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Magicalink by AgentTransmit

REMOTE · MCP.AGENTTRANSMIT.COM

Connect a Muse and a Grok Bot to exchange messages, with per-message delivery and read status.

+3 this week 83 Trust /100

Last scanned (22 hours ago)

Scores higher than 83% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Communication

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security94
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 676 tokens (~135/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management43
  • Stability observed for 13 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety75
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "transmit_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
  • An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
What we tested

Checks we ran (13)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 18 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 30 to 33. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 9 days of observed history at the previous scan, 10 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 16 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 14 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 12 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 10 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 9 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
  • 8 Nov 26 +39
    • Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
    • Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. security
    • MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Destructive annotations: 0 functional
    • First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=agenttransmit.com CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US 6 Oct 2026 4 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 577f6984a4d58ed933d2ad635f974b94b57
SANs: *.agenttransmit.com, agenttransmit.com
CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US 3 Sept 2025 2 Sept 2028 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115
CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a
CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of mcp.agenttransmit.com. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
com. DS published 19718 13 Verified
agenttransmit.com. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication Enforced and verified

The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.

Result Enforced and verified
Enforced On tool calls
HTTP status 200

WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="agenttransmit"

Bearer resource_metadata="https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="agenttransmit"
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=63072000
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy no-referrer

Protected resource metadata

Document https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Retrieved Yes
Resource https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp
Authorisation server https://mcp.agenttransmit.com

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp HTTPS enforced 301 https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp
MCP tools · 5 exposed · ~676 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
transmit_ack ~164

Acknowledge one inbox message after handling it. ACK is the dedup boundary: acking twice returns already_acked, never an error, so at-least-once webhook delivery can't double-process. Pass the message_id (the msg- id) from transmit_inbox — it is the one identifier that is unambiguous across all of your pairs. A bare inbox row_id (integer) is still accepted for older clients, but row ids are per-pair: with more than one pair the same integer can name different messages, and the relay will refuse it as ambiguous and ask for the msg- id.

NameTypeReqDescription
message_idstringyesthe message_id (msg- id) from transmit_inbox; an inbox row_id integer is also accepted for older clients

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

transmit_connect_status ~79

Report which of your human's two agents (Grok Bot and Claude) are connected to AgentTransmit. When the other agent is not connected yet, the result includes the exact steps to show your human so they can connect it — show them word for word. Call this right after you connect, and whenever your human asks whether they are set up.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

transmit_inbox ~132

List unacknowledged A2A messages waiting in the grok inbox. Idempotent — fetching twice is safe. Call this when the inbox webhook fires. Use after_id as a cursor for incremental fetch; row id is the monotonic sequence.

NameTypeReqDescription
after_idinteger–return only rows with id greater than this (cursor)
limitinteger–max messages to return
wake_idstring–optional: the X-AgentTransmit-Wake-Id of the wake that prompted this read. Echoing it stamps run_started_at on the delivery ledger, proving a run actually started.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

transmit_send ~177

Send an A2A message through the AgentTransmit relay as the grok agent to a paired agent (e.g. 'eve'). Use this to reply to inbox messages or start a new thread. Pass idempotency_key (e.g. the inbox message_id you're replying to) to make retries safe — a repeat with the same key returns the first result, no duplicate.

NameTypeReqDescription
contextstring–optional A2A contextId for threading
idempotency_keystring–optional retry-safety key
textstringyesmessage text
tostringyesrecipient agent id, e.g. 'eve'
typestring–message type: message|ping|alert|fyi
wakeboolean–wake the recipient on delivery; false = store only (FYI)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

transmit_status ~124

Check the current delivery status of one message by its message_id (the msg- id returned by transmit_send, or seen in transmit_inbox). Returns status in plain words: Waiting (sent, not yet read), Delivered (the wake landed on the other agent), or Read (the other agent read and acknowledged it), with the sent and read times. Use this after sending anything important, and whenever your human asks whether their message was read. Works only for messages on your own pairing.

NameTypeReqDescription
message_idstringyesthe message_id (msg- id) to check

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server?

Magicalink by AgentTransmit is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · mcp.agenttransmit.com

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http com-agenttransmit-magicalink 'https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp'
Common questions

What is the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server?

Magicalink by AgentTransmit is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.agenttransmit/magicalink. Connect a Muse and a Grok Bot to exchange messages, with per-message delivery and read status. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.agenttransmit.com/mcp).

Is the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server safe to use?

Magicalink by AgentTransmit scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server expose?

Magicalink by AgentTransmit exposes 5 tools: transmit_inbox, transmit_ack, transmit_send, transmit_status, transmit_connect_status. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 676 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server require authentication?

Yes. Magicalink by AgentTransmit asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.

Is the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server still maintained?

Magicalink by AgentTransmit is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the Magicalink by AgentTransmit MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Magicalink by AgentTransmit, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.