com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas
REMOTE · API.BABYBLUEVIPER.COM · SCANNED OCT 4
Second opinion before an irreversible agent action; signed proofs, free verify, public ledger.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability85
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 39112 tokens (~50/item across 767 items; 8 tools + 759 resources), lean.Pass
- Tools include usage examples.Pass
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 95% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
How do I install the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas is a hosted endpoint at https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.babyblueviper.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas 'https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas": {
"url": "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas] url = "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas --url 'https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas:
url: "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify" {
"McpServers": {
"com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 2 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Oct 26 0
- “review” added an optional parameter “verdict_relay” cosmetic
1 cosmetic change on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see it.
- 30 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Sept 26 75
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Oct 2026 · Probed https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.babyblueviper.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 16 Sept 2026 | 15 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5576fd8174af49139d0d9bc19bce871ea16 |
| SANs: api.babyblueviper.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.babyblueviper.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| babyblueviper.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self' https:; font-src 'self' data: https:; frame-ancestors 'self' https://chatgpt.com https://*.openai.com; base-uri 'self' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
audit_agent_readiness ~113
Audits a public agent or API URL for verifiability: discovery files (llms.txt, MCP card, robots, sitemap), handshake endpoints, and whether presented signed proofs validate. Returns a 0-100 score, a grade, ranked fixes, and a signed proof of the audit. Every result re-derives from a public fetch. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | The agent endpoint/site URL to audit (public http(s) only) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
conformance_certify ~121
Publishes a verifier's current conformance grade from the public registry (conformance.json) as a permanent, signed ledger entry, labeled 'certified as of this measurement'. It records the registry's existing measurement and cannot change it. Only works for a verifier currently listed as certified. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/conformance
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | The verifier's exact name as listed on GET /conformance.json (must currently show certified:true). |
| note | string | – | Optional short context for the ledger entry. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ledger ~126
Reads invinoveritas's public track record of signed verdicts, including ones that turned out wrong. Each entry is a signed Nostr event whose id and signature can be recomputed against invinoveritas's published key; entries are append-only and Bitcoin-timestamped, so they can't be edited after the fact. No arguments returns the index; pass entry to read one. Free, no sign-in. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/ledger
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| entry | string | – | Optional entry number (e.g. '1'); omit for the full index. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ledger_submit ~134
Publishes one of your own signed review proofs (from review with sign=true) as a public entry on the invinoveritas ledger. Publication is immediate and permanent: the entry is broadcast to Nostr relays and Bitcoin-timestamped. Only genuine invinoveritas-signed proofs are accepted. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/ledger
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| event | object | yes | The signed Nostr event from a prior /review(sign=true) call — the exact proof.event object that response returned. |
| note | string | – | Optional short context: what this verdict was for, why it's worth featuring. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
review ~2,154
Independent verdict on a proposed action before it is taken: a code diff, shell command, deployment plan, configuration change, another agent's output, or a proposed transaction. Returns approve / approve_with_concerns / reject with a confidence score, issues ranked by severity, suggested fixes and alternatives. With sign=true the verdict is returned as a signed proof that anyone can check later with verify_proof. The verdict is a reasoned second opinion, not a guarantee of outcome. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_binding | object | – | Optional: the exact real-world action this verdict authorizes — tool identity, materialized (not templated) arguments, and the id of the agent that will execute it, e.g. {'tool': 'place_order', 'agen… |
| artifact | string | yes | The artifact to review: unified diff / patch, shell command, plan, config, analysis, agent output, or raw text |
| artifact_type | string | – | Type of artifact. 'code_diff' or 'patch' triggers deep code review. 'plan' for architecture/strategy. 'trade' triggers the capital-scale-aware risk-manager review of a proposed entry/exit. 'onchain_a… |
| concerns | string | – | Specific things to check (e.g. 'production safety', 'edge cases in trading logic', 'regulatory risk') |
| confidentiality_tier | string | – | Which privacy/evidentiary tradeoff this verdict should use, only meaningful with sign=true. 'hash_only' (default): the proof carries only artifact_hash, raw content never disclosed — strongest privac… |
| context | string | – | What you are trying to accomplish, why now, success criteria |
| disclosed_summary | string | – | Only used when confidentiality_tier='partial_disclosure'. A real, human-readable description of the reviewed artifact/decision you're choosing to make public — bound raw into decision_ref. Ignored fo… |
