com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas
REMOTE · API.BABYBLUEVIPER.COM
Second opinion before an irreversible agent action; signed proofs, free verify, public ledger.
Available components
Last scanned (14 hours ago)
Scores higher than 96% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability86
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 40122 tokens (~52/item across 769 items; 10 tools + 759 resources), lean.Pass
- Tools include usage examples.Pass
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage99
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 96% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 10 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 12 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 16 Nov 26 0
- “payment_receipt” reworded the description of “resource_url” cosmetic
- “audit_agent_readiness” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
2 cosmetic changes on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see them.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 8 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 7 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.babyblueviper.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 15 Nov 2026 | 13 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 544a099a3b7df309206021e75d3d94f9f8c |
| SANs: api.babyblueviper.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.babyblueviper.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| babyblueviper.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self' https:; font-src 'self' data: https:; frame-ancestors 'self' https://chatgpt.com https://*.openai.com; base-uri 'self' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
audit_agent_readiness ~134
Audits a public agent or API URL for verifiability: discovery files (llms.txt, MCP card, robots, sitemap), handshake endpoints, and whether presented signed proofs validate. Returns a 0-100 score, a grade, ranked fixes, and a signed proof of the audit. Every result re-derives from a public fetch. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | The agent endpoint/site URL to audit (public http(s) only; private, loopback, link-local and metadata addresses are refused server-side, and redirects are not followed) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
conformance_certify ~121
Publishes a verifier's current conformance grade from the public registry (conformance.json) as a permanent, signed ledger entry, labeled 'certified as of this measurement'. It records the registry's existing measurement and cannot change it. Only works for a verifier currently listed as certified. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/conformance
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | The verifier's exact name as listed on GET /conformance.json (must currently show certified:true). |
| note | string | – | Optional short context for the ledger entry. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ledger ~126
Reads invinoveritas's public track record of signed verdicts, including ones that turned out wrong. Each entry is a signed Nostr event whose id and signature can be recomputed against invinoveritas's published key; entries are append-only and Bitcoin-timestamped, so they can't be edited after the fact. No arguments returns the index; pass entry to read one. Free, no sign-in. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/ledger
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| entry | string | – | Optional entry number (e.g. '1'); omit for the full index. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ledger_submit ~134
Publishes one of your own signed review proofs (from review with sign=true) as a public entry on the invinoveritas ledger. Publication is immediate and permanent: the entry is broadcast to Nostr relays and Bitcoin-timestamped. Only genuine invinoveritas-signed proofs are accepted. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/ledger
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| event | object | yes | The signed Nostr event from a prior /review(sign=true) call — the exact proof.event object that response returned. |
| note | string | – | Optional short context: what this verdict was for, why it's worth featuring. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
payment_receipt ~462
Signed receipt for one verdict-governed payment: endpoint, network, asset, max amount, payer, facilitator verdict, settlement id, denial reason, and retry state. retry_state is read from the token's authorizationState, so retrying with the same nonce cannot double-pay. Pass the signed review event and the payment args it bound; optional tx_hash. Refuses unsigned when the verdict does not verify or does not bind those args. The receipt itself checks with verify_proof. Free, no sign-in. Does not move funds. Docs: https://github.com/babyblueviper1/invinoveritas/tree/main/examples/qbtlabs-x402-verdict-gate#payment-receipt-safe-to-retry
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| args | object | yes | The payment args that verdict bound. Their hash must match the verdict's action_binding_args_hash. |
| authorization_signature | string | – | Optional: the payer's 65-byte EIP-3009 signature (hex). The receipt verifies it recovers to the payer over the bound amount, payee, validity window and the verdict's nonce, under the token's on-chain… |
| event | object | yes | The signed /review verdict (Nostr event) that governed the payment. |
