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AgentAvow Trust

PYPI · AGENTAVOW-TRUST · 2 COMPONENTS

Signed, offline-verifiable safety scores for the MCP servers, packages & tools an agent connects to

−3 this week 72 Trust /100

Last scanned (11 hours ago)

Scores higher than 69% of PyPI servers

Category Security

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security100
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
  • 0 of 13 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency19
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 540 tokens (~67/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management80
  • Stability observed for 24 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage89
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 67% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 5 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 4 Nov 26 −4
    • Stability: pass → 0.77 functional
  • 29 Oct 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 28 Oct 26 −1
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 22 Oct 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 21 Oct 26 −1
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 17 Oct 26 +3
    • Stability: 0.80 → pass security
  • 16 Oct 26 −3
    • Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/agentavow-trust@0.6.1

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem pypi
Reason No attestation published

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Install scripts 1 script
Hook Tier Command
build_backend allowlisted hatchling.build

Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →

Dependencies 13 packages
Packages resolved 13
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 8 exposed · ~414 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
about_agentavow ~30

What AgentAvow checks, which tool to use for what, and how to read a verdict.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

check_interaction_safety ~57

Check whether it's safe to perform a given interaction (delegate/trade/…) with an agent.

NameTypeReqDescription
interaction_typestring–e.g. delegate, trade, collaborate, follow.
target_entity_idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_trust_badge ~37

Get a shields-style trust badge (SVG URL + README markdown) for an agent identity.

NameTypeReqDescription
entity_idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

lookup_identity ~34

Resolve a DID (did:web:… / did:key:…) or search agents by name.

NameTypeReqDescription
querystringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

scan_mcp_server ~63

Scan a live MCP server by its https URL — checks the tool definitions for poisoning / prompt-injection — signed verdict.

NameTypeReqDescription
endpoint_urlstringyesThe MCP server's https URL.
forceboolean–Bypass the cache and re-scan.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

scan_package ~93

Scan a published npm / PyPI / crates / Docker / Hugging Face package for a signed 0-100 trust score and a safe / needs-review verdict.

NameTypeReqDescription
forceboolean–Bypass the cache and re-scan.
namestringyesPackage name.
registrystring–npm | pypi | crates | docker | huggingface (aliases like python/rust/hf accepted).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

scan_repo ~67

Scan a public GitHub repo ('owner/name') for a signed 0-100 trust score and a plain safe / needs-review verdict before connecting.

NameTypeReqDescription
forceboolean–Bypass the cache and re-scan.
repostringyesGitHub repo as 'owner/name'.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

verify_trust ~33

Resolve an agent identity and return its current trust score before you delegate to it.

NameTypeReqDescription
entity_idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the AgentAvow Trust MCP server?

AgentAvow Trust runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx agentavow-trust. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

pypi · agentavow-trust

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add com-agentavow-agentavow-trust -- uvx agentavow-trust
Common questions

What is the AgentAvow Trust MCP server?

AgentAvow Trust is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.agentavow/agentavow-trust. Signed, offline-verifiable safety scores for the MCP servers, packages & tools an agent connects to. This page covers its PyPI package (agentavow-trust).

Is the AgentAvow Trust MCP server safe to use?

AgentAvow Trust scores 72 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 5 November 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the AgentAvow Trust MCP server expose?

AgentAvow Trust exposes 8 tools: scan_repo, scan_package, scan_mcp_server, verify_trust, check_interaction_safety, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 414 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the AgentAvow Trust MCP server still maintained?

AgentAvow Trust is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the AgentAvow Trust MCP server under?

AgentAvow Trust declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.