AnchoredIP
REMOTE · API.ANCHOREDIP.COM · SCANNED SEP 24
Dedicated static outbound IPv4 over WireGuard. Free 7-day trial, no card, no sales call.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security66
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 8 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability69
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1562 tokens (~195/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage95
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 84% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "revoke_tunnel" implies "revoke" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the AnchoredIP MCP server?
AnchoredIP is a hosted endpoint at https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.anchoredip.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-anchoredip-anchoredip 'https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-anchoredip-anchoredip": {
"url": "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-anchoredip-anchoredip": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-anchoredip-anchoredip] url = "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-anchoredip-anchoredip": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-anchoredip-anchoredip --url 'https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-anchoredip-anchoredip:
url: "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/" {
"McpServers": {
"com-anchoredip-anchoredip": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-anchoredip-anchoredip -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-anchoredip-anchoredip": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Sept 26 +1
- DNSSEC: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 2 Sept 26 −1
- DNSSEC: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 1 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Aug 26 73
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 24 Sept 2026 · Probed https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=anchoredip.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 25 Jul 2026 | 23 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6d525b565c3691b6483c7485850489d5286 |
| SANs: anchoredip.com, api.anchoredip.com, www.anchoredip.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC secure
Validation of api.anchoredip.com. — Secure
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| anchoredip.com. | present | 5471 | 13 | Verified |
| api.anchoredip.com. | Verified address RRset verified with the apex keys |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/ | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/ | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/ |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_tunnel ~367
Provision a peer and return its WireGuard configuration. Three routing modes, and the right one depends on the machine. source (the default) sends only traffic from the leased address through us and leaves the default route alone — but it is written with wg-quick PostUp rules that invoke `ip`, so it runs on Linux under wg-quick and nowhere else. On macOS it aborts and deletes the interface. full works in every client but claims the default route, so it cannot run beside an always-on corporate VPN. destinations routes only the addresses you name. It needs no PostUp and takes no default route, so it runs in any client on any platform, and it matches what is usually being bought — one partner seeing a fixed address. It survives beside a VPN that installs a default route, but not one that captures traffic below the routing table. It cannot receive inbound connections from anywhere but those destinations.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | yes | Returned by order_lease. The only credential for a lease. |
| destinations | array | – | Addresses or ranges to route through the tunnel, like 203.0.113.10 or 203.0.113.0/24. Required with routing_mode=destinations and rejected without it. Ask the user which partner requires the address… |
| label | string | – | For the customer's own reference. |
| routing_mode | string | – | Defaults to source, which is Linux only. Use destinations when the machine is not a Linux server, or when only certain partners need to see the address. |
| transport | string | – | Defaults to wireguard. Use amneziawg where deep packet inspection blocks a plain WireGuard handshake; it needs an AmneziaWG client rather than wg-quick. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
lease_status ~51
Everything about one lease: whether it is active, which addresses it holds, its tunnels and when it renews.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | yes | Returned by order_lease. The only credential for a lease. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_plans ~33
The published catalogue with live prices and which payment methods each plan accepts. Prices are never hardcoded; read them here.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
order_lease ~109
Place an order. The trial plan is free and activates immediately; paid plans return payment details and stay pending until settled. No account or card is needed to order. A second trial for the same billing email is refused — order a paid plan instead, which needs no approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| billing_email | string | yes | – |
| country | string | yes | ISO 3166-1 alpha-2. |
| organization_name | string | yes | – |
| plan | string | yes | Slug from list_plans. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
renew_lease ~142
Raise an invoice for another term and keep the same addresses. This is how a trial becomes a paying customer: the address does not change, so whatever the customer's partner has already allowlisted goes on working. A trial cannot renew into itself, so name the plan to move to — called without one it returns the plans that can be moved to. Pressing it twice quotes the same reference rather than raising a second invoice.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | yes | Returned by order_lease. The only credential for a lease. |
| plan | string | – | Slug from list_plans. Defaults to the plan the lease is already on; required to leave a trial. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
revoke_tunnel ~118
Retire a peer and hand its slot back to the plan's allowance. An agent that provisions a tunnel per short-lived worker and never revokes one exhausts the allowance and then cannot bring the next machine up. Revoking the peer that holds the public address stops inbound connections to it and cannot be undone by promoting another — only by bringing a new machine up.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | yes | Returned by order_lease. The only credential for a lease. |
| tunnel_id | integer | yes | The id lease_status reports for the tunnel. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
set_autorenew ~117
Stop this lease charging the customer's card again, or start it again. Only a card subscription can be stopped — a bank transfer is a payment the customer sends us, so there is nothing of ours to cancel. Stopping is not a cancellation: the lease runs to the end of the period already paid for, and the same call turns it back on.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | yes | Returned by order_lease. The only credential for a lease. |
| enabled | boolean | yes | false stops the next charge, true resumes it. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
set_reverse_dns ~69
Publish a PTR record for an address on the lease. Live within a second; an empty hostname removes it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | yes | Returned by order_lease. The only credential for a lease. |
| address | string | yes | – |
| hostname | string | yes | Empty removes the record. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the AnchoredIP MCP server?
AnchoredIP is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.anchoredip/anchoredip. Dedicated static outbound IPv4 over WireGuard. Free 7-day trial, no card, no sales call. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.anchoredip.com/api/mcp/).
Is the AnchoredIP MCP server safe to use?
AnchoredIP scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the AnchoredIP MCP server expose?
AnchoredIP exposes 8 tools: list_plans, order_lease, lease_status, create_tunnel, revoke_tunnel, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,006 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the AnchoredIP MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to AnchoredIP without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the AnchoredIP MCP server still maintained?
AnchoredIP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 24 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.