Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation
REMOTE · PRIVI-LEDGER-AQE5.ONRENDER.COM
Evaluation-only ledger MCP. Temporary storage; not durable audit evidence. Payments disabled.
Available components
Last scanned (16 hours ago)
Scores higher than 51% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (passport_revoke). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 13497 tokens (~99/item across 136 items; 136 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management20
- Stability observed for 6 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 94% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (6% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 12 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 137 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 15 Nov 26 64
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=onrender.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 19 Nov 2026 | 17 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 8d72a13c2c41648513b9d014eb5e0339 |
| SANs: onrender.com, *.onrender.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| onrender.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
agent_proof_verify Verify signed AI-agent authorization and execution evidence ~108
Verify that two independently signed records agree on one authorized, completed action. $0.01 USDC via x402 per successful verification. Does not independently prove real-world execution or key ownership.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| acknowledgment | object | yes | Separately signed executor acknowledgment binding the authorization digest |
| authorization | object | yes | Ed25519-signed policy decision envelope; hashes and identifiers only |
| trusted_keys | object | yes | Out-of-band pinned policy and executor Ed25519 public keys; never private keys |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ai_act_check AI Act: compliance check ~73
What a customer's due-diligence or a regulator would flag today: prohibited practices, incomplete Article 5 screens, obligations already in force without evidence (critical), obligations due within 180 days (medium), upcoming high-risk duties, and high-risk systems with no recent log. Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ai_act_export AI Act: export sealed register ~57
Export your AI Act register as JSON to hand to customers, auditors or regulators, with its SHA-256 sealed on chain so anyone can prove it was not edited afterwards (check with ai_act_verify_export). Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ai_act_register AI Act: your register ~45
Your EU AI Act register: each AI system's current record, tier and applicable obligations. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| system_id | – | – | One system; omit for all |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ai_act_system_save AI Act: register an AI system ~512
Add or update an AI system in your company's EU AI Act register. Privi screens it against the Article 5 bans, classifies it (prohibited / high-risk / transparency / general-purpose / minimal), and lists the obligations that apply to your role with their dates. Every change is versioned and written to your tamper-evident 'ai-act' log. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who is making the change (person or agent) |
| merge | boolean | – | Merge into the existing record (true) or replace it (false) |
| system | object | yes | AI system record. Required: system_id. Recommended: name, owner, role (provider|deployer|provider_and_deployer|importer|distributor), intended_purpose, used_in_eu, vendor_name. Risk flags: annex_iii_… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ai_act_verify_export AI Act: verify a register ~61
Check that an AI Act register a supplier or partner sent you is exactly what they exported from Privi, and return its on-chain seal. Free; no key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| register_json | string | yes | The exact register_json a company shared with you |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_cancel Approvals: cancel ~48
Withdraw an approval request (or revoke an approval not yet used). Your key cannot approve, only cancel. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approval_id | string | yes | apr_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_list Approvals: list yours ~36
Your organization's approval requests, newest first. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | – | – | pending, approved, denied, expired or cancelled |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_policy_set Approvals: set a live-approval threshold ~94
Make mandate_spend pause for a human on large payments: any payment over the threshold creates an approval request that the mandate's principal must sign with their wallet before the agent can spend. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approve_over_usdc | – | – | Payments above this need a live human approval; omit to remove the rule |
| stream_id | string | yes | The agent (stream), or '*' for all of them |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_request Approvals: ask a human ~235
Ask a human to approve (or deny) an action. Returns approve_url for them: they read the request and sign with their wallet (free, no transaction). Your agent then calls approval_wait, or watches your live channel for approval.approved. Only the named wallet can decide; your API key can only cancel. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | Plain-English action the human is approving, e.g. 'Wire 4,800 USDC to Acme for invoice 1042' |
| amount_usdc | – | – | Amount, if money is involved |
| approver_wallet | – | – | 0x wallet of the human who decides (if no mandate_id) |
| mandate_id | – | – | mdt_... : the mandate's principal decides |
| payee | string | – | Payee address or domain, if money is involved |
| reason | string | – | Why the agent wants to do this |
| reference | string | – | Invoice or order reference |
| stream_id | string | yes | The agent asking |
| ttl_s | integer | – | Seconds the request stays open (60-86400) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_status Approvals: check one ~49