| max_verdict_age_seconds | integer | – | Optional max age of the verdict in seconds (1..86400). Default 120. |
| output_hash | string | – | Optional sha256 of the delivered result. With it, a settled payment reads paid_output_recorded; without it, paid_no_output_recorded (a possible ghost result: do not pay again for the same job). |
| resource_url | string | – | Optional https URL of the resource the payment was for, when the verdict bound no endpoint. Recorded and passed to the payment checker as data; this server never fetches it. |
| terms_hash | string | – | Optional sha256 (64 hex, optionally sha256:) of the terms the payment was for. A terms hash bound in the verdict's args takes precedence; a supplied one is labelled not bound. |
| tx_hash | string | – | Optional 0x + 64 hex settlement transaction. settlement_id is set only when this tx is the payment the verdict bound. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
review ~2,435
Independent verdict on a proposed action before it is taken: a code diff, shell command, deployment plan, configuration change, another agent's output, or a proposed transaction. Returns approve / approve_with_concerns / reject with a confidence score, issues ranked by severity, suggested fixes and alternatives. With sign=true the verdict is returned as a signed proof that anyone can check later with verify_proof. The verdict is a reasoned second opinion, not a guarantee of outcome. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_binding | object | – | Optional: the exact real-world action this verdict authorizes — tool identity, materialized (not templated) arguments, and the id of the agent that will execute it, e.g. {'tool': 'place_order', 'agen… |
| artifact | string | yes | The artifact to review: unified diff / patch, shell command, plan, config, analysis, agent output, or raw text |
| artifact_type | string | – | Type of artifact. 'code_diff' or 'patch' triggers deep code review. 'plan' for architecture/strategy. 'trade' triggers the capital-scale-aware risk-manager review of a proposed entry/exit. 'onchain_a… |
| concerns | string | – | Specific things to check (e.g. 'production safety', 'edge cases in trading logic', 'regulatory risk') |
| confidentiality_tier | string | – | Which privacy/evidentiary tradeoff this verdict should use, only meaningful with sign=true. 'hash_only' (default): the proof carries only artifact_hash, raw content never disclosed — strongest privac… |
| context | string | – | What you are trying to accomplish, why now, success criteria |
| disclosed_summary | string | – | Only used when confidentiality_tier='partial_disclosure'. A real, human-readable description of the reviewed artifact/decision you're choosing to make public — bound raw into decision_ref. Ignored fo… |
| evidence | array | – | Optional, with policy: [{id, provenance (requester_supplied|independent), kind, content}] for the substantive conditions. |
| external_evidence | array | – | Optional (v17, 2026-09-10): third-party evidence this judgment relied on — e.g. a tool-reliability registry's own historical PASS/FAIL record, worked out live with arian-gogani/nobulex-registry#1. Ar… |
| facts | object | – | Optional, with policy: the structured request fields the deterministic rules read (e.g. recipient, amount_atomic, chain, token). |
| intended_audience | string | – | Optional: declare who/what this verdict is intended for (your own DID, endpoint URL, or gateway identifier). Bound into decision_ref so it can't be silently stripped or altered once issued. NOT indep… |
| intended_verifier | string | – | Optional: a CAIP-10 string naming the specific on-chain verifier/gate this verdict is meant to be checked against, e.g. 'eip155:8453:0x8004A169FB4a3325136EB29fA0ceB6D2e539a432'. Bound into decision_r… |
| mediator_attestation | object | – | Optional (v22): your mediator proves control of its own key. {key_url (https, mediator's own domain), public_key_ed25519_b64, requested_at (unix s, +-600 s), nonce (8-128 ASCII), signature_ed25519_b6… |
| policy | object | – | Optional (2026-10-13): policy-governed review. {schema: 'invinoveritas.review_policy.v1', deterministic: [{id, field, op (eq|ne|in|not_in|lte|lt|gte|gt), value}], substantive: [{id, requirement, acce… |
| related_claims | object | – | Optional (policy v20): a structured claim about related_proof_event -- a non-empty subset of {artifact_hash, verdict, verified_at, policy_version, decision_ref}. Compared by exact equality against th… |
| related_proof_event | object | – | Optional: if the artifact being reviewed IS another party's already-signed verdict proof (a verdict-of-verdict re-review), pass that proof's full signed event ({id, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, co… |
| request_capture_ref | string | – | Optional: a requester-controlled commitment (a hash/id you generated and can independently prove existed at request-time) that this artifact was submitted for review — the captured-admission-v0 revie… |
| severity_threshold | string | – | Minimum severity to report |
| sign | boolean | – | Return the verdict as a portable signed proof (binds verdict, artifact hash and invinoveritas's public key, plus a content-addressed decision_ref). Anyone can check it later with verify_proof. |
| verdict_relay | object | – | Optional (verdict-relay/v2): also return a BIP-340 signature an ERC-8414 InvinoveritasVerdictAuthoritySigned contract verifies on-chain (garyyang-finchip/task-token-standard#2). {chain_id, authority,… |
No output schema declared.
