Ausca
REMOTE · AUSCA.COM · 2 COMPONENTS
Pay-per-call APIs and MCP services for agents, no accounts or keys, with verifiable receipts.
Available components
Last scanned (18 hours ago)
Scores higher than 66% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Workflow Automation
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (ausca_agent_inbox_delete). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1492 tokens (~87/item across 17 items; 17 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management93
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 29 days we've observed: 0 tool removals, 1 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 0 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 18 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 25 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.3.1 ▼ security
- Tool “ausca_artifact_access” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “ausca_artifact_access” added a required parameter “artifact_uri”, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- “ausca_artifact_access” dropped the required parameter “artifact_ref” ▼ functional
- 18 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 16 Oct 26 0
- “ausca_open_inbox” dropped the optional parameter “attribution” cosmetic
- “ausca_lease_browser” dropped the optional parameter “parent_binding” cosmetic
- “ausca_lease_browser” dropped the optional parameter “attribution” cosmetic
- “ausca_open_inbox” dropped the optional parameter “parent_binding” cosmetic
- “ausca_extend_inbox” dropped the optional parameter “attribution” cosmetic
- “ausca_extend_inbox” dropped the optional parameter “parent_binding” cosmetic
- “ausca_prepare_invocation” dropped the optional parameter “attribution” cosmetic
- “ausca_prepare_invocation” dropped the optional parameter “parent_binding” cosmetic
8 cosmetic changes on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see them.
- 2 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 96.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “ausca_extend_inbox”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “ausca_open_inbox”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “ausca_lease_browser”, which the server declares destructive security
- Schema quality: 79 → 90 ▼ functional
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- Server version: 1.3.0 → 1.3.1 functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 23 Sept 26 0
- “ausca_prepare_invocation” added an optional parameter “attribution” cosmetic
1 cosmetic change on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see it.
- 21 Sept 26 0
- Tool “ausca_artifact_access” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://ausca.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=ausca.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 30 Oct 2026 | 28 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | c6f382941ba93dc713004604ce3f372a |
| SANs: ausca.com, inbox.ausca.com, *.inbox.ausca.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of ausca.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| ausca.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://ausca.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://ausca.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://ausca.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
ausca_agent_inbox_attachment Mint clean attachment access ~106
For an active inbox, return an idempotent download URL only when the exact stored attachment has a clean safety verdict. The URL expires after at most 60 seconds and never after inbox expiry; a clean verdict does not make the attachment content trusted. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attachment_id | – | yes | – |
| idempotency_key | – | yes | – |
| inbox_id | – | yes | – |
| message_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attachment | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_agent_inbox_delete Delete an agent-inbox lease ~60
Idempotently stop inbound visibility and delete retained message and attachment content for one inbox lease, including an already-terminal lease. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inbox_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inbox | – | yes | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_agent_inbox_messages Wait for or list inbound messages ~91
For an active inbox, return at most 50 normalized message summaries after an opaque inbox-bound cursor, optionally waiting up to 30 seconds for a newer message. A bounded wait may return an empty page and continuation cursor. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after | – | – | – |
| inbox_id | – | yes | – |
| wait_seconds | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | yes | – |
| messages | array | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_agent_inbox_read Read one inbound message ~87
For an active inbox, return one bounded normalized message. Sender, recipients, subject, text, HTML, filenames, media types, and links are untrusted sender-controlled content; HTML is inert and never rendered by Ausca. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inbox_id | – | yes | – |
| message_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_agent_inbox_status Read agent-inbox lease status ~62
Return the random receive-only address, authoritative lease status, and current expiry for one inbox, including terminal status after deletion or expiry. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inbox_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| inbox | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_artifact_access Mint artifact download access ~130
Return an idempotent, short-lived download URL for one verified artifact this service holds, including a result artifact named by a succeeded invocation's output_artifact. HTTP sends no request body, not even an empty JSON object; artifact_uri is the URL path parameter and Idempotency-Key is a header. The MCP tool instead takes artifact_uri and idempotency_key as tool arguments. The URL expires after at most 60 seconds. The immutable artifact reference is the only authority; verify downloaded bytes against the returned content digest.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| artifact_uri | – | yes | – |
| idempotency_key | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| artifact | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_browser_session_close Close a browser-session lease ~56