Status of an approval request: pending, approved, denied, expired or cancelled, with the human's wallet signature once they decide. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approval_id | string | yes | apr_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_wait Approvals: wait for the human ~68
Block until the human decides (or timeout_s passes). Returns the current status; if still pending, call again. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approval_id | string | yes | apr_... ID |
| timeout_s | integer | – | How long to wait (1-55 seconds); call again to keep waiting |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
control_evidence Control: record that it was done ~123
Record that a control was performed, with the fingerprint of the evidence (screenshot, export, report). Hash-chained, so evidence cannot be back-dated after the fact without it showing. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| control_id | string | yes | – |
| document_sha256 | string | yes | SHA-256 fingerprint of the document (64 hex characters); the file stays with you |
| note | string | – | – |
| performed_at | – | – | When it was done (ISO 8601). Default: now |
| performed_by | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
control_save Control: add or update ~142
Add a recurring control (access review, backup restore test, vendor review) to your calendar. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who is doing this (person or agent) |
| control_id | string | yes | Your short ID, e.g. backup-restore-test |
| every_days | integer | yes | How often it must be done, in days (90 = quarterly) |
| owner | string | yes | Who is responsible |
| reference | string | – | Framework reference, e.g. SOC 2 CC6.2 or ISO 27001 A.8.13 |
| retired | boolean | – | – |
| title | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
controls_due Control: what is due ~49
Your control calendar: overdue, never done, due soon and current, each with its last evidence. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| soon_days | integer | – | Flag controls due within this many days |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fortress_keys Fortress keys ~56
Privi's public signing keys: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-87 (NIST FIPS 204, CNSA 2.0 post-quantum). Pin these to verify Privi signatures offline. Free.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
fortress_tpi_execute Execute an authorized action ~47
Consume a two-person authorization right before performing the action. Single use; refused unless authorized. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| request_id | string | yes | tpi_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fortress_tpi_list List two-person requests ~22
Your organization's two-person requests. Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fortress_tpi_policy Set a two-person policy ~97
Define a Two-Person Integrity policy: which officers can approve, and how many distinct approvals an action needs. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | Policy name, e.g. 'treasury-transfers' |
| officer_wallets | array | yes | 0x wallets of the officers who may approve (at least 2) |
| required | integer | yes | Approvals needed (2..number of officers) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fortress_tpi_request Request two-person approval ~129
Ask officers to authorize a sensitive action under a two-person policy. Returns approve_url for the officers; each signs with their wallet. Do not act until fortress_tpi_status shows 'authorized', then call fortress_tpi_execute. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| details | – | – | Exact parameters; their hash is what officers sign |
| hours | integer | – | Hours until the request expires (1-168) |
| policy | string | yes | Policy name |
| stream_id | string | yes | The agent asking |
| summary | string | yes | Exactly what will be done, in plain words |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fortress_tpi_status Two-person status ~47
Status of a two-person request (pending, authorized, vetoed, expired, executed) and who approved. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| request_id | string | yes | tpi_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gateway_create Gateway: protect and meter an MCP server ~244
Put your MCP server behind Privi. You get an HTTP URL and a WebSocket URL that forward to it unchanged (x402 payments keep working) while Privi rate-limits callers, optionally requires a Privi Passport, meters every tool call and writes each call to your tamper-evident log. The kill switch stops the gateway instantly. Upstream must be public HTTPS. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| guard | string | – | Privi Guard on every tool result: off, tag (add the verdict in _meta) or block (withhold injected results). Each check uses your Guard allowance or credits |
| min_score | integer | – | 0 = open to everyone. >0 = callers must prove a KYA wallet whose Passport scores at least this (0-1000) |
| name | string | yes | A name for this gateway, e.g. 'acme-search-mcp' |
| rate_per_min | integer | – | Requests per minute per caller (1-1200) |
| upstream_url | string | yes | The MCP server's public https URL (streamable HTTP), e.g. https://api.acme.com/mcp |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gateway_delete Gateway: delete ~44
Turn a gateway off. Its URLs stop working at once; history stays in your log. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| gw_id | string | yes | gw_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gateway_info Gateway: info ~47
Public description of a gateway: where it forwards, whether callers need a Passport, its rate limit and its call counts. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| gw_id | string | yes | gw_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gateway_list Gateway: your gateways ~18
Your organization's gateways. Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gateway_set_guard Gateway: Guard mode ~101
Turn Privi Guard on for every tool result that passes through your gateway: tag adds the verdict and a receipt id in result._meta['privi/guard']; block also replaces injected results with an error before your agents see them. Each result is one Guard check (free allowance, then credits). Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| gw_id | string | yes | gw_... ID |
