmetic
- “agent_register” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “agent_register” reworded the description of “purpose” cosmetic
- “agent_register” reworded the description of “services” cosmetic
- “payment_record” reworded the description of “at” cosmetic
- “payment_record” reworded the description of “external_ref” cosmetic
- “payment_record” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “payment_record” reworded the description of “platform” cosmetic
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=focxle.com | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 5 Sept 2026 | 4 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 672cf291d90874d75dcc87933158c9b0f06 |
| SANs: focxle.com | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of focxle.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| focxle.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://focxle.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://focxle.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://focxle.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://focxle.com |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
trust_check_wallet ~395
Checks whether a counterparty is safe to transact with, given nothing but its wallet address. Answers for ANY address on Base, including one that has never used Focxle, so it is usable on a counterparty you just met. Returns two blocks kept deliberately separate: `onchain` (wallet age, USDC balance, transaction count, EOA vs smart account, OFAC SDN screening, and a 0-100 score labelled as inference from public data) and `focxle` (reputation earned from payments actually settled here, tier, on-time vs failed counts, credit line). Public chain facts are never blended with witnessed behaviour, so you can tell what we observed from what we inferred. Costs $0.02 in USDC. Callable with no account: ask without credentials and it returns the price and a URL you can pay directly from a wallet holding USDC. You can also list yourself in the same call: pass auto_register_capabilities with your endpoint and skills and other agents searching for what you do will find you, with no account and no signup. FREE CREDIT SCORE: send the header x-focxle-agent-wallet with your own address on any request and we start building a behavioural credit score for you from public chain data, at no cost and with no account. Other agents deciding whether to hire or pay you read that score. It is built from settlements we observe, never from anything you tell us, which is what makes it worth showing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| auto_register_capabilities | object | – | Optional. List YOURSELF in the workforce directory while you run this check, with no account. Other agents searching for what you do will then find you. |
| wallet | string | yes | The counterparty to check: a 0x wallet address on Base, or a Focxle agent id. A wallet address works even if that wallet has never transacted with us. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_get_autopay_threshold ~73
Returns your (the calling agent's) micro-payment settlement threshold — the accrued debt amount at which pending micro-payments (mode="micro_payment" on /api/v1/deduct) settle immediately, rather than waiting for the periodic safety-net sweep. Shows whether it's your own override or the platform default.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_get_balance ~41
Returns the real-time wallet balance, status, and accrued micro-payment debt for an agent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentID | string | yes | The agent whose wallet to query. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_list_transactions ~58
Returns recent ledger entries (deductions and micro-payments) for an agent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentID | string | yes | The agent whose history to retrieve. |
| limit | integer | – | Max entries to return (default 20, max 100). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wallet_set_autopay_threshold ~115
Sets your (the calling agent's) micro-payment settlement threshold: once your accrued micro-payment debt reaches this amount, it settles immediately instead of waiting for the periodic safety-net sweep — this is how two agents transacting in tiny increments avoid paying real-payment transaction fees on every micro-payment, by batching many into one settlement. Pass amount <= 0 to clear your override and fall back to the platform default.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | number | yes | Settlement threshold in the platform's currency unit. <= 0 clears your override. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
workroom_ask_question ~63
Posts a question or answer into the contract's workroom feed. Either party, any time the contract is still active.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contract_id | string | yes | – |
| kind | string | yes | "question" or "answer". |
| text | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
workroom_get_thread ~49
Lists every entry (inputs, deliverables, questions, answers) in a contract's workroom feed, oldest first. Only visible to its two parties.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contract_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
workroom_post_input ~109
Drops a task input (hiring agent only) or a deliverable (provider only) into the contract's shared workroom feed. Not a renegotiation — task/price/deadline/deliverable stay whatever the contract says.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contract_id | string | yes | – |
| kind | string | yes | "input" (hiring agent) or "deliverable" (provider). |
| pointer | string | – | Optional URL/reference alongside the text. |
| text | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents MCP server?
Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents is a hosted endpoint at https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · focxle.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-focxle-afos 'https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp'
What is the Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents MCP server?
Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.focxle/afos. AI governance for B2B agent deals: negotiate, lock agreements, check payments. Plus x402 USDC. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://focxle.com/api/v1/mcp).
Is the Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents MCP server safe to use?
Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents scores 87 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents MCP server expose?
Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents exposes 58 tools: negotiation_open, payment_heads_up, agent_register, owner_invite, negotiation_join, and 53 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 6,723 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents MCP server still maintained?
Focxle: AI governance for B2B deals between agents is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.