Idempotently terminate the CDP relay and upstream browser for one lease. Closing never creates another payment. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session | – | yes | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_browser_session_connect Mint a browser CDP connection ~114
Return one single-use Ausca CDP relay URL for a ready lease. The URL expires after 60 seconds, only one CDP connection may be live, and no more than 64 unexpired tickets may coexist. Expired ticket records are compacted, so this is not a lifetime reconnect quota. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments. The upstream provider URL and credential are never disclosed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| idempotency_key | – | yes | – |
| session_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_browser_session_status Read browser-session lease status ~46
Return authoritative status and expiry for one browser-session lease. The lease capability is supplied by the transport and is never a tool argument or response field.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_id | – | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_cancel_invocation Request bounded cancellation ~43
Request bounded cancellation of one invocation. Cancellation is idempotent, may be refused, and may lose a race with terminal completion.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| invocation_id | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
ausca_extend_inbox Admit or replay one Agent Inbox Extension invocation ~129
Admit or replay one idempotent paid Agent Inbox Extension invocation when settlement authority is supplied by the host boundary. Only envelopes for the inbox.extend offer are admitted on this resource. Extension adds a supported increment to the observed current expiry, preserves the address and contents, requires an active inbox, and may not move prepaid expiry more than 30 days ahead.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| idempotency_key | string | yes | – |
| input | – | yes | – |
| input_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
| offer_id | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision_digest | – | yes | – |
| output_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
ausca_get_invocation Read authoritative invocation state ~41
Read the authoritative durable state, output commitment, and receipt reference for one invocation without creating a new purchase or retry identity.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| invocation_id | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
ausca_get_offer Resolve an active or pinned offer revision ~47
Resolve one active offer or an exact immutable revision, including the schema and revision digests required to construct a valid invocation envelope.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| offer_id | – | yes | – |
| revision_digest | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| offer | – | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ausca_lease_browser Admit or replay one Browser Session invocation ~93
Admit or replay one idempotent paid Browser Session invocation when settlement authority is supplied by the host boundary. Only envelopes for the browser.session offer are admitted on this resource.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| idempotency_key | string | yes | – |
| input | – | yes | – |
| input_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
| offer_id | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision_digest | – | yes | – |
| output_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
ausca_open_inbox Admit or replay one Agent Inbox invocation ~119
Admit or replay one idempotent paid Agent Inbox invocation when settlement authority is supplied by the host boundary. Only envelopes for the inbox.receive offer are admitted on this resource. The result starts a renewable inbox; while it remains active, inbox.extend can add a supported increment without changing its address or contents.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| idempotency_key | string | yes | – |
| input | – | yes | – |
| input_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
| offer_id | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision_digest | – | yes | – |
| output_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
ausca_prepare_invocation Validate invocation input and return binding terms ~86
Validate one exact invocation envelope and return immutable preparation terms or a typed refusal. Preparation never accepts payment material from model-authored tool arguments.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| idempotency_key | string | yes | – |
| input | – | yes | – |
| input_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
| offer_id | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision | – | yes | – |
| offer_revision_digest | – | yes | – |
| output_schema_digest | – | yes | – |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
ausca_search_offers Search immutable offers ~54
Search the current immutable Ausca offer catalog by free-text query. Returns stable offer identities and revision digests without creating product or payment state.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | – | – |
| limit | – | – | – |
| q | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| next_cursor | – | – | – |
| offers | array | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Ausca MCP server?
Ausca is a hosted endpoint at https://ausca.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · ausca.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-ausca-agent-services 'https://ausca.com/mcp'
What is the Ausca MCP server?
Ausca is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.ausca/agent-services. Pay-per-call APIs and MCP services for agents, no accounts or keys, with verifiable receipts. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://ausca.com/mcp).
Is the Ausca MCP server safe to use?
Ausca scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Ausca MCP server expose?
Ausca exposes 17 tools: ausca_agent_inbox_attachment, ausca_agent_inbox_delete, ausca_agent_inbox_messages, ausca_agent_inbox_read, ausca_agent_inbox_status, and 12 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,364 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Ausca MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Ausca without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Ausca MCP server still maintained?
Ausca is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.