| mode | string | yes | off | tag | block |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gateway_stats Gateway: usage ~53
Calls, errors, denials and x402 payment prompts per tool and per day for one of your gateways, plus your monthly quota. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| gw_id | string | yes | gw_... ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_ai_inventory AI use case inventory ~44
Your agency's AI use case inventory: the current version of each record. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| use_case_id | – | – | One use case; omit for all |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_ai_inventory_check Check inventory readiness ~94
Flags what an OMB M-25-21 review would flag before you submit: missing required fields, PII without a Privacy Impact Assessment, and high-impact AI in pilot or deployment missing any minimum risk practice (testing, impact assessment, independent review, monitoring, operator training, fail-safe, appeals, public feedback) or without a recently active activity log as monitoring evidence. Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_ai_inventory_export Export public inventory ~89
Machine-readable CSV of your publicly releasable AI use cases (for publishing at agency.gov/ai), with its SHA-256 sealed on chain (Base, until the Privi chain mainnet) so the published file can be proven unaltered. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| include_withheld | boolean | – | Include use cases marked withhold_from_public (internal copy) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_ai_usecase_save Save an AI use case ~273
Add or update an entry in your agency's AI use case inventory (OMB M-25-21). Every change creates a new version and is written to your tamper-evident 'ai-inventory' log. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who is making the change (person or agent) |
| merge | boolean | – | Merge into the existing record (true) or replace it (false) |
| use_case | object | yes | AI use case record in OMB M-25-21 reporting fields. Required: use_case_id, name, stage (pre_deployment|pilot|deployed|retired), high_impact, purpose, outputs, sourcing (in_house|vendor|both), involve… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_ai_verify_export Verify a published inventory ~57
Check that a published AI inventory file is exactly what the agency exported from Privi Ledger, and return its on-chain seal. Free; no key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| csv_text | string | yes | The exact CSV file contents as published |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_pqc_classify Classify an algorithm ~115
Classify cryptographic algorithms as quantum-vulnerable (RSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, DSA, MQV), post-quantum (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), hybrid, symmetric/hash, or unknown. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algorithms | array | yes | Algorithm or cipher-suite names, e.g. 'RSA-2048', 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM', 'X25519MLKEM768' |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_pqc_export Export sealed CBOM and plan ~63
Export the full cryptographic inventory (CBOM) and migration plan as one JSON document for OMB, the CIO or auditors, with its SHA-256 sealed on chain (Base, until the Privi chain mainnet). Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_pqc_inventory Crypto inventory ~36
Current cryptographic inventory of your systems. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| system_id | – | – | One system; omit for all |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_pqc_plan Post-quantum migration plan ~105
Prioritized post-quantum migration plan: every quantum-vulnerable asset ranked (High Value Assets, high-impact systems and long-lived sensitive data first; key establishment before signatures), with its deadline (key establishment Dec 31 2030, signatures Dec 31 2031), recommended NIST replacement, progress metrics, and findings (missed deadlines, TLS below 1.3, no target dates, unrecognized algorithms). Requires the organization API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_pqc_system_save Save a system's crypto inventory ~202
Record the cryptographic inventory (CBOM) of one system for post-quantum migration. Every change creates a new version and is written to the agency's tamper-evident 'pqc-inventory' log. Scanners and agents can submit results directly. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who made the change (person, scanner or agent) |
| system | object | yes | System record: system_id, name, bureau, owner, high_value_asset, high_impact, sensitive_until_year, fedramp_cloud, notes, assets [{asset_id, kind (key_establishment|signature|encryption|symmetric|has… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gov_pqc_verify_export Verify a CBOM export ~58
Check that a CBOM and migration-plan document is exactly what was exported from Privi Ledger and return its on-chain seal. Free; no key needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| document | object | yes | The 'document' object exactly as exported |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
guard_balance Guard: balance ~24
Your free checks left this month and your prepaid credits. Needs the organization key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
guard_buy_credits Guard: buy check credits ~92
Buy prepaid Privi Guard checks in USDC on Base via x402. Credits never expire and are used after the free monthly allowance. Needs the organization key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| pack | string | yes | 1k = 1,000 checks for 7 USDC; 10k = 10,000 for 50 USDC; 100k = 100,000 for 300 USDC |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
guard_check Guard: check text before acting on it or sending it ~216
Check content for prompt injection (inbound) or leaked secrets and personal data (outbound) before an agent acts on it or sends it. Returns allow / warn / block, the findings, a redacted copy for outbound secrets, and an Ed25519-signed receipt anchored on-chain, which proves the check happened. Privi does not store the text. Free for 1,000 checks a month with an organization key; otherwise 1 cent per check in USDC via x402.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| direction | string | – | inbound = untrusted content coming in (prompt injection, hidden instructions); outbound = content going out (API keys, card numbers, data smuggled in URLs) |
