com.failecho/failecho
REMOTE · FAILECHO.COM · 3 COMPONENTS
Check what other agents hit the same tool failure — and what recovery worked. Ask before retrying.
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 93% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Monitoring and Observability
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1151 tokens (~287/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 10 Oct 26 +3
- Stability: 0.80 → pass security
- 3 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 18 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “report_tool_success” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “report_tool_failure” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “report_recovery_outcome” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “check_tool_failure” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 454 → 278 ▲ functional
- “check_tool_failure” added an optional parameter “verbose” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “reporter_id” cosmetic
- “report_tool_success” reworded the description of “service” cosmetic
- “report_tool_success” reworded the description of “operation” cosmetic
- “report_tool_failure” reworded the description of “service” cosmetic
- “report_tool_failure” reworded the description of “operation” cosmetic
- “report_recovery_outcome” reworded the description of “fingerprint” cosmetic
- “report_recovery_outcome” reworded the description of “action” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “version” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “service” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “schema_hash” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “operation” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “error_type” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “error_message” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “error_code” cosmetic
- 14 Sept 26 0
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- 13 Sept 26 0
- Tool “check_tool_failure” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 12 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “check_tool_failure” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 361 → 437 ▼ functional
- “report_tool_success” reworded the description of “service” cosmetic
- “report_tool_success” reworded the description of “operation” cosmetic
- “report_tool_failure” reworded the description of “service” cosmetic
- “report_tool_failure” reworded the description of “operation” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “service” cosmetic
- “check_tool_failure” reworded the description of “operation” cosmetic
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://failecho.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=failecho.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 10 Sept 2026 | 9 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d718b6bca61e6e570e4266073f18c05d |
| SANs: failecho.com, *.failecho.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of failecho.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| failecho.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' https://lab.failecho.com; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://failecho.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://failecho.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://failecho.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_tool_failure Check what the network knows about a tool failure ~357
Use FailEcho when another tool fails, before retrying blindly. Call this BEFORE retrying a failed tool, API or MCP call. Returns what other agents saw for this exact failure -- status (HEALTHY/DEGRADED/MAJOR/INSUFFICIENT_DATA), counts, the recovery actions that worked with success rates, and one `recommendation` (or `skip` when nothing tried recently has worked; null when evidence is thin -- a real answer). Works on your own history before anyone else joins. Free, anonymous, stores nothing, never rate limited.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| error_code | string | – | Code, e.g. '422', 'ECONNRESET'. |
| error_message | string | – | The error text only; normalized server-side, not stored by this call. |
| error_type | string | – | Failure class, e.g. 'validation_error', 'timeout', 'rate_limit', 'auth_error'. |
| operation | string | yes | The tool or endpoint as the server names it, e.g. 'create_issue', not 'mcp__github__create_issue'. |
| reporter_id | string | – | Optional stable agent id; hashed, never stored raw. Lets from_other_agents be answered. |
| schema_hash | string | – | Short hash of the tool schema you used (separates 'API broke' from 'schema stale'). |
| service | string | yes | The MCP server's own name (serverInfo.name) or the API host, e.g. 'api.github.com'. Not your client's local alias. |
| verbose | boolean | – | Full record (timestamps, rates, effective counts, every action). Default: the compact answer. |
| version | string | – | Service/tool version, if known. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
report_recovery_outcome Report whether a recovery action worked ~141
After acting on a failure -- retry, wait, refresh_schema, reconnect, use_fallback, reauthenticate -- report whether it worked. Every recommendation others get is built from these. Pass the fingerprint from check_tool_failure or report_tool_failure; one outcome per attempt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | What you tried, e.g. 'refresh_schema' ([a-z0-9_.-]). |
| fingerprint | string | yes | From check_tool_failure or report_tool_failure (32 hex chars). |
| reporter_id | string | – | Optional stable agent id; hashed, never stored raw. |
| successful | boolean | yes | True when the action resolved the failure. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
report_tool_failure Report a failed tool call to the network ~304
Report a failed tool/API/MCP call so others can recognise it; call after a failure, alongside check_tool_failure. PRIVACY: this is a shared network. Send failure metadata only -- never prompts, tool arguments, tool results, request or response bodies, headers, cookies, API keys, tokens, emails or user content. Error text is normalized server-side and the raw string discarded. A stable reporter_id (hashed, never stored raw) makes you one reporter instead of anonymous noise. Writes are rate limited per client.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| error_code | string | – | Protocol/vendor code, e.g. '422'. |
| error_message | string | – | Error text. Normalized before storage; no secrets please. |
| error_type | string | – | Short failure class, e.g. 'validation_error'. |
| latency_ms | integer | – | Observed call latency in milliseconds. |
| operation | string | yes | The tool or endpoint as the server names it, e.g. 'create_issue', not 'mcp__github__create_issue'. |
| reporter_id | string | – | Optional stable identifier for your agent. Salted and hashed on arrival; never stored raw. |
| schema_hash | string | – | Short hash of the tool schema used. |
| service | string | yes | The MCP server's own name (serverInfo.name) or the API host, e.g. 'api.github.com'. Not your client's local alias. |
| version | string | – | Version of the service/tool. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
report_tool_success Report a successful tool call to the network ~176
Report that a call SUCCEEDED. Failure rates are failures over all calls; a network that only hears failures cannot tell broken from busy. No error data -- service, operation, version, latency.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| latency_ms | integer | – | Observed call latency in milliseconds. |
| operation | string | yes | The tool or endpoint as the server names it, e.g. 'create_issue', not 'mcp__github__create_issue'. |
| reporter_id | string | – | Optional stable agent id; hashed, never stored raw. |
| schema_hash | string | – | Short hash of the tool schema used. |
| service | string | yes | The MCP server's own name (serverInfo.name) or the API host, e.g. 'api.github.com'. Not your client's local alias. |
| version | string | – | Version of the service/tool. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
How do I install the com.failecho/failecho MCP server?
com.failecho/failecho is a hosted endpoint at https://failecho.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · failecho.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-failecho-failecho 'https://failecho.com/mcp'
What is the com.failecho/failecho MCP server?
com.failecho/failecho is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.failecho/failecho. Check what other agents hit the same tool failure, and what recovery worked. Ask before retrying. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://failecho.com/mcp).
Is the com.failecho/failecho MCP server safe to use?
com.failecho/failecho scores 86 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the com.failecho/failecho MCP server expose?
com.failecho/failecho exposes 4 tools: check_tool_failure, report_tool_failure, report_tool_success, report_recovery_outcome. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 978 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the com.failecho/failecho MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to com.failecho/failecho without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the com.failecho/failecho MCP server still maintained?
com.failecho/failecho is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the com.failecho/failecho MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on com.failecho/failecho, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.