{"artifact":"rm -rf ./build \u0026\u0026 git push --force origin main","artifact_type":"shell_command","context":"About to force-push a rebuilt main branch that other people pull from.","sign":true} validate ~260
Statistical reality-check of a backtest from its realized returns (or trade rows), not the strategy itself. Returns likely_real / borderline / overfit_or_noise using the Deflated Sharpe Ratio (adjusted for the number of variants tried), a sign-flip permutation test, and out-of-sample decay across purged folds. Inputs are not retained beyond a redacted audit hash. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | – | Optional caller agent ID |
| k_folds | integer | – | – |
| n_perms | integer | – | – |
| n_trials | integer | – | How many strategy variants/params you tried before selecting this one. Be honest — more trials = bigger Deflated-Sharpe haircut. |
| periods_per_year | number | – | Optional, for annualized-Sharpe display only. |
| returns | array | – | Per-trade (or per-period) realized returns. |
| trades | array | – | Alternative to 'returns': rows with a return field (ret/pnl/net_bps) and optional 'coin'/'ts'/'entry'/'exit' fields. |
| trial_sharpes | array | – | Optional: Sharpes of all variants tried → exact DSR variance. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_media ~193
Check whether a video, audio or image file is byte-for-byte a file a publisher registered with invinoveritas. Pass the file's SHA-256 (compute it locally; the file is not sent). A match returns the registration: per-claim evidential states from its C2PA Content Credentials (signature/hash binding, signer trust, declared edit history, declared AI-generation labels: VERIFIED / DECLARED_ONLY / CONTRADICTED / INSUFFICIENT), any capture tier with its caveat, the signed verdict and the Bitcoin timestamp. No match means not registered, which says nothing either way about the file. A re-encoded copy has a different hash. It never asserts that content is true. Full checks of the file itself: POST /verify-media (upload, free). Free, no auth.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 of the exact file bytes, 64 hex characters. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_proof ~414
Checks a signed invinoveritas proof without trusting whoever handed it over: recomputes the event id, checks the Schnorr signature, and confirms the signing key is invinoveritas's published key. Optionally pass expect_artifact_hash (sha256 of the content you received) to confirm the proof covers that exact content. Accepts the full event, or an event_id to look up. Returns {valid, checks, proof_payload}. Free, no sign-in. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/verify
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| event | object | – | The signed proof event {id,pubkey,created_at,kind,tags,content,sig} the counterparty handed you (from a /prove or /review sign=true response). |
| event_id | string | – | Alternatively, the Nostr event id alone (from a /review sign=true, /prove, or /witness proof) — fetches the durably-stored full event, independent of relay retention, and verifies it. |
| expect_artifact_hash | string | – | Optional sha256 hex of the output you received — asserts the proof is ABOUT that exact artifact. |
| expect_intended_verifier | string | – | Optional (added 2026-08-16) — asserts the proof's declared intended_verifier matches you, the consumption-identity check alongside expect_artifact_hash's content-identity check. A match confirms the… |
| proof_id | string | – | Alternatively, a stored attestation proof_id to fetch + verify. |
| verifier_signature | string | – | Optional (added 2026-08-16) — an EIP-191 personal_sign signature over 'invinoveritas-verify-proof:<event_id>', signed by the key controlling the address in expect_intended_verifier (eip155 CAIP-10 na… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
witness ~122
Timestamps and signs a third party's exact claim, unmodified and unjudged: 'we received this text, attributed to source X, at time T', not 'we agree with it'. The source is recorded as self-declared. The resulting proof checks with verify_proof. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | The exact claim to anchor, byte-for-byte (max 16000 chars) |
| source | string | yes | Who this claim is attributed to (self-declared, NOT verified by us) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas is a hosted endpoint at https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.babyblueviper.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-babyblueviper-invinoveritas 'https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify'
What is the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas. Second opinion before an irreversible agent action; signed proofs, free verify, public ledger. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify).
Is the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server safe to use?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas scores 89 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server expose?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas exposes 10 tools: review, verify_proof, payment_receipt, verify_media, witness, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 4,401 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server still maintained?
com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.