| external_evidence | array | – | Optional (v17, 2026-09-10): third-party evidence this judgment relied on — e.g. a tool-reliability registry's own historical PASS/FAIL record, worked out live with arian-gogani/nobulex-registry#1. Ar… |
| intended_audience | string | – | Optional: declare who/what this verdict is intended for (your own DID, endpoint URL, or gateway identifier). Bound into decision_ref so it can't be silently stripped or altered once issued. NOT indep… |
| intended_verifier | string | – | Optional: a CAIP-10 string naming the specific on-chain verifier/gate this verdict is meant to be checked against, e.g. 'eip155:8453:0x8004A169FB4a3325136EB29fA0ceB6D2e539a432'. Bound into decision_r… |
| mediator_attestation | object | – | Optional (v22): your mediator proves control of its own key. {key_url (https, mediator's own domain), public_key_ed25519_b64, requested_at (unix s, +-600 s), nonce (8-128 ASCII), signature_ed25519_b6… |
| related_claims | object | – | Optional (policy v20): a structured claim about related_proof_event -- a non-empty subset of {artifact_hash, verdict, verified_at, policy_version, decision_ref}. Compared by exact equality against th… |
| related_proof_event | object | – | Optional: if the artifact being reviewed IS another party's already-signed verdict proof (a verdict-of-verdict re-review), pass that proof's full signed event ({id, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, co… |
| request_capture_ref | string | – | Optional: a requester-controlled commitment (a hash/id you generated and can independently prove existed at request-time) that this artifact was submitted for review — the captured-admission-v0 revie… |
| severity_threshold | string | – | Minimum severity to report |
| sign | boolean | – | Return the verdict as a portable signed proof (binds verdict, artifact hash and invinoveritas's public key, plus a content-addressed decision_ref). Anyone can check it later with verify_proof. |
| verdict_relay | object | – | Optional (verdict-relay/v2): also return a BIP-340 signature an ERC-8414 InvinoveritasVerdictAuthoritySigned contract verifies on-chain (garyyang-finchip/task-token-standard#2). {chain_id, authority,… |
No output schema declared.
{"artifact":"rm -rf ./build \u0026\u0026 git push --force origin main","artifact_type":"shell_command","context":"About to force-push a rebuilt main branch that other people pull from.","sign":true}validate ~260
Statistical reality-check of a backtest from its realized returns (or trade rows), not the strategy itself. Returns likely_real / borderline / overfit_or_noise using the Deflated Sharpe Ratio (adjusted for the number of variants tried), a sign-flip permutation test, and out-of-sample decay across purged folds. Inputs are not retained beyond a redacted audit hash. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | – | Optional caller agent ID |
| k_folds | integer | – | – |
| n_perms | integer | – | – |
| n_trials | integer | – | How many strategy variants/params you tried before selecting this one. Be honest — more trials = bigger Deflated-Sharpe haircut. |
| periods_per_year | number | – | Optional, for annualized-Sharpe display only. |
| returns | array | – | Per-trade (or per-period) realized returns. |
| trades | array | – | Alternative to 'returns': rows with a return field (ret/pnl/net_bps) and optional 'coin'/'ts'/'entry'/'exit' fields. |
| trial_sharpes | array | – | Optional: Sharpes of all variants tried → exact DSR variance. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_proof ~414
Checks a signed invinoveritas proof without trusting whoever handed it over: recomputes the event id, checks the Schnorr signature, and confirms the signing key is invinoveritas's published key. Optionally pass expect_artifact_hash (sha256 of the content you received) to confirm the proof covers that exact content. Accepts the full event, or an event_id to look up. Returns {valid, checks, proof_payload}. Free, no sign-in. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/verify
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| event | object | – | The signed proof event {id,pubkey,created_at,kind,tags,content,sig} the counterparty handed you (from a /prove or /review sign=true response). |
| event_id | string | – | Alternatively, the Nostr event id alone (from a /review sign=true, /prove, or /witness proof) — fetches the durably-stored full event, independent of relay retention, and verifies it. |
| expect_artifact_hash | string | – | Optional sha256 hex of the output you received — asserts the proof is ABOUT that exact artifact. |
| expect_intended_verifier | string | – | Optional (added 2026-08-16) — asserts the proof's declared intended_verifier matches you, the consumption-identity check alongside expect_artifact_hash's content-identity check. A match confirms the… |
| proof_id | string | – | Alternatively, a stored attestation proof_id to fetch + verify. |
| verifier_signature | string | – | Optional (added 2026-08-16) — an EIP-191 personal_sign signature over 'invinoveritas-verify-proof:<event_id>', signed by the key controlling the address in expect_intended_verifier (eip155 CAIP-10 na… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
witness ~122
Timestamps and signs a third party's exact claim, unmodified and unjudged: 'we received this text, attributed to source X, at time T', not 'we agree with it'. The source is recorded as self-declared. The resulting proof checks with verify_proof. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | The exact claim to anchor, byte-for-byte (max 16000 chars) |
| source | string | yes | Who this claim is attributed to (self-declared, NOT verified by us) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas. Second opinion before an irreversible agent action; signed proofs, free verify, public ledger. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify).
Is the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server safe to use?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server expose?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas exposes 8 tools: review, verify_proof, witness, validate, ledger, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,444 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server still maintained?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.