Tack
REMOTE · TACK.CLAWHARD.COM
Check GitHub Actions workflows live: retired actions, bad inputs, injection. Pin actions to SHAs.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 52% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS check failed: the endpoint is reachable over plaintext HTTP. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1187 tokens (~296/item across 4 items; 2 tools + 2 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management7
- Stability observed for 2 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
- Supports UI / widget rendering.Pass
Checks we ran (14)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
- Capabilities
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 19 Nov 26 66
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://tack.clawhard.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=clawhard.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 19 Nov 2026 | 17 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 2875f4b0393c705613649d6a997cde74 |
| SANs: clawhard.com, tack.clawhard.com, *.tack.clawhard.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of tack.clawhard.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| clawhard.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://tack.clawhard.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://tack.clawhard.com/mcp | Served over HTTP | 200 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
tack_check_workflow Check a GitHub Actions workflow and pin every action to a commit SHA (live) ~610
Use when the user asks to write, review, fix or harden a GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/*.yml) or a composite action.yml, or when a workflow was just written or edited and is about to be committed (signals: "write a CI workflow", "why does my workflow fail", "Invalid workflow file", "Unexpected input", "pin actions to SHA", "is actions/checkout@v4 still current", "Node 20 deprecated", "upload-artifact v3", "runs-on ubuntu-20.04", "script injection", "pull_request_target"). Parses the YAML (errors with line and column, duplicate keys, anchors), checks the structure against GitHub's workflow syntax as documented on 2026-11-19 (including recent keys such as schedule timezone, cache-mode, background, wait, wait-all, cancel, parallel and $/ self-repository references), then resolves every uses: reference live on github.com: whether the repository, tag, branch or commit exists, which release a SHA is, the latest release, retired versions that make a job fail (upload/download-artifact v3 and older, actions/cache v1-v2 and old exact pins), runs.using node20-or-older runtimes, with: inputs the action does not declare (with a did-you-mean), missing required inputs, reusable-workflow inputs, and pinned-SHA comments that name the wrong version. Also flags retired runner labels (live runner-images list), script injection through ${{ github.event... }} in run:, pull_request_target checkouts of PR code, and a missing permissions key. Returns each finding with line, path, fix and doc link, per-action resolution, fix_message, and pinned_workflow: the same file with every action pinned to its full commit SHA and a # version comment (retired or missing refs move to the latest release; upgrade:true moves all). Example: {"workflow":"on: push\njobs:\n test:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - uses: actions/setup-node@v4\n with:\n node_version: 20"}. Does not run the workflow, evaluate expressions or see private…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | string | – | auto (default) detects a workflow (jobs:) or an action metadata file (runs:). |
| live | boolean | – | Resolve actions, inputs and runner labels on github.com. Default true; false = offline YAML and syntax checks only. |
| upgrade | boolean | – | Pin every action to its latest release instead of the version the file uses. Default false (retired or missing refs are moved to the latest release either way). |
| workflow | string | yes | The YAML text of a workflow file (.github/workflows/<name>.yml) or of an action.yml / action.yaml. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tack_resolve_actions Look up GitHub Actions: latest release, commit SHA, runtime and inputs (live) ~346
Use when a uses: line for a GitHub Action is about to be written and its current version, commit SHA or inputs are needed, or the user asks what the latest version of an action is, what SHA a tag points to, or whether an action or tag exists (signals: "latest actions/checkout", "pin setup-node to a SHA", "what inputs does this action take", "does v9 exist", "which version is this SHA"). Takes owner/repo (latest release), owner/repo@ref or owner/repo/path@ref, reads the tags and branches live from github.com and the action.yml at that commit, and returns per action: exists or not, the commit SHA, the release a SHA or major tag points to, the latest release and major tag, runs.using (flags node20 and older, which GitHub stopped shipping on 2026-09-23), retired versions that fail jobs, the declared inputs, and a ready-to-paste line: uses: owner/repo@<40-char sha> # vX.Y.Z. Example: {"actions":["actions/checkout","actions/setup-node@v4","docker/build-push-action@v6"]}. Up to 30 per call. Public github.com repositories only; for a whole workflow file use tack_check_workflow.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actions | array | yes | Action references: "owner/repo" (latest release), "owner/repo@v4", "owner/repo/path@ref", or a full uses: line. |
| upgrade | boolean | – | For references with a ref, return the pinned line for the latest release instead. Default false. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Tack MCP server?
Tack is a hosted endpoint at https://tack.clawhard.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · tack.clawhard.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-clawhard-tack 'https://tack.clawhard.com/mcp'
What is the Tack MCP server?
Tack is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.clawhard/tack. Check GitHub Actions workflows live: retired actions, bad inputs, injection. Pin actions to SHAs. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://tack.clawhard.com/mcp).
Is the Tack MCP server safe to use?
Tack scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Tack MCP server expose?
Tack exposes 2 tools: tack_check_workflow, tack_resolve_actions. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 956 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Tack MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Tack without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Tack MCP server still maintained?
Tack is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Tack MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 14 checks on Tack, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 10 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.