ca.swiftsign/mcp
REMOTE · SWIFTSIGN.CA · SCANNED SEP 20
E-signatures for agents: mint a sandbox key, send PDFs, track status, download the sealed result.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (swiftsign_send_envelope). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1020 tokens (~102/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 3 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the ca.swiftsign/mcp server?
ca.swiftsign/mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://swiftsign.ca/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · swiftsign.ca
claude mcp add --transport http ca-swiftsign-mcp 'https://swiftsign.ca/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"ca-swiftsign-mcp": {
"url": "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"ca-swiftsign-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.ca-swiftsign-mcp] url = "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"ca-swiftsign-mcp": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add ca-swiftsign-mcp --url 'https://swiftsign.ca/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
ca-swiftsign-mcp:
url: "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"ca-swiftsign-mcp": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add ca-swiftsign-mcp -t streamable-http -u 'https://swiftsign.ca/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"ca-swiftsign-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://swiftsign.ca/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 26 Aug 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 24 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Jul 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://swiftsign.ca/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=swiftsign.ca | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 8 Sept 2026 | 7 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 565b0e2d2dd90a6968c0207880724a5be31 |
| SANs: swiftsign.ca | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of swiftsign.ca. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ca. | present | 26384 | 13 | Verified |
| swiftsign.ca. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://js.stripe.com; worker-src 'self' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://*.r2.cloudflarestorage.com; connect-src 'self' blob: https://api.stripe.com https://*.sentry.io https://*.upstash.io; frame-src https://js.stripe.com https://checkout.stripe.com https://billing.stripe.com; form-action 'self' https://checkout.stripe.com; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://swiftsign.ca/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://swiftsign.ca/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://swiftsign.ca/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
swiftsign_check_status ~53
Check the status of an envelope — who signed, who hasn't, download links. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelopeId | string | yes | The envelope ID to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_confirm_send ~81
Dispatch a DRAFT envelope — use after a human has reviewed an envelope that swiftsign_send_envelope or swiftsign_send_from_template returned as draft_pending_confirmation. This emails the signers. Does NOT work on envelopes already SENT/COMPLETED/VOIDED.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelopeId | string | yes | The DRAFT envelope ID to dispatch |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_create_embedded_url ~100
Mint a short-lived embedded signing URL for a recipient (30-minute expiry). Returns a url to embed plus its expiresAt. The envelope must already be SENT. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelopeId | string | yes | The envelope ID |
| recipientId | string | yes | The recipient ID within that envelope |
| returnUrl | string | – | URL to redirect the signer to after they finish |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_download_signed_pdf ~163
Download the completed, sealed PDF (or its Certificate of Completion) for an envelope. Only works once status is COMPLETED — run swiftsign_check_status first. Does NOT work on DRAFT or SENT envelopes; nothing has been signed yet on those.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| certificate | boolean | – | If true, download the Certificate of Completion (audit trail) instead of the signed document |
| document | number | – | Which document to download when an envelope has several (0-based, default 0) |
| envelopeId | string | yes | The envelope ID (must be COMPLETED) |
| outputPath | string | – | Where to save the file (default: ./swiftsign-<id>.pdf). Ignored on the hosted endpoint, which returns base64. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_list_envelopes ~45
List envelopes (sent documents) with their status. Scoped to your key's mode — sandbox (sk_test_) keys see test envelopes, live keys see live.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_list_templates ~38
List your saved templates. Scoped to your key's mode — sandbox (sk_test_) keys see test templates, live keys see live.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_send_envelope ~229
Send a document for e-signature. Accepts PDF as base64, recipients, and field placement. Sandbox keys (sk_test_) send immediately (watermarked test mail). LIVE keys create a DRAFT and return it for human review unless confirm: true — nothing is emailed until confirmed. Field placement: page+x+y (percent, top-left origin) OR an anchor string, not both. After everyone signs, retrieve the sealed PDF with swiftsign_download_signed_pdf.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm | boolean | – | Set true to dispatch immediately on a LIVE key (sk_live_/sk_oat_). Without it, live envelopes are created as DRAFT and returned for human review before anything is emailed. Test keys (sk_test_) alway… |
| documents | array | yes | PDF documents to send |
| fields | array | yes | Signing fields to place on documents |
| message | string | – | Optional message to include |
| recipients | array | yes | People who need to sign or receive a copy |
| subject | string | yes | Email subject / document title |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_send_from_template ~170
Send an envelope from a saved template by assigning signers to roles. Sandbox keys (sk_test_) send immediately; LIVE keys create a DRAFT for human review unless confirm: true — nothing is emailed until confirmed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm | boolean | – | Set true to dispatch immediately on a LIVE key (sk_live_/sk_oat_). Without it, live envelopes are created as DRAFT and returned for human review before anything is emailed. Test keys (sk_test_) alway… |
| message | string | – | Optional message to include |
| roleAssignments | object | yes | Map of template role name → signer { name, email } |
| subject | string | – | Email subject / document title |
| templateId | string | yes | The template ID to send from |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_upgrade ~81
Initiate the upgrade to PRO ($15/mo flat). Returns a Stripe checkout_url that a human opens once to add a card — agents cannot complete the payment themselves. Moves the account from sandbox (sk_test_) to live sends. Returns status 'updated' if already on the plan.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| plan | string | – | Plan to upgrade to (default PRO) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
swiftsign_void_envelope ~60
Cancel/void an envelope that hasn't been completed yet. Signers can no longer sign a voided envelope. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelopeId | string | yes | The envelope ID to void |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the ca.swiftsign/mcp server?
ca.swiftsign/mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as ca.swiftsign/mcp. E-signatures for agents: mint a sandbox key, send PDFs, track status, download the sealed result. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://swiftsign.ca/mcp).
Is the ca.swiftsign/mcp server safe to use?
ca.swiftsign/mcp scores 82 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ca.swiftsign/mcp server expose?
ca.swiftsign/mcp exposes 10 tools: swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send, swiftsign_send_from_template, swiftsign_check_status, swiftsign_list_envelopes, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,020 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ca.swiftsign/mcp server require authentication?
No. We connected to ca.swiftsign/mcp without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ca.swiftsign/mcp server still maintained?
ca.swiftsign/mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.