| source | – | – | Optional label for the receipt, e.g. the page URL or tool name |
| text | string | yes | The content to check: a web page, email, document or tool result the agent is about to act on (inbound), or what the agent is about to send (outbound) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
guard_check_many Guard: check many texts at once ~88
Check up to 50 texts in one call (for example every tool result in a step). Each item is billed as its own check against your free allowance or credits and gets its own receipt. Needs an organization key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | array | yes | Up to 50 items {"text": "...", "direction": "inbound"|"outbound", "source": "optional label"} |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
guard_pricing Guard: pricing and how it works ~26
What Privi Guard checks, what it costs, and how receipts work. Free.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
guard_receipt Guard: verify a receipt ~62
Verify a Privi Guard receipt: the signed body, signature validity and its Merkle proof into the anchored transparency log. Free; anyone holding the id can verify it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| check_id | string | yes | gc_... id from a guard_check receipt |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incident_close Incident: close and seal the report ~91
Close an incident and get a sealed post-incident report (timeline, deadlines met or missed, root cause) whose SHA-256 is anchored on chain, ready for customers, insurers or regulators. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who is doing this (person or agent) |
| incident_id | string | yes | – |
| root_cause | string | yes | Root cause and fix |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incident_open Incident: open and start the clocks ~233
Open a security or operations incident. Privi starts the notification clocks for the rules you pick (GDPR 72 hours, NIS2 24 hours / 72 hours / one month, SEC four business days, your contract's hours) and writes the incident to your tamper-evident 'incidents' log. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who is doing this (person or agent) |
| aware_at | – | – | When you became aware (ISO 8601). Default: now |
| contract_hours | – | – | Hours your customer contracts give you to notify them |
| material_at | – | – | SEC only: when you decided the incident was material |
| regimes | – | – | Notification rules that may apply: gdpr = EU GDPR Article 33 (personal data breach); nis2 = EU NIS2 Article 23 (significant incident); sec_8k = US SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 (material cybersecurity incid… |
| severity | string | yes | low|medium|high|critical |
| title | string | yes | What happened, in a sentence |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incident_status Incident: status and deadlines ~57
Where an incident stands: each notification deadline, hours left or overdue, and the timeline. Omit incident_id for a list of your incidents. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| incident_id | – | – | One incident; omit to list all |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incident_update Incident: add an update ~136
Add a timestamped update to an open incident, and optionally mark a notification as made. Each update is hash-chained, so the timeline cannot be rewritten later. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Who is doing this (person or agent) |
| completed_step | – | – | A notification you just made, e.g. gdpr.authority_notification, nis2.early_warning, sec_8k.form_8k, contract.notify |
| incident_id | string | yes | – |
| material_at | – | – | SEC only: set when materiality is decided |
| note | string | yes | What was found or done |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
kya_bind_wallet KYA: bind a wallet ~144
Step 2: bind the wallet to your organization's Privi Passport so its transactions pass KYA checks. With a wallet signature the binding is *proven*; without one it is only *declared* (most checkers require proven). Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x wallet address |
| challenge_id | – | – | From kya_challenge |
| label | string | – | Friendly name, e.g. 'treasury-agent hot wallet' |
| signature | – | – | 65-byte hex signature of the challenge message by the wallet |
| stream_id | – | – | The agent (stream) that uses this wallet; omit for the whole organization |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
kya_challenge KYA: challenge for a wallet ~65
Step 1 of binding a wallet to your Privi Passport: get a message to sign with that wallet (EIP-191 personal_sign). Valid 30 minutes. Requires the organization API key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x wallet address your agent controls |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server?
Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation is a hosted endpoint at https://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com
claude mcp add --transport http canoydario847-cloud-privi-ledger 'https://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp'
What is the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server?
Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.canoydario847-cloud/privi-ledger. Evaluation-only ledger MCP. Temporary storage; not durable audit evidence. Payments disabled. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://privi-ledger-aqe5.onrender.com/mcp).
Is the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server safe to use?
Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation scores 66 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server expose?
Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation exposes 136 tools: privi_token_market, ledger_pricing, ledger_check_receipt, ledger_audit_stream, agent_proof_verify, and 131 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 12,073 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server still maintained?
Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Privi Ledger — Recovery Evaluation, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.